scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
Author

A. H. T. Levi

Bio: A. H. T. Levi is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Passions. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 41 citations.
Topics: Passions

Papers
More filters

Cited by
More filters
Book
01 Jan 1972
TL;DR: In "Probability and evidence", one of Britain's foremost twentieth-century philosophers addresses central questions in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of science as discussed by the authors, including the question "Has Harrod Answered Hume?" and "The Problem of Conditionals".
Abstract: In "Probability and Evidence," one of Britain's foremost twentieth-century philosophers addresses central questions in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of science. This book contains A.J. Ayer's John Dewey Lectures delivered at Columbia University, together with two additional essays, "Has Harrod Answered Hume?" and "The Problem of Conditionals."

363 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is contended that Descartes put forth what may reasonably be called a ‘psychology’ of the unensouled animal body and, correspondingly, of the human body when the soul does not intervene, and its ‘machine psychology’ is examined.

79 citations

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 2000
TL;DR: In this sense, all the major philosophers of the seventeenth century, with the possible exception of Malebranche, were determinists as mentioned in this paper, and each of them was a compatibilist with respect to freedom and determination: each held that being free is logically compatible with being causally determined.
Abstract: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND Determinism, broadly speaking, is the doctrine that whatever happens in the world is brought about by causes other than itself. In this sense, all the major philosophers of the seventeenth century – with the possible exception of Male-branche – were determinists. But these same philosophers also believed in human freedom. It follows that each of them (again, perhaps excepting Malebranche) was a compatibilist with respect to freedom and determination: each held that being free is logically compatible with being causally determined. Yet their specific teachings on this subject are very different from one another. For they had very different views on the nature and scope of human freedom, and different conceptions of causation. This chapter concentrates on the teachings of these major figures: Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Locke, and Leibniz. There were, of course, other seventeenth-century thinkers who concerned themselves with freedom and determinism – this was one of the most frequently debated issues of the age. And some of these others, in opposition to the philosophers, were incompatibilists. They held that an action logically cannot both be causally determined and be free, in any proper sense of ‘free’. An incompatibilist has two options: adhere to determination and deny that anything or anyone is free (this is hard determinism) or admit free actions and claim that these are undetermined, and thereby reject the doctrine of determinism (this is libertarianism). We know of no seventeenth-century thinker who took the hard determinist position, but quite a few were libertarians.

68 citations

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 2000

66 citations

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1998

43 citations