Author
Adrian J. T. Alsmith
Other affiliations: École Normale Supérieure, University of Barcelona, University of Copenhagen
Bio: Adrian J. T. Alsmith is an academic researcher from School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences. The author has contributed to research in topics: Illusion & Consciousness. The author has an hindex of 8, co-authored 19 publications receiving 377 citations. Previous affiliations of Adrian J. T. Alsmith include École Normale Supérieure & University of Barcelona.
Topics: Illusion, Consciousness, Virtual reality, Body schema, Torso
Papers
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TL;DR: A preliminary synthesis of the data on bodily self-consciousness and its neural correlates is provided, suggesting that at least two of these components-body ownership and self-location-are implemented in rather distinct neural substrates, located in the premotor cortex and in the temporo-parietal junction.
193 citations
TL;DR: The results suggest that while the experienced self is not spread out homogeneously across the entire body, nor is it localised in any single point, two distinct regions appear to be judged as where "I" am.
60 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body representations, and distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put weight on the explanatory role of the body itself or body representations.
Abstract: Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of representation depend so closely upon the body that their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction of this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body representations, which remain too often neglected or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put weight on the explanatory role of the body itself or body representations. We further analyse how and to what extent body representations can be said to be embodied. Finally, we give an overview of the full volume articulated around foundational issues (How should we define the notion of embodiment? To what extent and in what sense is embodiment compatible with representationalism? To what extent and in what sense are sensorimotor approaches similar to behaviourism?) and their applications in several cognitive domains (perception, concepts, selfhood, social cognition).
57 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the body schema and the body image representations are co-constructed, and a model on which these two forms of representation modify one another is proposed, and theoretical options for the way in which they might do so.
49 citations
TL;DR: For instance, this paper found that participants pointed most often to the upper torso, followed by the (upper) face, while using a physical pointer, in a body template task where participants pointed at themselves on a simple body outline.
Abstract: It is currently not well understood whether people experience themselves to be located in one or more specific part(s) of their body. Virtual reality (VR) is increasingly used as a tool to study aspects of bodily perception and self-consciousness, due to its strong experimental control and ease in manipulating multi-sensory aspects of bodily experience. To investigate where people self-locate in their body within virtual reality, we asked participants to point directly at themselves with a virtual pointer, in a VR headset. In previous work employing a physical pointer, participants mainly located themselves in the upper face and upper torso. In this study, using a VR headset, participants mainly located themselves in the upper face. In an additional body template task where participants pointed at themselves on a picture of a simple body outline, participants pointed most often to the upper torso, followed by the (upper) face. These results raise the question as to whether head-mounted virtual reality might alter where people locate themselves making them more “head-centred”.
24 citations
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1,205 citations
Journal Article•
787 citations
TL;DR: This work proposes that BSC includes body-centered perception (hand, face, and trunk), based on the integration of proprioceptive, vestibular, and visual bodily inputs, and involves spatio-temporal mechanisms integrating multisensory bodily stimuli within peripersonal space (PPS).
475 citations
TL;DR: The brain is an organ for prediction error minimization (PEM) as mentioned in this paper, and the brain is essentially self-evident in the sense that it is able to identify an evidentiary boundary between the brain and its environment.
Abstract: An exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization (PEM). This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications. Here, I assume the theory, briefly explain it, and then I argue that PEM implies that the brain is essentially self-evidencing. This means it is imperative to identify an evidentiary boundary between the brain and its environment. This boundary defines the mind-world relation, opens the door to skepticism, and makes the mind transpire as more inferentially secluded and neurocentrically skull-bound than many would nowadays think. Therefore, PEM somewhat deflates contemporary hypotheses that cognition is extended, embodied and enactive; however, it can nevertheless accommodate the kinds of cases that fuel these hypotheses.
395 citations