I TRUTH 1 Aristotle on the Law of Non-Contradiction 2 Theories of Truth 3 Trivialism II NEGATION 4 Contradiction 5 Boolean Negation 6 Denial and Rejection III RATIONALITY 7 Rational Belief 8 Belief Revision 9 Consistency and the Empirical Sciences IV LOGIC 10 Logic and Revisability 11 Validity 12 Logical Pluralism

Doubt truth to be a liar

Physics should have helped us to realise that a temporal theory of a phenomenon X is, in general, more than a simple combination of two components: the statics of X and the ordered set of temporal instants. The case in which all functions from times to world-states are allowed is uninteresting; there are too many such functions, and the theory has not begun until we have begun to restrict them. And often the principles that emerge from the interaction of time with the phenomena seem new and surprising. The most dramatic example of this, perhaps, is the interaction of space with time in relativistic space-time.

Combinations of Tense and Modality

The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy comprises over fifty specially commissioned essays by experts on the philosophy of this period. Starting in the late eighth century, with the renewal of learning some centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire, a sequence of chapters takes the reader through developments in many and varied fields, including logic and language, natural philosophy, ethics, metaphysics, and theology. Close attention is paid to the context of medieval philosophy, with discussions of the rise of the universities and developments in the cultural and linguistic spheres. A striking feature is the continuous coverage of Islamic, Jewish, and Christian material. There are useful biographies of the philosophers, and a comprehensive bibliography. The volumes illuminate a rich and remarkable period in the history of philosophy and will be the authoritative source on medieval philosophy for the next generation of scholars and students alike.

The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy

Apart from using our eyes to see and our ears to hear, we regularly and effortlessly perform a number of complex perceptual operations that cannot be explained in terms of the five senses taken individually. Such operations include, for example, perceiving that the same object is white and sweet, noticing the difference between white and sweet, or knowing that one's senses are active. Observing that lower animals must be able to perform such operations, and being unprepared to ascribe any share in rationality to them, Aristotle explained such operations with reference to a higher-order perceptual capacity which unites and monitors the five senses. This capacity is known as the 'common sense' or sensus communis. Unfortunately, Aristotle provides only scattered and opaque references to this capacity. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the exact nature and functions of this capacity have been a matter of perennial controversy. Pavel Gregoric offers an extensive and compelling treatment of the Aristotelian conception of the common sense, which has become part and parcel of Western psychological theories from antiquity through to the Middle Ages, and well into the early modern period. Aristotle on the Common Sense begins with an introduction to Aristotle's theory of perception and sets up a conceptual framework for the interpretation of textual evidence. In addition to analysing those passages which make explicit mention of the common sense, and drawing out the implications for Aristotlenulls terminology, Gregoric provides a detailed examination of each function of this Aristotelian faculty.

Aristotle on the common sense

[T] here is assuredly no more effectual method of clearing up one's own mind on any subject than by talking it over, so to speak, with men of real power and grasp, who have considered it from a totally different point of view. The parallax of time helps us to the true position of a conception, as the parallax of space helps us to that of a star. -T. H. Huxley, "On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata" (1901, 202)

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2998397.pdf

Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern

Soul as Efficient Cause in Aristotle’s Embryology

In Section II it is shown that some of the Quinean objections to modal logic found in [ 151 can be transferred to the notions used to describe and account for temporal change.’ The remainder of the paper is devoted to a demonstration of the thesis that Aristotle’s predecessors had already formulated problems similar to the temporal puzzles so generated, and that the three most prominent reactions to Qume’s puzzles were also anticipated by certain ancient Greek philosophers. Furthermore, Aristotle’s own reaction as manifested in his analysis of the elements of change in Physics A7 can be seen to involve concepts which easily lend themselves to the kind of semantical analysis which has recently enhanced our understanding of modality. Let us begin, then, by getting clear on just what problems I have in mind.

Aristotle's response to Quine's objections to modal logic

The persistence of aristotelian matter

Etude de la definition de la sagesse comme connaissance des causes et des principes de la substance (ousia) qui eclaire le projet meme de la «Metaphysique» d'Aristote. Distinguant l'essentialisme general du livre Z de la conception metaphysique de la substance a partir de la theorie de l'etre, l'A. montre que l'objet de la metaphysique d'Aristote est la forme de la substance sensible, c'est-a-dire l'ousia telle qu'elle constitue la cause de la chose qui existe dans la science naturelle aristotelicienne

Alan Code

Papers

Soul as Efficient Cause in Aristotle’s Embryology

Aristotle's response to Quine's objections to modal logic

The persistence of aristotelian matter

Aristotle's metaphysics as a science of principles

Explaining Various Forms of Living