confirm a basic finding from the study of civil war termination: ”peacemaking is a risky business.”’ The greatest source of risk comes from spoilers-leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.’ By signing a peace agreement, leaders put themselves at risk from adversaries who may take advantage of a settlement, from disgruntled followers who see peace as a betrayal of key values, and from excluded parties who seek either to alter the process or to destroy it. By implementing a peace agreement, peacemakers are vulnerable to attack from those who oppose their efforts. And most important, the risks of peacemaking increase the insecurity and uncertainty of average citizens who have the most to lose if war is renewed. When spoilers succeed, as they did in Angola in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994, the results are catastrophic. In both cases, the casualties of failed peace were infinitely higher than the casualties of war. When Jonas Savimbi refused to accept the outcome of UN-monitored elections in 1992 and plunged Angola back into civil war, approximately 300,000 people died. When Hutu extremists in Rwanda rejected the Arusha Peace Accords in 1994 and launched a campaign of genocide, over 1 million Rwandans died in less than three month^.^

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Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes

EIGHT members of the Yale Institute of Human Relations have co-operated to produce this book The result is not a mere juxtaposition of uncoordinated viewpoints but a unity of aim and consistency in presentation which make the multiple authorship almost undetectable Whatever judgment one may make about the value of the hypothesis elaborated in the book, there can be little doubt that the intimate collaboration of a team of specialists, each with a distinctive training, is a profitable way of examining a problem which has no clear-cut frontiers and which does not fall neatly into one of the conventional compartments of social study Frustration and Aggression By John Dollard Neal E Miller Leonard W Doob O H Mowrer Robert R Sears, in collaboration with Clellan S Ford, Carl Iver Hovland and Richard T Sollenberger (International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction) Pp ix + 150 (London: Kegan Paul and Co, Ltd, 1944) 10s 6d net

Frustration and Aggression

How do a few Third World political movements become global causes celebres, while most remain isolated? This book rejects dominant views that needy groups readily gain help from selfless nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Instead, they face a Darwinian struggle for scarce resources where support goes to the savviest, not the neediest. Examining Mexico's Zapatista rebels and Nigeria's Ogoni ethnic group, the book draws critical conclusions about social movements, NGOs, and 'global civil society'.

The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism

“Naming and shaming” is a popular strategy to enforce international human rights norms and laws. Nongovernmental organizations, news media, and international organizations publicize countries' violations and urge reform. Evidence that these spotlights are followed by improvements is anecdotal. This article analyzes the relationship between global naming and shaming efforts and governments' human rights practices for 145 countries from 1975 to 2000. The statistics show that governments put in the spotlight for abuses continue or even ramp up some violations afterward, while reducing others. One reason is that governments' capacities for human rights improvements vary across types of violations. Another is that governments are strategically using some violations to offset other improvements they make in response to international pressure to stop violations.

https://pages.ucsd.edu/~ehafner/pdfs/sticks_stones.pdf

Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem

"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide

This article explores a perverse consequence of the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention, or “Responsibility to Protect,” contrary to its intent of protecting civilians from genocide and ethnic cleansing. The root of the problem is that such genocidal violence often represents state retaliation against a substate group for rebellion (such as an armed secession) by some of its members. The emerging norm, by raising expectations of diplomatic and military intervention to protect these groups, unintentionally fosters rebellion by lowering its expected cost and increasing its likelihood of success. In practice, intervention does sometimes help rebels attain their political goals, but usually it is too late or inadequate to avert retaliation against civilians. Thus, the emerging norm resembles an imperfect insurance policy against genocidal violence. It creates moral hazard that encourages the excessively risky or fraudulent behavior of rebellion by members of groups that are vulnerable to genocidal retaliation, but it cannot fully protect against the backlash. The emerging norm thereby causes some genocidal violence that otherwise would not occur. Bosnia and Kosovo illustrate that in at least two recent cases the moral-hazard hypothesis explains why members of a vulnerable group rebelled and thereby triggered genocidal retaliation. The article concludes by exploring whether potential interveners could mitigate genocidal violence by modifying their intervention policies to reduce moral hazard.

The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans

In 1994 genocide in Rwanda claimed the lives of at least 500,000 Tutsi --some three-quarters of their population --while UN peacekeepers were withdrawn and the rest of the world stood aside. Ever since, it has been argued that a small military intervention could have prevented most of the killing. In The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention, Alan J. Kuperman exposes such conventional wisdom as myth. Combining unprecedented analyses of the genocide's progression and the logistical limitations of humanitarian military intervention, Kuperman reaches a startling conclusion: even if Western leaders had ordered an intervention as soon as they became aware of a nationwide genocide in Rwanda, the intervention forces would have arrived too late to save more than a quarter of the 500,000 Tutsi ultimately killed. Serving as a cautionary message about the limits of humanitarian intervention, the book's concluding chapters address lessons for the future.

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The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda

NATO's 2011 humanitarian military intervention in Libya has been hailed as a model for implementing the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect (R2P), on grounds that it prevented an impending bloodbath in Benghazi and facilitated the ouster of Libya's oppressive ruler, Muammar al-Qaddafi, who had targeted peaceful civilian protesters. Before the international community embraces such conclusions, however, a more rigorous assessment of the net humanitarian impact of NATO intervention in Libya is warranted. The conventional narrative is flawed in its portrayal of both the nature of the violence in Libya prior to the intervention and NATO's eventual objective of regime change. An examination of the course of violence in Libya before and after NATO's action shows that the intervention backfired. The intervention extended the war's duration about sixfold; increased its death toll approximately seven to ten times; and exacerbated human rights abuses, humanitarian suffering, Islamic radicalism, and weapon...

A Model Humanitarian Intervention?: Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign

In a close examination of what a realistic US military intervention could have achieved in the 1994 genocide case in Rwanda the claim that 5000 US ground troops deployed at the outset of the killing could have prevented the genocide was found insupportable. This claim was originally made by the UN commanding general in Rwanda during the genocide and has since been endorsed by members of the Congress human rights groups and a distinguished panel of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. However it is noted that although some lives could have been saved by intervention even a large force deployed immediately upon the onset of the killings could not saved even half of the ultimate victims. This paper discusses in detail the 1994 Rwandan genocide which left hundreds of thousands of Tutsi dead. It examines three levels of potential US military intervention: maximum moderate and minimal. Moreover it cites several important lessons from the Rwandan experience for policy-makers in pursuing prevention or intervention. Overall it is noted that the most obvious lesson of Rwandas tragedy is that intervention is no substitute for prevention.

Rwanda in Retrospect

This piece argues that the emerging norm of humanitarian military intervention, which is intended to prevent genocide and ethnic cleansing, perversely causes such violence through the dynamic of moral hazard. The norm, intended as a type of insurance policy against genocidal violence, unintentionally encourages disgruntled sub-state groups to rebel because they expect intervention to protect them from retaliation by the state. Actual intervention, however, is often too late or too feeble to prevent such retaliation. Thus, the norm causes some genocidal violence that otherwise would not occur. The piece starts by documenting the fact that historically most genocidal violence—unlike that of the Holocaust—has been retaliation against groups who threaten state authority. It then develops a framework based on deterrence theory to explain why groups vulnerable to genocidal retaliation might provoke that outcome. Next, it illustrates this dynamic in two cases from the 1990s: Bosnia and Kosovo. Following...

Alan J. Kuperman

Papers

The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans

The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda

A Model Humanitarian Intervention?: Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign

Rwanda in Retrospect

Suicidal rebellions and the moral hazard of humanitarian intervention