Alexa D. Foss

Bio: Alexa D. Foss is an academic researcher from Tufts University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Medicine & Influenza A virus subtype H5N1. The author has an hindex of 2, co-authored 4 publications receiving 24 citations.

Host barriers to SARS-CoV-2 demonstrated by ferrets in a high-exposure domestic setting.

Abstract: Ferrets (Mustela putorius furo) are mustelids of special relevance to laboratory studies of respiratory viruses and have been shown to be susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection and onward transmission. Here, we report the results of a natural experiment where 29 ferrets in one home had prolonged, direct contact and constant environmental exposure to two humans with symptomatic disease, one of whom was confirmed positive for SARS-CoV-2. We observed no evidence of SARS-CoV-2 transmission from humans to ferrets based on viral and antibody assays. To better understand this discrepancy in experimental and natural infection in ferrets, we compared SARS-CoV-2 sequences from natural and experimental mustelid infections and identified two surface glycoprotein Spike (S) mutations associated with mustelids. While we found evidence that angiotensin-converting enzyme II provides a weak host barrier, one mutation only seen in ferrets is located in the novel S1/S2 cleavage site and is computationally predicted to decrease furin cleavage efficiency. These data support the idea that host factors interacting with the novel S1/S2 cleavage site may be a barrier in ferret SARS-CoV-2 susceptibility and that domestic ferrets are at low risk of natural infection from currently circulating SARS-CoV-2. We propose two mechanistically grounded hypotheses for mustelid host adaptation of SARS-CoV-2, with possible effects that require additional investigation.

Ecological divergence of wild birds drives avian influenza spillover and global spread

Abstract: The diversity of influenza A viruses (IAV) is primarily hosted by two highly divergent avian orders: Anseriformes (ducks, swans and geese) and Charadriiformes (gulls, terns and shorebirds). Studies of IAV have historically focused on Anseriformes, specifically dabbling ducks, overlooking the diversity of hosts in nature, including gull and goose species that have successfully adapted to human habitats. This study sought to address this imbalance by characterizing spillover dynamics and global transmission patterns of IAV over 10 years at greater taxonomic resolution than previously considered. Furthermore, the circulation of viral subtypes in birds that are either host-adapted (low pathogenic H13, H16) or host-generalist (highly pathogenic avian influenza—HPAI H5) provided a unique opportunity to test and extend models of viral evolution. Using Bayesian phylodynamic modelling we uncovered a complex transmission network that relied on ecologically divergent bird hosts. The generalist subtype, HPAI H5 was driven largely by wild geese and swans that acted as a source for wild ducks, gulls, land birds, and domestic geese. Gulls were responsible for moving HPAI H5 more rapidly than any other host, a finding that may reflect their long-distance, pelagic movements and their immuno-naïve status against this subtype. Wild ducks, long viewed as primary hosts for spillover, occupied an optimal space for viral transmission, contributing to geographic expansion and rapid dispersal of HPAI H5. Evidence of inter-hemispheric dispersal via both the Pacific and Atlantic Rims was detected, supporting surveillance at high latitudes along continental margins to achieve early detection. Both neutral (geographic expansion) and non-neutral (antigenic selection) evolutionary processes were found to shape subtype evolution which manifested as unique geographic hotspots for each subtype at the global scale. This study reveals how a diversity of avian hosts contribute to viral spread and spillover with the potential to improve surveillance in an era of rapid global change.

Outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 in New England Seals

Abstract: The recent incursion of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H5N1) virus into North America and subsequent dissemination of virus across the continent, has had significant adverse impacts on domestic poultry, and has led to widespread mortality in many wild bird species. Here we report the recent spillover of H5N1 into marine mammals in the northeastern United States, with associated mortality on a regional scale. This spillover is coincident with a second wave of H5N1 in sympatric wild birds also experiencing regional mortality events. Viral sequences derived from both seal and avian hosts reveal distinct viral genetic differences between the two waves of infection. Spillover into seals was closely related to virus from the second wave, and one of eight seal-derived sequences had the mammalian adaptation PB2 E627K. One-Sentence Summary An outbreak of H5N1 in New England seals is the first known population-scale mammalian mortality event associated with the emerging highly pathogenic avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4b.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Outbreak in New England Seals, United States

Abstract: We report the spillover of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) into marine mammals in the northeastern United States, coincident with H5N1 in sympatric wild birds. Our data indicate monitoring both wild coastal birds and marine mammals will be critical to determine pandemic potential of influenza A viruses.

Ferrets not infected by SARS-CoV-2 in a high-exposure domestic setting

Abstract: Ferrets (Mustela putorius furo) are mustelids of special relevance to laboratory studies of respiratory viruses and have been shown to be susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection and onward transmission. Here, we report the results of a natural experiment where 29 ferrets in one home had prolonged, direct contact and constant environmental exposure to two humans with symptomatic COVID-19. We observed no evidence of SARS-CoV-2 transmission from humans to ferrets based on RT-PCR and ELISA. To better understand this discrepancy in experimental and natural infection in ferrets, we compared SARS-CoV-2 sequences from natural and experimental mustelid infections and identified two surface glycoprotein (Spike) mutations associated with mustelids. While we found evidence that ACE2 provides a weak host barrier, one mutation only seen in ferrets is located in the novel S1/S2 cleavage site and is computationally predicted to decrease furin activity. These data support that host factors interacting with the novel S1/S2 cleavage site may be a barrier in ferret SARS-CoV-2 susceptibility and that domestic ferrets are at low risk of natural infection from currently circulating SARS-CoV-2. This may be overcome in laboratory settings using concentrated viral inoculum, but the effects of ferret host-adaptations require additional investigation.

Genetic and structural basis for SARS-CoV-2 variant neutralization by a two-antibody cocktail.

Abstract: Understanding the molecular basis for immune recognition of SARS-CoV-2 spike glycoprotein antigenic sites will inform the development of improved therapeutics. We determined the structures of two human monoclonal antibodies-AZD8895 and AZD1061-which form the basis of the investigational antibody cocktail AZD7442, in complex with the receptor-binding domain (RBD) of SARS-CoV-2 to define the genetic and structural basis of neutralization. AZD8895 forms an 'aromatic cage' at the heavy/light chain interface using germ line-encoded residues in complementarity-determining regions (CDRs) 2 and 3 of the heavy chain and CDRs 1 and 3 of the light chain. These structural features explain why highly similar antibodies (public clonotypes) have been isolated from multiple individuals. AZD1061 has an unusually long LCDR1; the HCDR3 makes interactions with the opposite face of the RBD from that of AZD8895. Using deep mutational scanning and neutralization escape selection experiments, we comprehensively mapped the crucial binding residues of both antibodies and identified positions of concern with regards to virus escape from antibody-mediated neutralization. Both AZD8895 and AZD1061 have strong neutralizing activity against SARS-CoV-2 and variants of concern with antigenic substitutions in the RBD. We conclude that germ line-encoded antibody features enable recognition of the SARS-CoV-2 spike RBD and demonstrate the utility of the cocktail AZD7442 in neutralizing emerging variant viruses.

Assessing the risks of SARS-CoV-2 in wildlife

Abstract: The novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 likely emerged from a wildlife source with transmission to humans followed by rapid geographic spread throughout the globe and severe impacts on both human health and the global economy. Since the onset of the pandemic, there have been many instances of human-to-animal transmission involving companion, farmed and zoo animals, and limited evidence for spread into free-living wildlife. The establishment of reservoirs of infection in wild animals would create significant challenges to infection control in humans and could pose a threat to the welfare and conservation status of wildlife. We discuss the potential for exposure, onward transmission and persistence of SARS-CoV-2 in an initial selection of wild mammals (bats, canids, felids, mustelids, great apes, rodents and cervids). Dynamic risk assessment and targeted surveillance are important tools for the early detection of infection in wildlife, and here we describe a framework for collating and synthesising emerging information to inform targeted surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 in wildlife. Surveillance efforts should be integrated with information from public and veterinary health initiatives to provide insights into the potential role of wild mammals in the epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2.

Genetic and structural basis for recognition of SARS-CoV-2 spike protein by a two-antibody cocktail

Abstract: The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has led to an urgent need to understand the molecular basis for immune recognition of SARS-CoV-2 spike (S) glycoprotein antigenic sites. To define the genetic and structural basis for SARS-CoV-2 neutralization, we determined the structures of two human monoclonal antibodies COV2-2196 and COV2-21301, which form the basis of the investigational antibody cocktail AZD7442, in complex with the receptor binding domain (RBD) of SARS-CoV-2. COV2-2196 forms an 'aromatic cage' at the heavy/light chain interface using germline-encoded residues in complementarity determining regions (CDRs) 2 and 3 of the heavy chain and CDRs 1 and 3 of the light chain. These structural features explain why highly similar antibodies (public clonotypes) have been isolated from multiple individuals1-4. The structure of COV2-2130 reveals that an unusually long LCDR1 and HCDR3 make interactions with the opposite face of the RBD from that of COV2-2196. Using deep mutational scanning and neutralization escape selection experiments, we comprehensively mapped the critical residues of both antibodies and identified positions of concern for possible viral escape. Nonetheless, both COV2-2196 and COV2130 showed strong neutralizing activity against SARS-CoV-2 strain with recent variations of concern including E484K, N501Y, and D614G substitutions. These studies reveal germline-encoded antibody features enabling recognition of the RBD and demonstrate the activity of a cocktail like AZD7442 in preventing escape from emerging variant viruses.

SARS-CoV-2 evolution in animals suggests mechanisms for rapid variant selection.

Abstract: SARS-CoV-2 spillback from humans into domestic and wild animals has been well documented, and an accumulating number of studies illustrate that human-to-animal transmission is widespread in cats, mink, deer, and other species. Experimental inoculations of cats, mink, and ferrets have perpetuated transmission cycles. We sequenced full genomes of Vero cell-expanded SARS-CoV-2 inoculum and viruses recovered from cats (n = 6), dogs (n = 3), hamsters (n = 3), and a ferret (n = 1) following experimental exposure. Five nonsynonymous changes relative to the USA-WA1/2020 prototype strain were near fixation in the stock used for inoculation but had reverted to wild-type sequences at these sites in dogs, cats, and hamsters within 1- to 3-d postexposure. A total of 14 emergent variants (six in nonstructural genes, six in spike, and one each in orf8 and nucleocapsid) were detected in viruses recovered from animals. This included substitutions in spike residues H69, N501, and D614, which also vary in human lineages of concern. Even though a live virus was not cultured from dogs, substitutions in replicase genes were detected in amplified sequences. The rapid selection of SARS-CoV-2 variants in vitro and in vivo reveals residues with functional significance during host switching. These observations also illustrate the potential for spillback from animal hosts to accelerate the evolution of new viral lineages, findings of particular concern for dogs and cats living in households with COVID-19 patients. More generally, this glimpse into viral host switching reveals the unrealized rapidity and plasticity of viral evolution in experimental animal model systems.

Monitoring of SARS-CoV-2 infection in mustelids

Abstract: American mink and ferret are highly susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), but no information is available for other mustelid species. SARS-CoV-2 spreads very efficiently within mink farms once introduced, by direct and indirect contact, high within-farm animal density increases the chance for transmission. Between-farm spread is likely to occur once SARS-CoV-2 is introduced, short distance between SARS-CoV-2 positive farms is a risk factor. As of 29 January 2021, SARS-CoV-2 virus has been reported in 400 mink farms in eight countries in the European Union. In most cases, the likely introduction of SARS-CoV-2 infection into farms was infected humans. Human health can be at risk by mink-related variant viruses, which can establish circulation in the community, but so far these have not shown to be more transmissible or causing more severe impact compared with other circulating SARS-CoV-2. Concerning animal health risk posed by SARS-CoV-2 infection the animal species that may be included in monitoring plans are American mink, ferrets, cats, raccoon dogs, white-tailed deer and Rhinolophidae bats. All mink farms should be considered at risk of infection; therefore, the monitoring objective should be early detection. This includes passive monitoring (in place in the whole territory of all countries where animals susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 are bred) but also active monitoring by regular testing. First, frequent testing of farm personnel and all people in contact with the animals is recommended. Furthermore randomly selected animals (dead or sick animals should be included) should be tested using reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), ideally at weekly intervals (i.e. design prevalence approximately 5% in each epidemiological unit, to be assessed case by case). Suspected animals (dead or with clinical signs and a minimum five animals) should be tested for confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Positive samples from each farm should be sequenced to monitor virus evolution and results publicly shared.