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Alexander Vostroknutov

Other affiliations: University of Trento
Bio: Alexander Vostroknutov is an academic researcher from Maastricht University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Experimental economics & Social preferences. The author has an hindex of 13, co-authored 47 publications receiving 588 citations. Previous affiliations of Alexander Vostroknutov include University of Trento.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the idea that prosocial behavior in experimental games is driven by social norms imported into the laboratory and show that dierences in behavior across subjects are driven by heterogeneity in sensitivity to social norms.
Abstract: We explore the idea that prosocial behavior in experimental games is driven by social norms imported into the laboratory. Under this view, dierences in behavior across subjects is driven by heterogeneity in sensitivity to social norms. We introduce an incentivized method of eliciting individual norm-sensitivity, and we show how it relates to play in public goods, trust, dictator and ultimatum games. We show how our observations can be rationalized in a stylized model of norm-dependent preferences under reasonable assumptions about the nature of social norms. Then we directly elicit norms in these games to test the robustness of our interpretation. JEL classications: C91, C92, D03

170 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The experiment demonstrates that individuals are able to learn effective planning for future distant rewards, with a procedure of backward analysis.
Abstract: We study experimentally how subjects learn to plan ahead when they make sequential decisions. The task is the Race game. This game is played on a finite set of m possible positions occupied by a marker, which is initially in the first position. Two players alternate in the role of mover, and each one can move the marker forward by 1, 2 ...,k places. The player who puts the marker in the final position wins. Learning follows a similar pattern for all subjects. The experience of losses in early rounds induces them to switch the mode of analysis to backward analysis, which proceeds from the final position. The game has a simple dominant strategy, so we can calculate the frequency of errors made by subjects in each of the positions. The hypothesis that players follow a backward analysis gives precise predictions on the pattern of errors: for example that errors are more frequent, the further the position is from the end. The experiment demonstrates that individuals are able to learn effective planning for future distant rewards, with a procedure of backward analysis. Their learning process may appear a pure insight, but is derived from evaluation of experience. Subjects are also able to transfer the knowledge they get from playing one game to a related game.

91 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the idea that prosocial behavior in experimental games is driven by social norms imported into the laboratory, and they introduce an incentivized method of eliciting individual norm-sensitivity, and how it relates to play in public goods, trust, dictator and ultimatum games.
Abstract: We explore the idea that prosocial behavior in experimental games is driven by social norms imported into the laboratory. Under this view, differences in behavior across subjects is driven by heterogeneity in sensitivity to social norms. We introduce an incentivized method of eliciting individual norm-sensitivity, and we show how it relates to play in public goods, trust, dictator and ultimatum games. We show how our observations can be rationalized in a stylized model of norm-dependent preferences under reasonable assumptions about the nature of social norms. Then we directly elicit norms in these games to test the robustness of our interpretation.

89 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study public good games with dynamic interdependencies, where each agent's wealth at the end of period t serves as her endowment in t + 1.

39 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce a new task to elicit a proxy for individual norm-following propensity by asking subjects to choose from two actions, where one is costly, and their willingness to incur such a cost reveals respect for norms.

29 citations


Cited by
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Journal Article
TL;DR: A Treatise on the Family by G. S. Becker as discussed by the authors is one of the most famous and influential economists of the second half of the 20th century, a fervent contributor to and expounder of the University of Chicago free-market philosophy, and winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in economics.
Abstract: A Treatise on the Family. G. S. Becker. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1981. Gary Becker is one of the most famous and influential economists of the second half of the 20th century, a fervent contributor to and expounder of the University of Chicago free-market philosophy, and winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in economics. Although any book with the word "treatise" in its title is clearly intended to have an impact, one coming from someone as brilliant and controversial as Becker certainly had such a lofty goal. It has received many article-length reviews in several disciplines (Ben-Porath, 1982; Bergmann, 1995; Foster, 1993; Hannan, 1982), which is one measure of its scholarly importance, and yet its impact is, I think, less than it may have initially appeared, especially for scholars with substantive interests in the family. This book is, its title notwithstanding, more about economics and the economic approach to behavior than about the family. In the first sentence of the preface, Becker writes "In this book, I develop an economic or rational choice approach to the family." Lest anyone accuse him of focusing on traditional (i.e., material) economics topics, such as family income, poverty, and labor supply, he immediately emphasizes that those topics are not his focus. "My intent is more ambitious: to analyze marriage, births, divorce, division of labor in households, prestige, and other non-material behavior with the tools and framework developed for material behavior." Indeed, the book includes chapters on many of these issues. One chapter examines the principles of the efficient division of labor in households, three analyze marriage and divorce, three analyze various child-related issues (fertility and intergenerational mobility), and others focus on broader family issues, such as intrafamily resource allocation. His analysis is not, he believes, constrained by time or place. His intention is "to present a comprehensive analysis that is applicable, at least in part, to families in the past as well as the present, in primitive as well as modern societies, and in Eastern as well as Western cultures." His tone is profoundly conservative and utterly skeptical of any constructive role for government programs. There is a clear sense of how much better things were in the old days of a genderbased division of labor and low market-work rates for married women. Indeed, Becker is ready and able to show in Chapter 2 that such a state of affairs was efficient and induced not by market or societal discrimination (although he allows that it might exist) but by small underlying household productivity differences that arise primarily from what he refers to as "complementarities" between caring for young children while carrying another to term. Most family scholars would probably find that an unconvincingly simple explanation for a profound and complex phenomenon. What, then, is the salient contribution of Treatise on the Family? It is not literally the idea that economics could be applied to the nonmarket sector and to family life because Becker had already established that with considerable success and influence. At its core, microeconomics is simple, characterized by a belief in the importance of prices and markets, the role of self-interested or rational behavior, and, somewhat less centrally, the stability of preferences. It was Becker's singular and invaluable contribution to appreciate that the behaviors potentially amenable to the economic approach were not limited to phenomenon with explicit monetary prices and formal markets. Indeed, during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, he did undeniably important and pioneering work extending the domain of economics to such topics as labor market discrimination, fertility, crime, human capital, household production, and the allocation of time. Nor is Becker's contribution the detailed analyses themselves. Many of them are, frankly, odd, idiosyncratic, and off-putting. …

4,817 citations

01 Jan 2002
TL;DR: This article investigated whether income inequality affects subsequent growth in a cross-country sample for 1965-90, using the models of Barro (1997), Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) and Sachs and Warner (1997) with negative results.
Abstract: We investigate whether income inequality affects subsequent growth in a cross-country sample for 1965-90, using the models of Barro (1997), Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) and Sachs and Warner (1997), with negative results. We then investigate the evolution of income inequality over the same period and its correlation with growth. The dominating feature is inequality convergence across countries. This convergence has been significantly faster amongst developed countries. Growth does not appear to influence the evolution of inequality over time. Outline

3,770 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
Paul Kline1
01 Aug 1986-Nature
TL;DR: In this article, a book is one of the greatest friends to accompany while in your lonely time and when you have no friends and activities, reading book can be a great choice.
Abstract: Feel lonely? What about reading books? Book is one of the greatest friends to accompany while in your lonely time. When you have no friends and activities somewhere and sometimes, reading book can be a great choice. This is not only for spending the time, it will increase the knowledge. Of course the b=benefits to take will relate to what kind of book that you are reading. And now, we will concern you to try reading models of man as one of the reading material to finish quickly.

1,117 citations

27 Sep 2016
TL;DR: ROSE-ACKERMAN and PALIFKA as discussed by the authors presented the second edition of Corruption and Government, which updated Rose-Ackerman's 1999 book to address emerging issues and to rethink old questions in light of new data.
Abstract: ROSE-ACKERMAN Susan, PALIFKA Bonnie J. Corruption and government : causes, consequences, and reform Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2016, XXIII-618 p. ISBN 978-1-107-44109-5 MOND 723 Resume editeur : The second edition of Corruption and Government updates Susan Rose-Ackerman's 1999 book to address emerging issues and to rethink old questions in light of new data. The book analyzes the research explosion that accompanied the fall of the Berlin Wall, the founding of Transparency Intern...

656 citations