Alfredo Narváez Medécigo

Bio: Alfredo Narváez Medécigo is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Judicial opinion & Federal republic. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 9 citations.

Constitutional Review in the United States of America: Does “Diffused” Mean Complete Decentralization?

Abstract: The international influence of American (or U.S. American) constitutionalism is indisputable. The innovative framework set by the Founding Fathers back in 1787 and the resilient organizations developed thereupon had such a positive impact overseas that they were still the leading global reference 200 years after the Philadelphia Convention. Institutions such as judicial review, federalism, or even presidentialism disseminated alongside American military sway across the most varied settings and soon became unavoidable elements to consider in state-building efforts worldwide. Be it in post-colonial Latin America throughout the nineteenth century, Asia and Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II, or the emerging African nations during the second half of the twentieth century; the United States of America was for a much extended period of time the dominant prototype of a successful constitutional arrangement. Though this once hegemonic influence has somewhat lost momentum within the past couple of decades, American legal institutions enjoy to this day remarkable prestige and continue to impact significantly other systems around the globe. American courts, for instance, are still often referred to as “the most powerful and admired judiciary in the world.” Not only do they still reach more international headlines than any of their colleagues overseas, but also, as cases brought before them continue to drive many aspects of the contemporary legal debate, American judicial decisions are followed closely by foreign legal academia. So, while the new “world favorite” of democratic constitutionalism—the Federal Republic of Germany—is still relatively young and in significant ways a result of its American counterpart, the legal system of the United States is of such tradition and status that even today it takes a great share of the attention from scholars and practitioners around the globe.

Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges' Bill

Abstract: We tend to take for granted that the United States Supreme Court has the discretionary power, through its use of the writ of certiorari, to select the cases it wishes to decide. The Court, however, has not always possessed this discretion. Professor Hartnett traces the history of certiorari in the Court, paying particular attention to the unprecedented efforts of Chief Justice William Howard Taft to promote the landmark Judges' Bill of 1925, and the uncritical deference to the Court shown by Congress in enacting it. After describing ways in which the Court asserted even broader discretion than Congress provided, Professor Hartnett questions whether certiorari is consistent with the traditional conceptions of judicial review, the nature of judicial power, and the rule of law. While questioning certiorari, he emphasizes its importance not only in encouraging Supreme Court Justices to think of themselves as final arbiters of controversial questions, but also in shaping substantive constitutional law.

A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus

Abstract: For decades, scholars and judges have assumed that federal habeas corpus review of state court criminal convictions should focus on the individual rights of habeas petitioners and that the federal courts should ask whether a state prisoner is being unlawfully detained because the state violated his individual federal rights. This individualized approach to federal habeas review is expensive, time-consuming, and woefully ineffective in stopping states from violating defendants' federal rights. Indeed, many states systematically violate criminal defendants' federal rights with impunity. This Article proposes a new conception of federal habeas review under which the federal courts focus on states, not on individual petitioners. Federal habeas relief should be available when a state routinely violates its criminal defendants' federal rights as part of a systemic practice. Reconfiguring federal habeas corpus review to focus on states and systemic practices would reduce redundancy, increase efficiency, and be more respectful of state institutions while, at the same time, recovering one of the original and now lost purposes of federal habeas corpus review.

The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right

Abstract: The central point of disagreement between the majority and dissenting opinions in the D.C. Circuit in Boumediene v. Bush, the latest in a series of challenges to the detention of non-citizen enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is the question whether the Constitution's Suspension Clause applies in Guantanamo. In this symposium essay, I argue that both sides of the current debate are focusing on the wrong question because of a deeply rooted historical misunderstanding of the Suspension Clause. Retracing the original understanding of the Clause, the essay argues that the Suspension Clause was meant as a grant of authority to Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in certain circumstances, rather than as a constraint on Congress's power thereto. As such, the Clause delineates the only circumstances wherein Congress may abridge the otherwise-available common law writ of habeas corpus. The problem, as the essay retraces, comes from reading together the Supreme Court's decisions in Ex parte Bollman (1807) and Tarble's Case (1872), the former of which precluded common-law habeas corpus in the federal courts, and the latter of which denied state courts the authority to issue habeas petitions against federal custodians. As I argue, although each decision is defensible on its own merits, together, they produce a constitutional conundrum vis-a-vis Congress's power over habeas corpus, and one that should limit Congress's power to completely preclude federal habeas jurisdiction over claims cognizable at common law to those cases authorized by the Constitution, i.e., Cases of Rebellion or Invasion [when] the public Safety may require it.

State Habeas Relief for Federal Extra-judicial Detainees

Abstract: Nearly 150 years ago, the United States Supreme Court rebuffed efforts by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to free an abolitionist and an unhappy teenage soldier from federal confinement. It has been widely understood ever since that state courts lack the power to grant habeas relief to individuals held in federal custody, even if those individuals are being detained without the review, approval, or participation of any court. This Article contends that it is time to restore state courts' ability to act as a primary protector of individuals' freedom. The Article first tells the story of a long-forgotten time when state courts routinely awarded habeas relief to federal extra-judicial detainees. The Article then argues that the Court erred when it held that state courts may never come to federal prisoners' aid. Although scholars today uniformly reject the Court's constitutional rationale for declaring federal detainees wholly beyond state courts' reach, they attempt to rationalize the Court's holding on other grounds. Specifically, scholars believe that Congress preempted the state habeas remedy for federal prisoners when it authorized federal courts to grant federal prisoners habeas relief in the Judiciary Act of 1789. This Article contends that Congress has neither explicitly nor implicitly preempted state courts' power to award the habeas remedy to persons extra-judicially held in federal confinement. In fact, the historical record strongly suggests that the Constitution's Suspension Clause was intended to guarantee both individuals and the states that, absent extraordinary circumstances, federal leaders could not strip state courts of their power to provide habeas relief to federal extra-judicial detainees. This Article contends that it is time to honor the Constitution's promise.