Bio: Allen Buchanan is an academic researcher from University of Arizona. The author has contributed to research in topics: Human rights & Economic Justice. The author has an hindex of 46, co-authored 165 publications receiving 9518 citations. Previous affiliations of Allen Buchanan include University of Minnesota & Durham University.
Papers published on a yearly basis
•01 Jan 1990
TL;DR: The primary ethical framework: patient-centered principles and application: Advance directives, personhood, and personal identity provide a framework for distributing justice and the incompetent.
Abstract: Preface Introduction Part I. Theory: 1. Competence and incompetence 2. The primary ethical framework: patient-centered principles 3. Advance directives, personhood, and personal identity 4. Distributive justice and the incompetent Part II. Application: 5. Minors 6. The elderly 7. The mentally ill Looking forward Appendix 1: living trust and nomination of conservatorship Appendix 2: durable power of attorney for health care Notes Index.
TL;DR: The notion of the right to rule is subject to stronger and weaker interpretations, but for now it will suffice to say that an institution is legitimate in the sociological sense when it is widely believed to have the right.
Abstract: ‘Legitimacy’ has both a normative and a sociological meaning. To say that an institution is legitimate in the normative sense is to assert that it has the right to rule — where ruling is promulgating rules and attempting to secure compliance with them by attaching costs to noncompliance and/or benefits to compliance. Ruling in this broad sense does not require that the rules be backed by coercion, much less that the rulemaker claims a rightful monopoly on coercion within a jurisdiction, so it does not presuppose the state. Later we will see that the notion of the right to rule is subject to stronger and weaker interpretations, but for now it will suffice to say that an institution is legitimate in the sociological sense when it is widely believed to have the right to rule.1 When people disagree over whether the WTO is legitimate, they are not disagreeing about whether they or others believe that institution has the right to rule; they are disagreeing about whether it has the right to rule.
•24 Apr 2000
TL;DR: The meaning of genetic causation, by Elliott Sober, and the morality of inclusion and policy implications are examined.
Abstract: This book, written by four internationally renowned bioethicists and first published in 2000, was the first systematic treatment of the fundamental ethical issues underlying the application of genetic technologies to human beings. Probing the implications of the remarkable advances in genetics, the authors ask how should these affect our understanding of distributive justice, equality of opportunity, the rights and obligations as parents, the meaning of disability, and the role of the concept of human nature in ethical theory and practice. The book offers a historical context to contemporary debate over the use of these technologies by examining the eugenics movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The questions raised in this book will be of interest to any reflective reader concerned about science and society and the rapid development of biotechnology, as well as to professionals in such areas as philosophy, bioethics, medical ethics, health management, law, and political science.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defined a duty of non-intervention for all the peoples of the world and a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.
Abstract: 1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples. 2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense. 6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.1
12 Jul 2007
TL;DR: In this article, the idea of a moral theory of international law and its application in international legal reform is discussed. But the authors focus on the notion of self-deterministration and self-determination and do not discuss self-disparity.
Abstract: Acknowledgements Synopsis 1 Introduction: The Idea of a Moral Theory of International Law PART I: JUSTICE 2 The Commitment to Justice 3 Human Rights 4 Distributive Justice and International Law PART II: LEGITIMACY 5 Political Legitimacy 6 Recognitional Legitimacy 7 The Legitimacy of the International Legal System PART III: SELF-DETERMINATION 8 Self-Determination and Secession 9 Intra-state Autonomy PART IV: REFORM 10 Principled Proposals for Reform 11 The Morality of International Legal Reform Bibliography Index
TL;DR: It is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction.
Abstract: All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.
TL;DR: 7 requirements are proposed that systematically elucidate a coherent framework for evaluating the ethics of clinical research studies and are universal, although they must be adapted to the health, economic, cultural, and technological conditions in which clinical research is conducted.
Abstract: Many believe that informed consent makes clinical research ethical. However, informed consent is neither necessary nor sufficient for ethical clinical research. Drawing on the basic philosophies underlying major codes, declarations, and other documents relevant to research with human subjects, we propose 7 requirements that systematically elucidate a coherent framework for evaluating the ethics of clinical research studies: (1) value-enhancements of health or knowledge must be derived from the research; (2) scientific validity-the research must be methodologically rigorous; (3) fair subject selection-scientific objectives, not vulnerability or privilege, and the potential for and distribution of risks and benefits, should determine communities selected as study sites and the inclusion criteria for individual subjects; (4) favorable risk-benefit ratio-within the context of standard clinical practice and the research protocol, risks must be minimized, potential benefits enhanced, and the potential benefits to individuals and knowledge gained for society must outweigh the risks; (5) independent review-unaffiliated individuals must review the research and approve, amend, or terminate it; (6) informed consent-individuals should be informed about the research and provide their voluntary consent; and (7) respect for enrolled subjects-subjects should have their privacy protected, the opportunity to withdraw, and their well-being monitored. Fulfilling all 7 requirements is necessary and sufficient to make clinical research ethical. These requirements are universal, although they must be adapted to the health, economic, cultural, and technological conditions in which clinical research is conducted. JAMA. 2000;283:2701-2711.
TL;DR: In this paper, a judge in some representative American jurisdiction is assumed to accept the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his jurisdiction and to follow earlier decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale, as l
Abstract: 1.. HARD CASES 5. Legal Rights A. Legislation . . . We might therefore do well to consider how a philosophical judge might develop, in appropriate cases, theories of what legislative purpose and legal principles require. We shall find that he would construct these theories in the same manner as a philosophical referee would construct the character of a game. I have invented, for this purpose, a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen, whom I shall call Hercules. I suppose that Hercules is a judge in some representative American jurisdiction. I assume that he accepts the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his jurisdiction. He accepts, that is, that statutes have the general power to create and extinguish legal rights, and that judges have the general duty to follow earlier decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale, as l
••25 Nov 2004
TL;DR: In this article, the authors reread Kant's cosmopolitan doctrine and the right to have rights and the contradictions of the nation-state in the case of the European Union, and the law of peoples, distributive justice and migrations.
Abstract: Introduction 1. On hospitality: rereading Kant's cosmopolitan doctrine 2. 'The right to have rights': Hannah Arendt and the contradictions of the nation-state 3. The law of peoples, distributive justice and migrations 4. Transformations of citizenship: the case of the European Union 5. Democratic iterations: the local, the national and the global Conclusion References Index.
TL;DR: By bridging the divides that separate physicians from patients, themselves, colleagues, and society, narrative medicine offers fresh opportunities for respectful, empathic, and nourishing medical care.
Abstract: The effective practice of medicine requires narrative competence, that is, the ability to acknowledge, absorb, interpret, and act on the stories and plights of others. Medicine practiced with narrative competence, called narrative medicine, is proposed as a model for humane and effective medical practice. Adopting methods such as close reading of literature and reflective writing allows narrative medicine to examine and illuminate 4 of medicine's central narrative situations: physician and patient, physician and self, physician and colleagues, and physicians and society. With narrative competence, physicians can reach and join their patients in illness, recognize their own personal journeys through medicine, acknowledge kinship with and duties toward other health care professionals, and inaugurate consequential discourse with the public about health care. By bridging the divides that separate physicians from patients, themselves, colleagues, and society, narrative medicine offers fresh opportunities for respectful, empathic, and nourishing medical care.