http://www.maths.qmul.ac.uk/%7Elatora/report_06.pdf

Complex networks: Structure and dynamics

MATPOWER is an open-source Matlab-based power system simulation package that provides a high-level set of power flow, optimal power flow (OPF), and other tools targeted toward researchers, educators, and students. The OPF architecture is designed to be extensible, making it easy to add user-defined variables, costs, and constraints to the standard OPF problem. This paper presents the details of the network modeling and problem formulations used by MATPOWER, including its extensible OPF architecture. This structure is used internally to implement several extensions to the standard OPF problem, including piece-wise linear cost functions, dispatchable loads, generator capability curves, and branch angle difference limits. Simulation results are presented for a number of test cases comparing the performance of several available OPF solvers and demonstrating MATPOWER's ability to solve large-scale AC and DC OPF problems.

/pdf/matpower-steady-state-operations-planning-and-analysis-tools-1v40ihity5.pdf

MATPOWER: Steady-State Operations, Planning, and Analysis Tools for Power Systems Research and Education

Most of the existing demand-side management programs focus primarily on the interactions between a utility company and its customers/users. In this paper, we present an autonomous and distributed demand-side energy management system among users that takes advantage of a two-way digital communication infrastructure which is envisioned in the future smart grid. We use game theory and formulate an energy consumption scheduling game, where the players are the users and their strategies are the daily schedules of their household appliances and loads. It is assumed that the utility company can adopt adequate pricing tariffs that differentiate the energy usage in time and level. We show that for a common scenario, with a single utility company serving multiple customers, the global optimal performance in terms of minimizing the energy costs is achieved at the Nash equilibrium of the formulated energy consumption scheduling game. The proposed distributed demand-side energy management strategy requires each user to simply apply its best response strategy to the current total load and tariffs in the power distribution system. The users can maintain privacy and do not need to reveal the details on their energy consumption schedules to other users. We also show that users will have the incentives to participate in the energy consumption scheduling game and subscribing to such services. Simulation results confirm that the proposed approach can reduce the peak-to-average ratio of the total energy demand, the total energy costs, as well as each user's individual daily electricity charges.

/pdf/autonomous-demand-side-management-based-on-game-theoretic-2xyp3ii3r8.pdf

Autonomous Demand-Side Management Based on Game-Theoretic Energy Consumption Scheduling for the Future Smart Grid

A power grid is a complex system connecting electric power generators to consumers through power transmission and distribution networks across a large geographical area. System monitoring is necessary to ensure the reliable operation of power grids, and state estimation is used in system monitoring to best estimate the power grid state through analysis of meter measurements and power system models. Various techniques have been developed to detect and identify bad measurements, including interacting bad measurements introduced by arbitrary, nonrandom causes. At first glance, it seems that these techniques can also defeat malicious measurements injected by attackers.In this article, we expose an unknown vulnerability of existing bad measurement detection algorithms by presenting and analyzing a new class of attacks, called false data injection attacks, against state estimation in electric power grids. Under the assumption that the attacker can access the current power system configuration information and manipulate the measurements of meters at physically protected locations such as substations, such attacks can introduce arbitrary errors into certain state variables without being detected by existing algorithms. Moreover, we look at two scenarios, where the attacker is either constrained to specific meters or limited in the resources required to compromise meters. We show that the attacker can systematically and efficiently construct attack vectors in both scenarios to change the results of state estimation in arbitrary ways. We also extend these attacks to generalized false data injection attacks, which can further increase the impact by exploiting measurement errors typically tolerated in state estimation. We demonstrate the success of these attacks through simulation using IEEE test systems, and also discuss the practicality of these attacks and the real-world constraints that limit their effectiveness.

False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids

A power grid is a complex system connecting electric power generators to consumers through power transmission and distribution networks across a large geographical area. System monitoring is necessary to ensure the reliable operation of power grids, and state estimation is used in system monitoring to best estimate the power grid state through analysis of meter measurements and power system models. Various techniques have been developed to detect and identify bad measurements, including the interacting bad measurements introduced by arbitrary, non-random causes. At first glance, it seems that these techniques can also defeat malicious measurements injected by attackers.In this paper, we present a new class of attacks, called false data injection attacks, against state estimation in electric power grids. We show that an attacker can exploit the configuration of a power system to launch such attacks to successfully introduce arbitrary errors into certain state variables while bypassing existing techniques for bad measurement detection. Moreover, we look at two realistic attack scenarios, in which the attacker is either constrained to some specific meters (due to the physical protection of the meters), or limited in the resources required to compromise meters. We show that the attacker can systematically and efficiently construct attack vectors in both scenarios, which can not only change the results of state estimation, but also modify the results in arbitrary ways. We demonstrate the success of these attacks through simulation using IEEE test systems. Our results indicate that security protection of the electric power grid must be revisited when there are potentially malicious attacks.

Topics considered include characteristics of power generation units, transmission losses, generation with limited energy supply, control of generation, and power system security. This book is a graduate-level text in electric power engineering as regards to planning, operating, and controlling large scale power generation and transmission systems. Material used was generated in the post-1966 period. Many (if not most) of the chapter problems require a digital computer. A background in steady-state power circuit analysis is required.

Allen J. Wood

Papers

Power Generation, Operation, and Control

Power generation operation and control — 2nd edition