Alun Gibbs

Bio: Alun Gibbs is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: European Union law & Cartel. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 29 citations.

Why go to court in Europe? An analysis of cartel appeals 1995-2004

Abstract: Harding, Christopher; Gibbs, Alun, (2005) 'Why Go to Court in Europe? An Analysis of Cartel Appeals, 1995-2004', European Law Review 3, pp. 349-370. RAE2008

European Union Law: Text and Materials

Abstract: As the preferred choice of both teachers and students, this textbook offers an unrivalled combination of expertise, accessibility and comprehensive coverage. The new edition reflects the way the economic crisis has impacted the shape and nature of European Union law. Materials from case law, legislation and academic literature are integrated throughout to expose the student to the broadest range of views. Additional online material on the application of EU law in non member states and on rulings on the Fiscal Compact ensures the material is completely current. The new edition includes a timeline which charts the evolution of the EU project. Written in a way which encourages sophisticated analysis, the book ensures the student's full engagement with sometimes complex material. More importantly, it offers the clarity which is essential to understanding. A required text for all interested in European Union law.

European antitrust policy 1957–2004 : an analysis of commission decisions

Abstract: This paper provides a survey of European antitrust law enforcement since its foundation in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 up to and including 2004. We present a complete overview and statistical analysis of all 538 formal Commission decisions under Articles 81, 82, and 86 of the European Community Treaty. We report a range of summary statistics concerning report route, investigation duration, length of the decision, decision type, imposed fines, number of parties, sector classification, nationality, and Commissioner and Director General responsible. The statistics are linked to changes in legislation and administrative implementation, thereby providing an historical overview that summarizes the Commission’s work in the area of antitrust. One or more appeals were filed with respect to 161 of the 538 decisions. We estimate the determinants of the size of the imposed fine and probability of appeal when an infringement has been found.

European antitrust policy 1957-2004: An analysis of Commission decisions

Abstract: This paper provides a survey of European antitrust law enforcement since its foundation in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 up to and including 2004. We present a complete overview and statistical analysis of all 538 formal Commission decisions under Articles 81, 82, and 86 of the European Community Treaty. We report a range of summary statistics concerning report route, investigation duration, length of the decision, decision type, imposed fines, number of parties, sector classification, nationality, and Commissioner and Director General responsible. The statistics are linked to changes in legislation and administrative implementation, thereby providing an historical overview that summarizes the Commission’s work in the area of antitrust. One or more appeals were filed with respect to 161 of the 538 decisions. We estimate the determinants of the size of the imposed fine and probability of appeal when an infringement has been found.

Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe

Abstract: The European Commission has made transparent in a number of recent publications that undertakings that colluded to fix prices or share markets can expect fines based on affected commerce as well as private antitrust damage claims. Research on discovered cartels characterizes modern international cartels in terms of illegal gains, duration of the infringement and success on appeal. This paper offers a back-of-the-envelope calculation into the net effective (expected) liability of a representative modern international cartel. The exercise reveals that the Commission's recent commitments to punish cartels are likely to remain insufficient to deter collusion, unless European cartel enforcement produces a high (perceived) probability of discovery across the board. This calls for broad, unbiased, random and active cartel detection.