Alvin W. Gouldner

Bio: Alvin W. Gouldner is an academic researcher from Washington University in St. Louis. The author has contributed to research in topics: Social theory & Ideology. The author has an hindex of 37, co-authored 87 publications receiving 22742 citations. Previous affiliations of Alvin W. Gouldner include University of Amsterdam & Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

Theoretical Requirements of the Applied Social Sciences

Abstract: The author has strong preliminary indications from his research into Holiness groups of a basic ethical primacy obscured by a more striking emotionalism.'3 The content of this ethic is largely what Weber calls "inner-worldly asceticism"; it is oriented to production rather than to consumption, to achievement for its own sake, to leading consistent, disciplined lives. In short, in many new Sectarian movements the underlying ethical themes are already framed in the same general terms as those of the older denominations. John Holt noted some years ago that most of the phenomenal growth of the Holiness movement in the South had taken place in those areas characterized by rapid industrial or agricultural development.'4 He saw this as an attempt on the part of new lower-class elements in these areas to cope with the disruption of their traditional rural life patterns. He viewed the resulting upsurge of Holiness religion as "reactionary and [morally] reformist" rather than "constructive." As an alternative hypothesis, Holiness religion may be a powerful agent in socializing lower-class groups in the values and usages of our predominantly middle-class society. Certainly the appearance in any region of industrial or market agriculture developments poses the need for the internalization of a rather specific type of value orientation on the part of those who are to participate in the system. The lack of such internalization is most apparent in lowerclass groups. Insofar as Holiness religion, among other things, requires a steady, conscientious involvement in the new system, it is more than just a reactionary coping with a strange new life by an appeal to rural values. This is a problem area in which a good deal of work needs to be done and may lead to better integration of the sociology of religion with other phases of sociology, notably social mobility and stratification. Although the proposed reformulation of the Church-Sect typology reflects only one range of theoretically important considerations, it is hoped that this paper will provoke renewed interest both in the basic theory of the sociology of religion and in the realm of concrete research problems. 13 G. Benton Johnson, A Framework for the Analysis of Religious Action with Special Reference to Holiness and Non-Holiness Groups (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1953). The author found nearly unanimous agreement among his Holiness informants that a person cannot be a sincere, converted Christian (despite "spiritual" manifestations such as prayer, testimonials, and even speaking in tongues) without leading a scrupulously moral life. It is possible, however, to lead a moral life, refrain from "spiritual" signs and be considered a Christian so long as commitment to the religious ideals is understood. The author does not assume that all Pentecostal or Holiness groups are ethical Sects. 14 John B. Holt, "Holiness Religion: Cultural Shock and Social Reorganization," in American Sociological Review, 5 (October, 1940), pp. 740747.

The sociologist as partisan: sociology and the welfare state

Abstract: Sociology begins by disenchanting the world, and it proceeds by disenchanting itself. Having insisted upon the non-rationality of those whom it studies, sociology comes, at length, to confess its own captivity. But voluntary confessions should always be suspect. We should try to notice, when men complain about the bonds that enchain them, whether their tone is one of disappointed resentment or of comfortable accommodation. In 1961, in an address to a learned society, I attacked what I took to be dominant professional ideology of sociol ogists: that favoring the value-free doctrine of social science. Today, only six years later, I find myself in the uncom fortable position of drawing back from some who found my argument against the value-free myth so persuasive. I now find myself caught between two contradictory impulses: I do not wish to seem ungrateful toward those who sym pathized with my position, yet the issue is a serious one and I also do not want to encumber discussions of it with considerations of personal tact or professional courtesy. In a nutshell: I fear that the myth of a value-free social science is about to be supplanted by still another myth, and that the once glib acceptance of the value-free doctrine is about to be superseded by a new but no less glib rejection of it. My uneasiness concerning this came to a head upon reading Howard S. Becker's paper which boldly raises the problem, "Whose Side Are We on?" Rather than presenting the storybook picture of the sociologist as a value-free scien tist, Becker begins by stating that it is impossible for a social scientist to do research "uncontaminated by personal and political sympathies." We are told that, no matter what perspective a sociologist takes, his work must be written either from the standpoint of subordinates or superiors. Ap parently one cannot do equal justice to both. The most telling indication of just how large a change sociology has recently undergone, may be seen not so much from the position that Becker takes but from the way his position is presented. There is nothing defensive in the manner that Becker rejects the older, non-partisan con ception of the sociologist's role. Instead, Becker presents his rejection of this position as if it needed no explanation; as if it were completely obvious to everyone; and as if there were nothing to argue about. His posture is not that of the cocky challenger but of a blas? referee announcing the out come of a finished fight, and whose verdict must be obvious. More than anything else, this suggests that there has been a substantial change in the occupational culture of sociol ogists in the last decade or so. Becker's conception of the partisan sociologist would be unimportant were it simply an expression of his own idio syncratic individuality. The fact is, however, that there is every reason to believe that he is voicing the sentiments of a substantial and probably growing number of sociologists, and, in particular, those whose interests focus upon the study of social problems, or the sociology of "deviant be havior." It is notable that the article in which Becker asks, "Whose Side Are We on?, was delivered originally as his

Explorations in Applied Social Science

Abstract: Not so long ago the words "social engineer" were a term of opprobrium. They carried with them the suspicion that such a social scientist had somehow betrayed his vow of dispassionate objectivity and had sold his scientific heritage for a tasteless mess of popularity. This fastidious judgment was congenial to a stable society confident in the capacity of its established routines to cope with familiar tensions. It made sense also in a culture which had an unshaken belief in progress, rationality, and justice, and an optimistic faith that each new generation would automatically outdistance its predecessors. (7) As these assumptions no longer appear transparently self-evident, there emerge such pragmatic disciplines as disaster research, industrial sociology, military sociology, propaganda and communications research, and group dynamics to mention only a few. Today, the growth of such organizations as HUMRO, RAND Corporation, The Air Forces Institute, and others, indicates the rapid transition to a more honorific and powerful place for the applied social sciences. The applied social sciences have shifted for themselves, growing rapidly but in a trial-and-error fashion and with little assistance from the theorist.

The iron cage revisited institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields

Abstract: What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital

Abstract: In this paper, the concept of social capital is introduced and illustrated, its forms are described, the social structural conditions under which it arises are examined, and it is used in an analys...

The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism

Abstract: A model is presented to account for the natural selection of what is termed reciprocally altruistic behavior. The model shows how selection can operate against the cheater (non-reciprocator) in the system. Three instances of altruistic behavior are discussed, the evolution of which the model can explain: (1) behavior involved in cleaning symbioses; (2) warning cries in birds; and (3) human reciprocal altruism. Regarding human reciprocal altruism, it is shown that the details of the psychological system that regulates this altruism can be explained by the model. Specifically, friendship, dislike, moralistic aggression, gratitude, sympathy, trust, suspicion, trustworthiness, aspects of guilt, and some forms of dishonesty and hypocrisy can be explained as important adaptations to regulate the altruistic system. Each individual human is seen as possessing altruistic and cheating tendencies, the expression of which is sensitive to developmental variables that were selected to set the tendencies at a balance ap...

Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment

Abstract: ■ Abstract The recent proliferation of scholarship on collective action frames and framing processes in relation to social movements indicates that framing processes have come to be regarded, alongside resource mobilization and political opportunity processes, as a central dynamic in understanding the character and course of social movements. This review examines the analytic utility of the framing literature for un- derstanding social movement dynamics. We first review how collective action frames have been conceptualized, including their characteristic and variable features. We then examine the literature related to framing dynamics and processes. Next we review the literature regarding various contextual factors that constrain and facilitate framing processes. We conclude with an elaboration of the consequences of framing processes for other movement processes and outcomes. We seek throughout to provide clarifi- cation of the linkages between framing concepts/processes and other conceptual and theoretical formulations relevant to social movements, such as schemas and ideology.