Showing papers by "Amartya Sen published in 1974"

Rawls versus Bentham: An Axiomatic Examination of the Pure Distribution Problem

Abstract: The decision rules yielded respectively by the Rawlsian ‘maximin’ conception of justice and by classical utilitarianism are compared and contrasted. The discussion is based on the assumption of a pure distribution problem and sharp differences are brought out. An axiomatic analysis of the two conceptions is undertaken, the result of which is that Rawls and utilitarianism both omit essential aspects of distributional welfare judgments: Rawls leaves out questions of welfare differences, utilitarianism leaves out questions of welfare levels. It is possible to pay attention to the ranking of welfare levels without concentrating exclusively on the welfare levels of worst off persons only, thereby departing from both Bentham and Rawls.

Prisoner's dilemma and social justice: A reply

Abstract: In a recent notel prompted by a paper of ours published in Mind in I965, John Smyth first quotes, but does not dispute, our claim that a useful sense may be given to Rousseau's concept of the 'general will' by reference to the theory of non-zero-sum non-cooperative games, and then goes on to dispute our argument that 'a contract falling within a set of rules conforming to an "unambiguous general will" also falls within a set of rules "that satisfy the (Rawlsian) criterion of social justice" '. He argues that 'the problem of obtaining the object of the general will is essentially a problem not of obtaining a Rawlsian rule or contract, but a problem of enforcing a rule or a contract' (p. 427). It seems to us that Smyth's objection is based on a confusion between two different problems: (i) How can the 'general will', as we interpret it, be enforced? (2) Will an 'unambiguous general will' pass Rawls's test of 'social justice'? Smyth is interested in (i), and is accordingly led to the difficulties of devising enforceable sanctions in the case of the Prisoner's Dilemma. He seems, however, to be under the impression that this somehow undermines our affirmative answer to question (2). This is clearly a mistake, since Smyth himself agrees subsequently that 'a just contract is not necessarily an enforceable contract' (p. 430). It would, if our argument required it, be perfectly possible to envisage the parties to Prisoner's Dilemma being subject to an automatic penalty device of the form of a Doomsday Machine. But even if it were not, it still would not follow that their contract embodying the 'general will' would fail to meet Rawls's criterion of social justice. The relation of a contractual theory of fairness and justice in the manner of Rawls to the notion of the general will rests precisely on the supposition that parties to the contract would recognise it to be to their interest to make some sort of firm commitment in advance. Mr. Smyth says nothing which invalidates our claim that men in Rawls's 'original position ' 2 would agree, among other things, not to confess if they were in due course to find themselves in a 'Prisoner's Dilemma' situation, and should therefore accept that if they were to confess they would be behaving unjustly. Enforcement is a separate issue altogether.