Showing papers by "Amartya Sen published in 1977"

Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory

Abstract: En 1881, Edgeworth posait comme premier principe de l'economie le fait "que chaque agent a comme motivation unique son interet propre" Cette conception egoiste de l'homme a penetre la theorie economique et y persiste L'A demontre l'inconsistance des concepts qui en sont les points nodaux: "rationalite" de la "conduite" qui consiste a "choisir" selon "l'ordre de ses preferences" ou selon le critere de "l'engagement financier" ou de "l'utilite"

Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination

Abstract: Recent developments in social choice theory are critically surveyed in the light of a categorization of interpersonal aggregation problems into four distinct types that seem to require varying treatment but typically do not receive it. Informational inadequacy of the usual social choice framework is discussed in this context. A fairly thorough exploration of the correspondences between consistency conditions for choice functions and regularity properties of the binary relation of preference leads to a re-examination of the class of "impossibility" results in social choice theory, necessitating reinterpretations of various theorems (including Arrow's). SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY is "concerned with relationships between individuals' preferences and social choice" (Fishburn (1973, p. 3)). But a great many problems fit this general description and they can be classified into types that are fundamentally different from each other. It can be argued that some of the difficulties in the general theory of social choice arise from a desire to fit essentially different classes of group aggregation problems into one uniform framework and from seeking excessive generality. An alternative is to classify these problems into a number of categories and to investigate the appropriate structure for each category. In a small way, this is what will be done in this paper, and some of the recent developments in the theory of social choice will be examined in that light.

Non-Linear Social Welfare Functions: A Reply to Professor Harsanyi

Abstract: A preliminary point first. John Harsanyi’s (1977) rejoinder is concerned exclusively with a relatively small part of my lecture (1977), viz., that dealing with Harsanyi’s critique of non-linear social welfare functions. All the formal results, e.g., (T.1) – (T.4), and much of the informal discussion in my lecture were concerned with other issues. While I find Harsanyi’s critique of non-linear social welfare functions interesting and important, and welcome this opportunity of discussing further why I disagree with him, I would certainly like to avoid generating the impression that Harsanyi and I are battling on the main substance of my lecture.

Rationality and morality: A reply

Abstract: In his contribution, 'Rationality and Morality', (this issue, pp. 197-223), Professor Kurt Baier has provided a detailed and interesting critique of the treatment of the Prisoners' Dilemma and related games in my paper for the 1972 Bristol Conference on Practical Reason.1 The purpose of this note is to respond to Professor Baier's criticisms and to take this opportunity to make a few general remarks on the issues involved.2