Anatol Rapoport

Bio: Anatol Rapoport is an academic researcher from University of Toronto. The author has contributed to research in topics: Game theory & Repeated game. The author has an hindex of 45, co-authored 197 publications receiving 16787 citations. Previous affiliations of Anatol Rapoport include University of Michigan & University of New Hampshire.

Prisoner's Dilemma

Abstract: The game nicknamed ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ by A.W. Tucker has attracted wide attention, doubtless because it has raised doubts about the universal applicability of the so called Sure-thing Principle as a principle of rational decision.

Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Co-operation

Abstract: The term "Prisoner's Dilemma" comes from the original anecdote used to illustrate this game of strategy. Two prisoners, held incommunicado, are charged with the same crime. They can be convicted only if either confesses. If both prisoners confess, their payoff is minus one. If neither confesses, it is plus one. If only one confesses, he is set free for having turned state's evidence and is given a reward of plus two to boot. The prisoner who holds out is convicted on the strength of the other's testimony and is given a more severe sentence than if he had confessed. His payoff is minus two. It is in the interest of each to confess no matter what the other does, but it is in their collective interest to hold out. There is no satisfactory solution to the paradox of this game. Its simplicity is misleading. What seems rational from your own point of view, turns out to be detrimental in the end. This book is an account of many experiments in which Prisoner's Dilemma was played. Analyzing the results, one can learn how people are motivated to trust or distrust their partners, to keep faith or to betray, to be guided by joint or selfish interest. The method represents an important step toward building a bridge between psychology which is based on hard data and reproducible experiments and psychology which is concerned with internal conflict.

Fights, Games, and Debates

Abstract: A scientifically grounded method by which we can understand human conflict in all its forms

The Strength of Weak Ties

Abstract: Analysis of social networks is suggested as a tool for linking micro and macro levels of sociological theory. The procedure is illustrated by elaboration of the macro implications of one aspect of small-scale interaction: the strength of dyadic ties. It is argued that the degree of overlap of two individuals' friendship networks varies directly with the strength of their tie to one another. The impact of this principle on diffusion of influence and information, mobility opportunity, and community organization is explored. Stress is laid on the cohesive power of weak ties. Most network models deal, implicitly, with strong ties, thus confining their applicability to small, well-defined groups. Emphasis on weak ties lends itself to discussion of relations between groups and to analysis of segments of social structure not easily defined in terms of primary groups.

Statistical mechanics of complex networks

Abstract: The emergence of order in natural systems is a constant source of inspiration for both physical and biological sciences. While the spatial order characterizing for example the crystals has been the basis of many advances in contemporary physics, most complex systems in nature do not offer such high degree of order. Many of these systems form complex networks whose nodes are the elements of the system and edges represent the interactions between them. Traditionally complex networks have been described by the random graph theory founded in 1959 by Paul Erdohs and Alfred Renyi. One of the defining features of random graphs is that they are statistically homogeneous, and their degree distribution (characterizing the spread in the number of edges starting from a node) is a Poisson distribution. In contrast, recent empirical studies, including the work of our group, indicate that the topology of real networks is much richer than that of random graphs. In particular, the degree distribution of real networks is a power-law, indicating a heterogeneous topology in which the majority of the nodes have a small degree, but there is a significant fraction of highly connected nodes that play an important role in the connectivity of the network. The scale-free topology of real networks has very important consequences on their functioning. For example, we have discovered that scale-free networks are extremely resilient to the random disruption of their nodes. On the other hand, the selective removal of the nodes with highest degree induces a rapid breakdown of the network to isolated subparts that cannot communicate with each other. The non-trivial scaling of the degree distribution of real networks is also an indication of their assembly and evolution. Indeed, our modeling studies have shown us that there are general principles governing the evolution of networks. Most networks start from a small seed and grow by the addition of new nodes which attach to the nodes already in the system. This process obeys preferential attachment: the new nodes are more likely to connect to nodes with already high degree. We have proposed a simple model based on these two principles wich was able to reproduce the power-law degree distribution of real networks. Perhaps even more importantly, this model paved the way to a new paradigm of network modeling, trying to capture the evolution of networks, not just their static topology.

The Structure and Function of Complex Networks

Abstract: Inspired by empirical studies of networked systems such as the Internet, social networks, and biological networks, researchers have in recent years developed a variety of techniques and models to help us understand or predict the behavior of these systems. Here we review developments in this field, including such concepts as the small-world effect, degree distributions, clustering, network correlations, random graph models, models of network growth and preferential attachment, and dynamical processes taking place on networks.

The Theory of Island Biogeography

Abstract: Preface to the Princeton Landmarks in Biology Edition vii Preface xi Symbols Used xiii 1. The Importance of Islands 3 2. Area and Number of Speicies 8 3. Further Explanations of the Area-Diversity Pattern 19 4. The Strategy of Colonization 68 5. Invasibility and the Variable Niche 94 6. Stepping Stones and Biotic Exchange 123 7. Evolutionary Changes Following Colonization 145 8. Prospect 181 Glossary 185 References 193 Index 201

The Evolution of Cooperation

Abstract: Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.