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André de Groot

Bio: André de Groot is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Utterance & Comprehension. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 43 citations.

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors investigated children's comprehension of non-literal language and their awareness of the say-mean distinction in such language, and found that 6-and 7-year-olds were tested for awareness and comprehension of both metaphor and irony.
Abstract: According to Olson (1988), full comprehension of nonliteral language must include the recognition of the implied meaning of the utterance and an awareness that there are two distinct levels of meaning—what is said and what is meant. Three experiments were performed to investigate children's comprehension of nonliteral language and their awareness of the say-mean distinction in such language. In Experiment 1, children heard irony modeled and were asked to produce similar utterances. Six-year-olds produced literal insults, showing that they understood the modeled irony but were not aware of the say-mean distinction. In Experiment 2, 6- and 7-year-olds were tested for awareness and comprehension of both metaphor and irony.

44 citations


Cited by
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Journal ArticleDOI
01 Apr 2006-Brain
TL;DR: It is confirmed that children with ASD have difficulty interpreting the communicative intent of others and suggested that these individuals can recruit regions activated as part of the normative neural circuitry when task demands require explicit attention to socially relevant cues.
Abstract: While individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are typically impaired in interpreting the communicative intent of others, little is known about the neural bases of higher-level pragmatic impairments. Here, we used functional MRI (fMRI) to examine the neural circuitry underlying deficits in understanding irony in high-functioning children with ASD. Participants listened to short scenarios and decided whether the speaker was sincere or ironic. Three types of scenarios were used in which we varied the information available to guide this decision. Scenarios included (i) both knowledge of the event outcome and strong prosodic cues (sincere or sarcastic intonation), (ii) prosodic cues only or (iii) knowledge of the event outcome only. Although children with ASD performed well above chance, they were less accurate than typically developing (TD) children at interpreting the communicative intent behind a potentially ironic remark, particularly with regard to taking advantage of available contextual information. In contrast to prior research showing hypoactivation of regions involved in understanding the mental states of others, children with ASD showed significantly greater activity than TD children in the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) as well as in bilateral temporal regions. Increased activity in the ASD group fell within the network recruited in the TD group and may reflect more effortful processing needed to interpret the intended meaning of an utterance. These results confirm that children with ASD have difficulty interpreting the communicative intent of others and suggest that these individuals can recruit regions activated as part of the normative neural circuitry when task demands require explicit attention to socially relevant cues.

354 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper used an irony task to assess 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds' and adults' recursive understanding of others' minds and found that children who understand these aspects of mind are able to reflect on the speaker's attitude.
Abstract: This study describes the development of social reasoning in school-age children. An irony task is used to assess 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds’ (N= 72) and adults’ (N= 24) recursive understanding of others’ minds. Guttman scale analysis demonstrates that in order to understand a speaker’s communicative intention, a child needs to recognize the speaker’s belief, the detection of which depends on the ability to identify the discrepancy between the intended and the expressed meaning. Only children who understand these aspects of mind are able to reflect on the speaker’s attitude. Theory of mind and language ability make unique contributions to children’s interpretation of irony over and above the impact of age and memory, but attunement to expressive prosody does not.

245 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: There is no particular ironic tone of voice and that listeners interpret verbal irony by combining a variety of cues, including information outside of the linguistic context.
Abstract: Research on nonverbal vocal cues and verbal irony has often relied on the concept of an ironic tone of voice. Here we provide acoustic analysis and experimental evidence that this notion is oversimplified and misguided. Acoustic analyses of spontaneous ironic speech extracted from talk radio shows, both ambiguous and unambiguous in written form, revealed only a difference in amplitude variability compared to matched nonironic speech from the same sources, and that was only among the most clear-cut items. In a series of experiments, participants rated content-filtered versions of the same ironic and nonironic utterances on a range of affective and linguistic dimensions. Listeners did not rely on any set of vocal cues to identify verbal irony that was separate from other emotional and linguistic judgments. We conclude that there is no particular ironic tone of voice and that listeners interpret verbal irony by combining a variety of cues, including information outside of the linguistic context.

204 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This study is the first to examine developmental changes in the neural circuitry underlying natural language pragmatics using irony comprehension as a test case and finds greater involvement of prefrontal regions in children may subserve the integration of multiple cues to reconcile the discrepancy between the literal and intended meaning of an ironic remark.
Abstract: Understanding the intended meaning of a remark beyond what is explicitly stated is an integral part of successful social interactions. Here, we examined the neural circuitry underlying the interpretation of communicative intent in children and adults using irony comprehension as a test case. Participants viewed cartoon drawings while listening to short scenarios ending with a potentially ironic remark and were asked to decide whether the speaker was being sincere or ironic. In both children and adults, instructions to attend to the cues provided by the speaker's facial expression or tone of voice modulated the activity in visual and language cortices, respectively. Overall, children engaged the medial prefrontal cortex and left inferior frontal gyrus more strongly than adults, whereas adults recruited the fusiform gyrus, extrastriate areas and the amygdala more strongly than children. Greater involvement of prefrontal regions in children may subserve the integration of multiple cues to reconcile the discrepancy between the literal and intended meaning of an ironic remark. This developmental shift from a reliance on frontal regions to posterior occipitotemporal regions may reflect the automatization of basic reasoning about mental states. This study is the first to examine developmental changes in the neural circuitry underlying natural language pragmatics.

195 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that we create our social reality, meaning, and self in embodied and situated dialogue, and explore the practice of social poetics as a form of management inquiry.
Abstract: The author’s position in this article is that we create our social realities, meaning, and selves in embodied and situated dialogue. Given the premise that language is metaphorical and sense making a multiply constructed, dynamic embodied practice, then what are the implications for research? The author suggests social poetics is one research practice that offers a way of exploring how, in the flow of our embodied dialogical activity, we relate to our surroundings and make sense of our experiences. Embracing a radically reflexive stance, social poetics elevates everyday, imaginative ways of talking, for example, metaphors, storytelling, and gestural statements. Using excerpts from research conversations, the author explores the practice of social poetics as a form of management inquiry.

192 citations