Showing papers by "Andrei Shleifer published in 2008"
TL;DR: The anti-self-dealing index as mentioned in this paper is a measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders, which is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific selfdealing transaction.
2,447 citations
TL;DR: The authors argued that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes, and they summarized this evidence and attempted a unified interpretation.
Abstract: In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes. We summarize this evidence and attempt a unified interpretation. We also address several objections to the empirical claim that legal origins matter. Finally, we assess the implications of this research for economic reform.
2,134 citations
TL;DR: This article presented insolvency practitioners from 88 countries, and asked them to describe in detail how debt enforcement will proceed in their countries, using the data on time, cost, and the likely disposition of the assets (preservation as a going concern versus piecemeal sale) to construct a measure of the efficiency of debt enforcement in each country.
Abstract: We present insolvency practitioners from 88 countries, and ask them to describe in detail how debt enforcement will proceed in their countries. We use the data on time, cost, and the likely disposition of the assets (preservation as a going concern versus piecemeal sale) to construct a measure of the efficiency of debt enforcement in each country. We identify several characteristics of debt enforcement procedures, such as the structure of appeals and availability of floating charge finance, that influence efficiency. Our measure of efficiency of debt enforcement is strongly correlated with per capita income and legal origin and predicts debt market development across countries. Interestingly, it is also highly correlated with measures of the quality of contract enforcement and public regulation obtained in other studies.
566 citations
TL;DR: The authors present a model of uninformative persuasion in which individuals "think coarsely" where they group situations into categories and apply the same model of inference to all situations within a category.
Abstract: We present a model of uninformative persuasion in which individuals “think coarsely”: they group situations into categories and apply the same model of inference to all situations within a category. Coarse thinking exhibits two features that persuaders take advantage of: (i) transference, whereby individuals transfer the informational content of a given message from situations in a category where it is useful to those where it is not, and (ii) framing, whereby objectively useless information influences individuals’ choice of category. The model sheds light on uninformative advertising and product branding, as well as on some otherwise anomalous evidence on mutual fund advertising.
353 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider three broad views of the role of informal firms in economic development and find that informal firms are small and extremely unproductive, compared even to the small formal firms and especially relative to the larger formal firms.
Abstract: In developing countries, informal firms (those that are not registered with the government) account for about half of all economic activity. We consider three broad views of the role of such firms in economic development. According to the romantic view, these firms would become the engine of economic growth if not stopped by government regulation. According to the parasite view, informal firms, by avoiding taxes and regulations, unfairly compete with the more efficient formal firms and, by taking away their market share, undermine economic progress. According to the dual view, informal firms are highly inefficient, do not pose much threat to the formal firms, but also do not contribute to economic growth, which is driven by the efficient formal firms. Using data from World Bank firm level surveys, we find that informal firms are small and extremely unproductive, compared even to the small formal firms, and especially relative to the larger formal firms. Compared to the informal firms, formal ones are run by much better educated managers. As a consequence, they use more capital, have different customers, market their products, and use more external finance. Hardly any formal firms had ever operated informally. This evidence is inconsistent with the romantic and parasite views, but supports the dual view. In this "Walmart" theory of economic development, growth comes from the creation of the highly productive formal firms. Informal firms keep millions of people alive, but disappear over time.
130 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors describe how debt enforcement will proceed against an identical hotel about to default on its debt and use the data on time, cost and the likely disposition of the assets (preservation as a going concern vs. piecemeal sale) to construct a measure of the efficiency of debt enforcement in each country.
Abstract: Insolvency practitioners from 88 countries describe how debt enforcement will proceed against an identical hotel about to default on its debt. We use the data on time, cost, and the likely disposition of the assets (preservation as a going concern vs. piecemeal sale) to construct a measure of the efficiency of debt enforcement in each country. This measure is strongly correlated with per capita income and legal origin and predicts debt market development. Several characteristics of debt enforcement procedures, such as the structure of appeals and availability of floating charge finance, influence efficiency.
121 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors construct and analyze a comprehensive list of dual-class firms in the United States and use this list to investigate the relationship between insider ownership and firm value, finding strong evidence that firm value is increasing in insiders' cash-flow rights and decreasing in insider voting rights.
Abstract: We construct and analyze a comprehensive list of dual-class firms in the United States and use this list to investigate the relationship between insider ownership and firm value. Our data has two useful features for this valuation analysis. First, since dual-class stock separates cash-flow rights from voting rights, we can separately identify the impact of each. Second, we address endogeneity concerns by using exogenous predictors of dualclass status as instruments. While other data sets have provided one of these features, our data set is the first to provide both. In single-stage regressions, we find strong evidence that firm value is increasing in insiders’ cash-flow rights and decreasing in insider voting rights. In instrumental-variable regressions, the point estimates remain the same sign and magnitude, but the significance levels are lower.
64 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a dataset of 465 state-court appellate decisions involving the application of the economic loss rule in construction disputes was created and tracked over a period from 1970 to 2005.
Abstract: The efficiency of common law rules is central to achieving efficient resource allocation in a market economy. While many theories suggest reasons why judge-made law should tend toward efficient rules, the question whether the common law actually does converge in commercial areas has remained empirically untested. We create a dataset of 465 state-court appellate decisions involving the application of the Economic Loss Rule in construction disputes and track the evolution of law in this area from 1970 to 2005. We find that over this period the law did not converge to any stable resting point and evolved differently in different states. We find that legal evolution is influenced by plaintiffs' claims, the relative economic power of the parties, and nonbinding federal precedent.
63 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider three broad views of the role of informal firms in economic development and find that informal firms are small and extremely unproductive, compared even to the small formal firms and especially relative to the larger formal firms.
Abstract: In developing countries, informal firms (those that are not registered with the government) account for about half of all economic activity. We consider three broad views of the role of such firms in economic development. According to the romantic view, these firms would become the engine of economic growth if not stopped by government regulation. According to the parasite view, informal firms, by avoiding taxes and regulations, unfairly compete with the more efficient formal firms and, by taking away their market share, undermine economic progress. According to the dual view, informal firms are highly inefficient, do not pose much threat to the formal firms, but also do not contribute to economic growth, which is driven by the efficient formal firms. Using data from World Bank firm level surveys, we find that informal firms are small and extremely unproductive, compared even to the small formal firms, and especially relative to the larger formal firms. Compared to the informal firms, formal ones are run by much better educated managers. As a consequence, they use more capital, have different customers, market their products, and use more external finance. Hardly any formal firms had ever operated informally. This evidence is inconsistent with the romantic and parasite views, but supports the dual view. In this "Walmart" theory of economic development, growth comes from the creation of the highly productive formal firms. Informal firms keep millions of people alive, but disappear over time.
62 citations
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TL;DR: The anti-self-dealing index as discussed by the authors is a measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders, which is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific selfdealing transaction.
Abstract: We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the previously introduced index of anti-director rights.
57 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the causes and consequences of trial judges exercising fact discretion in finding facts in a trial are modeled and two motivations for the exercise of such discretion are judicial policy preferences and judges' aversion to reversal on appeal when the law is unsettled.
Abstract: Following legal realists, we model the causes and consequences of trial judges exercising discretion in finding facts in a trial. We identify two motivations for the exercise of such discretion: judicial policy preferences and judges’ aversion to reversal on appeal when the law is unsettled. In the latter case, judges exercising fact discretion find the facts that fit the settled precedents, even when they have no policy preferences. In a standard model of a tort, judicial fact discretion leads to setting of damages unpredictable from true facts of the case but predictable from knowledge of judicial preferences, distorts the number and severity of accidents, and generates welfare losses. It also encourages litigants to take extreme positions in court and raises the incidence of litigation relative to settlement, especially in new and complex disputes for which the law is unsettled.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the evolution of legal rules between 1950 and 2000 and found that between the two simple disputes, the formalism of legal procedure did not converge, and possibly diverged, between common law and French civil law countries.
Abstract: Djankov et al. (2003a) propose and measure for 109 countries in the year 2000 an index of formalism of legal procedure for two simple disputes: eviction of a non-paying tenant and collection of a bounced check. For a sub-sample of 40 countries, we compute this index every year starting in 1950, which allows us to study the evolution of legal rules. We find that between 1950 and 2000, the formalism of legal procedure did not converge, and possibly diverged, between common law and French civil law countries. At least in this specific area of law, the results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that national legal systems are converging, and support the view that legal origins exert long lasting influence on legal rules.
Posted Content•
TL;DR: This paper argued that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes, and they summarized this evidence and attempted a unified interpretation.
Abstract: In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country’s laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes. We summarize this evidence and attempt a unified interpretation. We also address several objections to the empirical claim that legal origins matter. Finally, we assess the implications of this research for economic reform.
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a model of uninformative persuasion in which individuals group situations into categories and apply the same model of inference to all situations within a category Coarse thinking exhibits two features that persuaders take advantage of: (i) transference, whereby individuals transfer the informational content of a given message from situations in a category where it is useful to those where it not, and framing, whereby objectively useless information influences individuals' choice of category.
Abstract: We present a model of uninformative persuasion in which individuals “think coarsely†: they group situations into categories and apply the same model of inference to all situations within a category Coarse thinking exhibits two features that persuaders take advantage of: (i) transference, whereby individuals transfer the informational content of a given message from situations in a category where it is useful to those where it is not, and (ii) framing, whereby objectively useless information influences individuals' choice of category The model sheds light on uninformative advertising and product branding, as well as on some otherwise anomalous evidence on mutual fund advertising
01 Jan 2008
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used an episode of a drastic reform in Russia between 2001 and 2004 which liberalized registration, licensing, and inspections, and found that on average, the reform reduced the administrative costs of firms; but, the progress of reform had a substantial geographical variation.
Abstract: What determines the enforcement of reform of business regulation? What are the outcomes of such reform? We address these questions using an episode of a drastic reform in Russia between 2001 and 2004 which liberalized registration, licensing, and inspections. Based on the analysis of micro-level panel data on regulatory burden, we find that: 1) On average, the reform reduced the administrative costs of firms; but, the progress of reform had a substantial geographical variation. 2) The enforcement of deregulation reform was better in regions with a transparent government, low corruption, better access of the public to independent media sources, a powerful industrial lobby, and stronger fiscal autonomy. 3) Using the exogenous variation in regulation generated by the interaction of reform and its institutional determinants, we find a substantial positive eect of regulatory reform on net entry into the ocial
TL;DR: The relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the company, as measured by Tobin's Q, was investigated by as mentioned in this paper, who found evidence of a signifi cant nonmonotonic relationship.
Abstract: We investigate the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the fi rm, as measured by Tobin's Q. In a 1980 cross-section of 371 Fortune 500 fi rms, we fi nd evidence of a signifi cant nonmonotonic relationship. Tobin's Q fi rst increases, then declines, and fi nally rises slightly as ownership by the board of directors rises. For older fi rms, there is evidence that Q is lower when the fi rm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an offi cer unrelated to the founder.