Bio: Annette Barnes is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Second-generation programming language & Formal language. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 444 citations.
TL;DR: A set of principles for designing cognitively effective visual notations: ones that are optimized for human communication and problem solving are defined, which form a design theory, called the Physics of Notations, which focuses on the physical properties of notations rather than their logical properties.
Abstract: Visual notations form an integral part of the language of software engineering (SE). Yet historically, SE researchers and notation designers have ignored or undervalued issues of visual representation. In evaluating and comparing notations, details of visual syntax are rarely discussed. In designing notations, the majority of effort is spent on semantics, with graphical conventions largely an afterthought. Typically, no design rationale, scientific or otherwise, is provided for visual representation choices. While SE has developed mature methods for evaluating and designing semantics, it lacks equivalent methods for visual syntax. This paper defines a set of principles for designing cognitively effective visual notations: ones that are optimized for human communication and problem solving. Together these form a design theory, called the Physics of Notations as it focuses on the physical (perceptual) properties of notations rather than their logical (semantic) properties. The principles were synthesized from theory and empirical evidence from a wide range of fields and rest on an explicit theory of how visual notations communicate. They can be used to evaluate, compare, and improve existing visual notations as well as to construct new ones. The paper identifies serious design flaws in some of the leading SE notations, together with practical suggestions for improving them. It also showcases some examples of visual notation design excellence from SE and other fields.
01 Aug 1996-International Journal of Human-computer Studies \/ International Journal of Man-machine Studies
TL;DR: This analysis reveals a fragmented and poorly understood account of how graphical representations work, exposing a number of assumptions and fallacies, and proposes a new agenda for graphical representation research.
Abstract: Advances in graphical technology have now made it possible for us to interact with information in innovative ways, most notably by exploring multimedia environments and by manipulating three-dimensional virtual worlds. Many benefits have been claimed for this new kind of interactivity, a general assumption being that learning and cognitive processing are facilitated. We point out, however, that little is known about the cognitive value ofanygraphical representations, be they good old-fashioned (e.g. diagrams) or more advanced (e.g. animations, multimedia, virtual reality). In our paper, we critique the disparate literature on graphical representations, focusing on four representative studies. Our analysis reveals a fragmented and poorly understood account of how graphical representations work, exposing a number of assumptions and fallacies. As an alternative we propose a new agenda for graphical representation research. This builds on the nascent theoretical approach within cognitive science that analyses the role played by external representations in relation to internal mental ones. We outline some of the central properties of this relationship that are necessary for the processing of graphical representations. Finally, we consider how this analysis can inform the selection and design of both traditional and advanced forms of graphical technology.
TL;DR: This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility and can be found a neural realizer of this overflow.
Abstract: How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases - when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority - and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: Do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is "Yes," then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is "Yes"? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if we assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.
TL;DR: In this article, the Intangible Heritage as Metacultural Production (IHMP) is presented as a Metaculture Production approach to the preservation of the IHMP.
Abstract: (2004). Intangible Heritage as Metacultural Production1. Museum International: Vol. 56, No. 1-2, pp. 52-65.