Anthony Kenny

Bio: Anthony Kenny is an academic researcher from University of Oxford. The author has contributed to research in topics: Contemporary philosophy & Western philosophy. The author has an hindex of 38, co-authored 111 publications receiving 4972 citations.

The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy

Abstract: In the introduction to this large volume the editors refer to their strategy of concentrating on 'those parts of later medieval philosophy that are most readily recognisable as philosophical to a student of twentieth-century philosophy' (p. 3). Twentieth-century philosophy is obviously conceived by the editors in terms of the philosophizing prevalent in university departments of philosophy in the Englishspeaking world. This means that attention is focused on logical and analytic studies in the late Middle Ages. To be sure, the word 'late' should not be greatly emphasized. For the year 1100, which is taken as marking the beginning of the period covered in this volume, hardly belongs to the late Middle Ages. But it is, of course, true that because of the prominence of logical studies at the time the philosophy of the later medieval period is likely to seem more congenial than some other areas of medieval thought to students of philosophy in this country and America, unless perhaps the students happen to be looking for something different from the intellectual food to which they are accustomed. By concentrating on logical studies the work serves the useful purpose of complementing those treatments of medieval philosophy in which attention is focused more on metaphysical and ethical topics. Not that these topics are entirely neglected in the volume under review. They are not. But it is perhaps arguable that the work would have gained in value, if it had been more exclusively a history of logic in the Middle Ages. Some readers at any rate might have found the work more helpful, if the chapters on logic had contained more explanatory material, even at the cost of omitting the brief treatments of metaphysical, ethical and political themes. The retort can indeed be made that the work claims to be a history of later medieval philosophy, not simply of logical studies in the Middle Ages. This is true, but no disrespect is intended to the relevant contributors if one suggests that the chapters on seventeenthcentury scholasticism and on recent neoscholasticism (with references to some still living thinkers) might well have been sacrificed to permit fuller exposition and discussion of some of the features of philosophy in the Middle Ages. For one thing, the cultural background of the 'transcendental Thomists' is different from that of the medieval philosophers. Forty-one contributors participate. The advantage of having a plurality of authors is that the different main topics can be allotted to specialists. The disadvantage is that there may be a failure to convey an overall view. The editors have tried to guard against this danger by arranging that the different chapters should be furnished with introductions and conclusions. But a student who is looking for an overall view of medieval philosophy or for an impression of the spirit and general development of medieval thought would be well advised to turn, for example, to the writings of the late Etienne Gilson. The present volume can hardly take their place, though it certainly 223

Action, emotion and will

Abstract: Kenny attacks previous philosophical tendencies that considered the passions primarily as objects of inspection, the presence of which we are aware by having them, and traces his argument against behaviourists who define emotions in terms of patterns of behaviour. Rejecting the view that emotions, motives and desires are private internal events, differentiated by their different feels, he argues that they are differentiated by the kinds of desires, contexts and activities that are relevant to them. Through a variety of distinctions and analyses, he sketches a theory of the will developed from Geach's account of judgement found in "Mental Acts". He searches for an account of "fully human action" where intention is central and develops an interesting and original theory of voluntary action.

Perceptual symbol systems.

Abstract: Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statis- tics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement record- ing systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The stor- age and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components - not at the level of holistic perceptual expe- riences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a com- mon frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift, run) and introspec- tion (e.g., compare, memory, happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and ab- stract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinato- rially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a per- ceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal sym- bol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.

Handbook of Emotions

Abstract: Part 1. Interdisciplinary Foundations. R.C. Solomon, The Philosophy of Emotions. P.N. Stearns, History of Emotions: Issues of Change and Impact. J.E. Stets, J.H. Turner, The Sociology of Emotions. J. Panksepp, The Affective Brain and Core Consciousness: How Does Neural Activity Generate Emotional Feelings? N.H. Frijda, The Psychologist's Point of View. L.S. Greenberg, The Clinical Application of Emotion in Psychotherapy. P.N. Johnson-Laird, K. Oatley, Emotions, Music, and Literature. J. Tooby, L. Cosmides, The Evolutionary Psychology of the Emotions and Their Relationship to Internal Regulatory Variables. R. Loewenstein, G. Loewenstein, The Role of Emotion in Economic Behavior. Part 2. Biological and Neurophysiological Approaches to Emotion. J.E. LeDoux, E.A. Phelps, Emotional Networks in the Brain. J.T. Larsen, G.G. Berntson, K.M. Poehlmann, T.A. Ito, J.T. Cacioppo, The Psychophysiology of Emotion. J. Bachorowski, M.J. Owren, Vocal Expressions of Emotion. D. Matsumoto, D. Keltner, M.N. Shiota, M. O'Sullivan, M. Frank, Facial Expressions of Emotion. J.M. Haviland-Jones, P.J. Wilson, A "Nose" for Emotion: Emotional Information and Challenges in Odors and Semiochemicals. T.D. Wager, L. Feldman Barrett, E. Bliss-Moreau, K. Lindquist, S. Duncan, H. Kober, J. Joseph, M. Davidson, J. Mize, The Neuroimaging of Emotion. A.D. Craig, Interoception and Emotion: A Neuroanatomical Perspective. Part 3. Developmental Changes. L.A. Camras, S.S. Fatani, The Development of Facial Expressions: Current Perspectives on Infant Emotions. M. Lewis, The Emergence of Human Emotions. P.L. Harris, Children's Understanding of Emotion. C. Saarni, The Interface of Emotional Development with Social Context. S.C. Widen, J.A. Russell, Young Children's Understanding of Others' Emotions. A.S. Walker-Andrews, Intermodal Emotional Processes in Infancy. C. Magai, Long-Lived Emotions: A Lifecourse Perspective on Emotional Development. Part 4. Social Perspectives. L.R. Brody, J.A. Hall, Gender and Emotion in Context. R.A. Shweder, J. Haidt, R. Horton, C. Joseph, The Cultural Psychology of the Emotions: Ancient and Renewed. E.R. Smith, D.M. Mackie, Intergroup Emotions. M.L. Hoffman, Empathy and Prosocial Behavior. A.H. Fischer, A.S.R. Manstead, Social Functions of Emotion. Part 5. Personality Issues. R.E. Lucas, E. Diener, Subjective Well-Being. J.E. Bates, J.A. Goodnight, J.E. Fite, Temperament and Emotion. J.J. Gross, Emotion Regulation. K.A. Lindquist, L. Feldman Barrett, Emotional Complexity. Part 6. Cognitive Factors. P. Salovey, B.T. Detweiler-Bedell, J.B. Detweiler-Bedell, J.D. Mayer, Emotional Intelligence. A.M. Isen, Some Ways in which Positive Affect Influences Decision Making and Problem Solving. N.L. Stein, M.W. Hernandez, T. Trabasso, Advances in Modeling Emotion and Thought: The Importance of Development, On-Line and Multilevel Analyses. P.M. Niedenthal, Emotion Concepts. E.A. Kensinger, D.L. Schacter, Memory and Emotion. M. Minsky, A Framework for Representing Emotional States. G.L. Clore, A. Ortony, Appraisal Theories: How Cognition Shapes Affect into Emotion. Part 7. Health and Emotions. M.A. Diefenbach, S.M. Miller, M. Porter, E. Peters, M. Stefanek, H. Leventhal, Emotions and Health Behavior: A Self-Regulation Perspective. M.E. Kemeny, A. Shestyuk, Emotions, the Neuroendocrine and Immune Systems, and Health. N.S. Consedine, Emotions and Health. A.M. Kring, Emotion Disturbances as Transdiagnostic Processes in Psychopathology. Part 8. Select Emotions. A. Ohman, Fear and Anxiety: Overlaps and Dissociations. E.A. Lemerise, K.A. Dodge, The Development of Anger and Hostile Interactions. M. Lewis, Self-Conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and Guilt. P. Rozin, J. Haidt, C.R. McCauley, Disgust. B.L. Fredrickson, M.A. Cohn, Positive Emotions. G.A. Bonanno, L. Goorin, K.G. Coifman, Sadness and Grief.

Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and Contagion

Abstract: We hypothesize that there is a general bias, based on both innate predispositions and experience, in animals and humans, to give greater weight to negative entities (e.g., events, objects, personal traits). This is manifested in 4 ways: (a) negative potency (negative entities are stronger than the equivalent positive entities), (b) steeper nega tive gradients (the negativity of negative events grows more rapidly with approach to them in space or time than does the positivity of positive events, (c) negativity domi nance (combinations of negative and positive entities yield evaluations that are more negative than the algebraic sum of individual subjective valences would predict), and (d) negative differentiation (negative entities are more varied, yield more complex conceptual representations, and engage a wider response repertoire). We review evi dence for this taxonomy, with emphasis on negativity dominance, including literary, historical, religious, and cultural sources, as well as the psychological literatures on learning, attention, impression formation, contagion, moral judgment, development, and memory. We then consider a variety of theoretical accounts for negativity bias. We suggest that 1 feature of negative events that make them dominant is that negative entities are more contagious than positive entities.

Rules and Representations

Abstract: Foreword by Norbert Hornstein Preface Part I 1 Mind and Body 2 Structures, Capacities, and Conventions 3 Knowledge of Grammar 4 Some Elements of Grammar Part II 5 On the Biological Basis of Language Capacities 6 Language and Unconscious Knowledge Notes Index

The Promise of Happiness

Abstract: The Promise of Happiness is a provocative cultural critique of the imperative to be happy. It asks what follows when we make our desires and even our own happiness conditional on the happiness of others: “I just want you to be happy”; “I’m happy if you’re happy.” Combining philosophy and feminist cultural studies, Sara Ahmed reveals the affective and moral work performed by the “happiness duty,” the expectation that we will be made happy by taking part in that which is deemed good, and that by being happy ourselves, we will make others happy. Ahmed maintains that happiness is a promise that directs us toward certain life choices and away from others. Happiness is promised to those willing to live their lives in the right way. Ahmed draws on the intellectual history of happiness, from classical accounts of ethics as the good life, through seventeenth-century writings on affect and the passions, eighteenth-century debates on virtue and education, and nineteenth-century utilitarianism. She engages with feminist, antiracist, and queer critics who have shown how happiness is used to justify social oppression, and how challenging oppression causes unhappiness. Reading novels and films including Mrs. Dalloway, The Well of Loneliness, Bend It Like Beckham, and Children of Men, Ahmed considers the plight of the figures who challenge and are challenged by the attribution of happiness to particular objects or social ideals: the feminist killjoy, the unhappy queer, the angry black woman, and the melancholic migrant. Through her readings she raises critical questions about the moral order imposed by the injunction to be happy.