计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

In Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, henceforth AJR, (2001), we advanced the hypothesis that the mortality rates faced by Europeans in different parts of the world after 1500 affected their willingness to establish settlements and choice of colonization strategy. Places that were relatively healthy (for Europeans) were—when they fell under European control—more likely to receive better economic and political institutions. In contrast, places where European settlers were less likely to go were more likely to have “extractive” institutions imposed. We also posited that this early pattern of institutions has persisted over time and influences the extent and nature of institutions in the modern world. On this basis, we proposed using estimates of potential European settler mortality as an instrument for institutional variation in former European colonies today. Data on settlers themselves are unfortunately patchy—particularly because not many went to places they believed, with good reason, to be most unhealthy. We therefore followed the lead of Curtin (1989 and 1998) who compiled data on the death rates faced by European soldiers in various overseas postings. 1 Curtin’s data were based on pathbreaking data collection and statistical work initiated by the British military in the mid-nineteenth century. These data became part of the foundation of both contemporary thinking about public health (for soldiers and for civilians) and the life insurance industry (as actuaries and executives considered the

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The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation

https://personal.lse.ac.uk/FERREIRD/gender.pdf

Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance

Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison

Outside the United States and the United Kingdom, large corporations usually have controlling owners, who are usually very wealthy families. Pyramidal control structures, cross shareholding, and super-voting rights let such families control corporations without making a commensurate capital investment. In many countries, a few such families end up controlling considerable proportions of their countries’ economies. Three points emerge. First, at the firm level, these ownership structures, because they vest dominant control rights with families who often have little real capital invested, permit a range of agency problems and hence resource misallocation. If a few families control large swaths of an economy, such corporate governance problems can attain macroeconomic importance—affecting rates of innovation, economywide resource allocation, and economic growth. If political influence depends on what one controls, rather than what one owns, the controlling owners of pyramids have greatly amplified political influence relative to their actual wealth. This influence can distort public policy regarding property rights protection, capital markets, and other institutions. We denote this phenomenon economic entrenchment, and posit a relationship between the distribution of corporate control and institutional development that generates and preserves economic entrenchment as one possible equilibrium. The literature suggests key determinants of economic entrenchment, but has many gaps where further work exploring the political economy importance of the distribution of corporate control is needed.

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Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth

Data on corporate governance and disclosure practices reveal wide within-country variation that decreases with the strength of investors’ legal protection. A simple model identifies three firm attributes related to that variation: investment opportunities, external financing, and ownership structure. Using firm-level governance and transparency data from 27 countries, we find that all three firm attributes are related to the quality of governance and disclosure practices, and firms with higher governance and transparency rankings are valued higher in stock markets. All relations are stronger in less investor-friendly countries, demonstrating that firms adapt to poor legal environments to establish efficient governance practices.

/pdf/to-steal-or-not-to-steal-firm-attributes-legal-environment-14qocik7c3.pdf

To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation

We document a robust cross-sectional positive association across industries between a measure of the economic efficiency of corporate investment and the magnitude of firmspecific variation in stock returns This finding is interesting for two reasons, neither of which is a priori obvious First, it adds further support to the view that firm-specific return variation gauges the extent to which information about the firm is quickly and accurately reflected in share prices Second, it can be interpreted as evidence that more informative stock prices facilitate more efficient corporate investment CORPORATE CAPITAL INVESTMENT should be more efficient where stock prices are more informative Informed stock prices convey meaningful signals to management about the quality of their decisions They also convey meaningful signals to the financial markets about the need to intervene when management decisions are poor Corporate governance mechanisms, such as shareholder lawsuits, executive options, institutional investor pressure, and the market for corporate control, depend on stock prices Where stock prices are more informative, these mechanisms induce better corporate governance—which includes more efficient capital investment decisions Our objective in this paper is to examine empirically whether capital investment decisions are indeed more efficient where stock prices are more informative To do this, we require a measure of the efficiency of investment and a measure of the informativeness of stock prices

/pdf/value-enhancing-capital-budgeting-and-firm-specific-stock-1ys1we6f6j.pdf

Value-Enhancing Capital Budgeting and Firm-specific Stock Return Variation

Roll (1988) observes low R2 statistics for common asset pricing models due to vigorousfirms-specific returns variation not associated with public information. He concludes (p. 56) that this implies â¬Seither private information or else occasional frenzy unrelated to concrete information.â¬?We show that firms and industries with lower market model R2 statistics exhibit higher association between current returns and future earnings, indicating more information about future earnings in current stock returns. This supports Rollâ¬"s first interpretation â¬ higher firms-specific returns variation as a fraction of total variation signals more information-laden stock prices and, therefore, more efficient stock markets.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/2451_27594.pdf?abstractid=1281358&mirid=1

Does Greater Firm-Specific Return Variation Mean More or Less Informed Stock Pricing?

Roll [1988] observes low R 2 statistics for common asset pricing models due to vigorous firm-specific return variation not associated with public information. He concludes that this implies “either private information or else occasional frenzy unrelated to concrete information” [p. 56]. We show that firms and industries with lower market model R 2 statistics exhibit higher association between current returns and future earnings, indicating more information about future earnings in current stock returns. This supports Roll’s first interpretation: higher firm-specific return variation as a fraction of total variation signals more information-laden stock prices and, therefore, more efficient stock markets.

http://people.stern.nyu.edu/byeung/greater.pdf

We examine how local and global political risks affect industry return volatility. Our central premise is that some industries are more sensitive to political events than others. We find that industries that are more dependent on trade, contract enforcement, and labor exhibit greater return volatility when local political risks are higher. Political uncertainty in countries of trading partners of trade-dependent industries similarly results in greater volatility. Volatility decomposition results indicate that while systematic volatility is associated with domestic political uncertainty, global political risks translate into larger idiosyncratic volatility. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

Art Durnev

Papers

To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation

Value-Enhancing Capital Budgeting and Firm-specific Stock Return Variation

Does Greater Firm-Specific Return Variation Mean More or Less Informed Stock Pricing?

Does Greater Firm-Specific Return Variation Mean More or Less Informed Stock Pricing?

Precarious Politics and Return Volatility