Artur Czumaj

Bio: Artur Czumaj is an academic researcher from University of Warwick. The author has contributed to research in topics: Property testing & Approximation algorithm. The author has an hindex of 36, co-authored 200 publications receiving 4486 citations. Previous affiliations of Artur Czumaj include New Jersey Institute of Technology & Max Planck Society.

Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria

Abstract: The coordination ratio is a game theoretic measure that aims to reflect the price of selfish routing in a network. We show the worst-case coordination ratio on m parallel links (of possibly different speeds) isΘ(log m/log log log m)Our bound is asymptotically tight and it entirely resolves an question posed recently by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [3].

Speeding up two string-matching algorithms

Abstract: We show how to speed up two string-matching algorithms: the Boyer-Moore algorithm (BM algorithm), and its version called here the reverse factor algorithm (RF algorithm). The RF algorithm is based on factor graphs for the reverse of the pattern. The main feature of both algorithms is that they scan the text right-to-left from the supposed right position of the pattern. The BM algorithm goes as far as the scanned segment (factor) is a suffix of the pattern. The RF algorithm scans while the segment is a factor of the pattern. Both algorithms make a shift of the pattern, forget the history, and start again. The RF algorithm usually makes bigger shifts than BM, but is quadratic in the worst case. We show that it is enough to remember the last matched segment (represented by two pointers to the text) to speed up the RF algorithm considerably (to make a linear number of inspections of text symbols, with small coefficient), and to speed up the BM algorithm (to make at most 2 ·n comparisons). Only a constant additional memory is needed for the search phase. We give alternative versions of an accelerated RF algorithm: the first one is based on combinatorial properties of primitive words, and the other two use the power of suffix trees extensively. The paper demonstrates the techniques to transform algorithms, and also shows interesting new applications of data structures representing all subwords of the pattern in compact form.

Balanced allocations: the heavily loaded case

Abstract: We investigate balls-into-bins processes allocating m balls into n bins based on the multiple-choice paradigm. In the classical single-choice variant each ball is placed into a bin selected uniformly at random. In a multiple-choice process each ball can be placed into one out of $d \ge 2$ randomly selected bins. It is known that in many scenarios having more than one choice for each ball can improve the load balance significantly. Formal analyses of this phenomenon prior to this work considered mostly the lightly loaded case, that is, when $m \approx n$. In this paper we present the first tight analysis in the heavily loaded case, that is, when $m \gg n$ rather than $m \approx n$.The best previously known results for the multiple-choice processes in the heavily loaded case were obtained using majorization by the single-choice process. This yields an upper bound of the maximum load of bins of $m/n + {\mbox{$\cal O$}}(\sqrt{m \ln n \,/\, n})$ with high probability. We show, however, that the multiple-choice...

Broadcasting algorithms in radio networks with unknown topology

Abstract: In this paper we present new randomized and deterministic algorithms for the classical problem of broadcasting in radio networks with unknown topology. We consider directed n-node radio networks with specified eccentricity D (maximum distance from the source node to any other node). Bar-Yehuda et al. presented an algorithm that for any n-node radio network with eccentricity D completes the broadcasting in O(D log n + log2 n) time, with high probability. This result is almost optimal, since as it has been shown by Kushilevitz and Mansour and Alon et al., every randomized algorithm requires Ω (D log(n/D) + log2 n) expected time to complete broadcasting.Our first main result closes the gap between the lower and upper bound: we describe an optimal randomized broadcasting algorithm whose running time complexity is O(D log (n/D + log2 n), with high probability. In particular, we obtain a randomized algorithm that completes broadcasting in any n-node radio network in time O(n), with high probability.The main source of our improvement is a better "selecting sequence" used by the algorithm that brings some stronger property and improves the broadcasting time. Two types of "selecting sequences" are considered: randomized and deterministic ones. The algorithm with a randomized sequence is easier (more intuitive) to analyze but both randomized and deterministic sequences give algorithms of the same asymptotic complexity.

Broadcasting algorithms in radio networks with unknown topology

Abstract: In this paper we present new randomized and deterministic algorithms for the classical problem of broadcasting in radio networks with unknown topology. We consider directed n-node radio networks with specified eccentricity D (maximum distance from the source node to any other node). Our first main result closes the gap between the lower and upper bound: we describe an optimal randomized broadcasting algorithm whose running time complexity is O(D log(n/D) + log/sup 2/n), with high probability. In particular, we obtain a randomized algorithm that completes broadcasting in any n-node radio network in time O(n), with high probability. The main source of our improvement is a better "selecting sequence" used by the algorithm that brings some stronger property and improves the broadcasting time. Next, we demonstrate how to apply our approach to deterministic broadcasting, and describe a deterministic oblivious algorithm that completes broadcasting in almost optimal time O(n log/sup 2/D). Finally, we show how our randomized broadcasting algorithm can be used to improve the randomized complexity of the gossiping problem.

Random graphs

Abstract: We will review some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems. We will cover algorithmic and structural questions. We will touch on newer models, including those related to the WWW.

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

A guided tour to approximate string matching

Abstract: We survey the current techniques to cope with the problem of string matching that allows errors. This is becoming a more and more relevant issue for many fast growing areas such as information retrieval and computational biology. We focus on online searching and mostly on edit distance, explaining the problem and its relevance, its statistical behavior, its history and current developments, and the central ideas of the algorithms and their complexities. We present a number of experiments to compare the performance of the different algorithms and show which are the best choices. We conclude with some directions for future work and open problems.

Fundamentals of Queueing Theory

Abstract: Praise for the Third Edition: "This is one of the best books available. Its excellent organizational structure allows quick reference to specific models and its clear presentation . . . solidifies the understanding of the concepts being presented."IIE Transactions on Operations EngineeringThoroughly revised and expanded to reflect the latest developments in the field, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition continues to present the basic statistical principles that are necessary to analyze the probabilistic nature of queues. Rather than presenting a narrow focus on the subject, this update illustrates the wide-reaching, fundamental concepts in queueing theory and its applications to diverse areas such as computer science, engineering, business, and operations research.This update takes a numerical approach to understanding and making probable estimations relating to queues, with a comprehensive outline of simple and more advanced queueing models. Newly featured topics of the Fourth Edition include:Retrial queuesApproximations for queueing networksNumerical inversion of transformsDetermining the appropriate number of servers to balance quality and cost of serviceEach chapter provides a self-contained presentation of key concepts and formulae, allowing readers to work with each section independently, while a summary table at the end of the book outlines the types of queues that have been discussed and their results. In addition, two new appendices have been added, discussing transforms and generating functions as well as the fundamentals of differential and difference equations. New examples are now included along with problems that incorporate QtsPlus software, which is freely available via the book's related Web site.With its accessible style and wealth of real-world examples, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition is an ideal book for courses on queueing theory at the upper-undergraduate and graduate levels. It is also a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners who analyze congestion in the fields of telecommunications, transportation, aviation, and management science.

Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy

Abstract: We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic agents, which must encourage players to honestly report information. Specifically, we show that the recent notion of differential privacv, in addition to its own intrinsic virtue, can ensure that participants have limited effect on the outcome of the mechanism, and as a consequence have limited incentive to lie. More precisely, mechanisms with differential privacy are approximate dominant strategy under arbitrary player utility functions, are automatically resilient to coalitions, and easily allow repeatability. We study several special cases of the unlimited supply auction problem, providing new results for digital goods auctions, attribute auctions, and auctions with arbitrary structural constraints on the prices. As an important prelude to developing a privacy-preserving auction mechanism, we introduce and study a generalization of previous privacy work that accommodates the high sensitivity of the auction setting, where a single participant may dramatically alter the optimal fixed price, and a slight change in the offered price may take the revenue from optimal to zero.