Arun Kanda

Bio: Arun Kanda is an academic researcher from Indian Institute of Technology Delhi. The author has contributed to research in topics: Supply chain & Supply chain management. The author has an hindex of 23, co-authored 37 publications receiving 2470 citations. Previous affiliations of Arun Kanda include Indian Institutes of Technology.

Interpretive structural modeling (ISM) of IT‐enablers for Indian manufacturing SMEs

Abstract: Purpose – This paper aims to investigate the issue of information technology (IT) adoption and implementation in Indian manufacturing small‐ and medium‐scale enterprise (SMEs) towards enhancing the capabilities of their supply chain.Design/methodology/approach – Extracts of recently completed case‐based research for ten SME units are utilized for the identification of IT‐enablers. To support the logical deduction of the factors, diagnostic techniques like force‐field analysis, situation‐actor‐process and learning‐action‐performance are used. Further, key managerial insights were obtained by developing an interpretive structural modeling (ISM) model for the set of factors, specific to Indian context.Findings – ISM delivers interrelationships among the factors which were utilized for deriving managerial insights. Further, these factors are classified into four categories, namely, autonomous, driver, dependent, and linkage to understand their relative impact on the implementation of IT in Indian SMEs.Practic...

A Review on Supply Chain Coordination: Coordination Mechanisms, Managing Uncertainty and Research Directions

Abstract: The Supply Chain (SC) members are dependent on each other for resources and information, and this dependency has been increasing in recent times due to outsourcing, globalization and rapid innovations in information technologies. This increase in dependency brings some extent of risk and uncertainty too along with benefits. To meet these challenges, SC members must work towards a unified system and coordinate with each other. There is a need to identify the coordination mechanisms which helps in addressing the uncertainty in supply chain and achieving supply chain coordination.

Supply chain performance measurement framework for small and medium scale enterprises

Abstract: Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to propose an integrated supply chain performance measurement framework for the case of small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) using set of qualitative and quantitative insights gained during the case study research.Design/methodology/approach – This paper develops the supply chain performance measurement framework using the facts revealed through case study analysis, secondary data specific to various SME clusters in India and detailed contemporary studies reported on supply chain management in SMEs. It integrates the salient features of balanced scorecard (BSC) and supply chain operation reference (SCOR) model to deliver a comprehensive performance measurement framework for SMEs.Findings – This paper reports set of performance indicators for the supply chain processes like “source,” “make,” and “deliver” in SMEs. It also relates the measures with various supply chain cycles like “procurement,” “manufacturing,” “replenishment,” and “customer order.” As a result, ...

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index