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Assimakis P. Komninos

Bio: Assimakis P. Komninos is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Competition law & Authorization. The author has an hindex of 3, co-authored 5 publications receiving 62 citations.


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01 Nov 2008
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that sanctions imposed by the Commission in competition proceedings are "criminal charges" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR by an independent and impartial tribunal fulfilling all the conditions of article 6ECHR (part I).
Abstract: From the Introduction. This paper will thus show that, given the rapid "criminalisation" of competition law proceedings, sanctions should in principle be imposed at first instance I. Sanctions imposed by the Commission in competition proceedings are "criminal charges" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR by an independent and impartial tribunal fulfilling all the conditions of Article 6 ECHR (part I). Or at the very least, these sanctions should be subject to full jurisdictional review by an independent and impartial tribunal in order to comply with Article 6 ECHR and to cure the defects of the administrative procedure (part II). It is doubtful however whether such a full jurisdictional review, as it is understood by the ECtHR, is available at Community-level in antitrust cases.

40 citations

Dissertation
01 Jan 2018
TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate the efficacy of the leniency program in the enforcement of competition law applied in respect of cartel infringements based on cases decided by the UK's principal enforcement authority.
Abstract: Leniency Programmes have been introduced as a complementary measure in the enforcement of competition law in detecting cartels, on the basis that hard to find evidence will be provided by undertakings coming forward to confess, in exchange for immunity or reduction in fines. The advantages of leniency are deemed to be twofold, since evidence is thereby expected to be given voluntarily, and in turn it would save up the limited resources available to enforcement authorities, by reducing lengthy investigations in search of evidence. Therefore, the widely accepted view by regulators, economists, and lawyers alike is that leniency is by far the most effective method of detecting and deterring anticompetitive activities by undertakings. An ‘undertaking’ covers any entity engaged in an economic activity that offers goods or services in a given market. In the UK, Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 governs prohibitions that fall within the category of cartels of which price-fixing, market or customer sharing, agreements to restrict production or supply, and bid-rigging are the most serious ‘hard-core cartels’. This study evaluates the efficacy of the Leniency Programme in the enforcement of competition law applied in respect of cartel infringements based on cases decided by the UK’s principal enforcement authority. Chapter I cases decided and published over a twelve-year period, since the Competition Act 1998 came into force, have been analysed in order to evaluate whether the leniency programme has been an incentive for colluders to apply for leniency. The results indicate that very few leniency applications were submitted voluntarily before an investigation was begun by the enforcement authority. Moreover, the detection rate of Chapter I cases on average has been very low over the twelveyear period, less than 2 cases per year, excluding settlements. The research also shows that contrary to the accepted view that evidence relating to cartels is difficult to find, cartels studied in this thesis have left a trail of both electronic, and other evidence that the authorities were able to seize. Further, the leniency applicants were not always reliable witnesses, and despite leniency, the enforcement authorities had to conduct lengthy investigations, negating the cost saving assertion and taking resources away from ex officio interventions by the authorities. The conclusion drawn from this study is that rather than enhancing detection and deterrence of anticompetitive behaviour by undertakings, the leniency programme overlaps, and in effect, undermines the public enforcement of competition law in the UK.

36 citations

Dissertation
01 Jan 2016
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an approach to reconcile effectiveness and fairness in competition law enforcement in EU Cartel Enforcement, based on the notion of fairness through effectiveness and effectiveness through fairness.
Abstract: ................................................................................................................................ 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................................................. 9 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................................... 10 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 12 Background and Context ..................................................................................................... 12 I. Problem and Aim of the Thesis ........................................................................................... 13 II. Key Concepts and their Application in this Thesis ............................................................. 16 III. Effectiveness and Fairness ............................................................................................. 17 A. The notion of effectiveness ..................................................................................... 17 1. Notions of fairness ................................................................................................... 18 2. Reconciling Effectiveness and Fairness in Competition Law Enforcement .................. 18 B. Theories of punishment .......................................................................................... 21 1. a. Deterrence ......................................................................................................... 21 b. Retribution ......................................................................................................... 25 c. A mixed theory of punishment ......................................................................... 27 i. Approximation of the theories .................................................................... 28 ii. Application in cartel enforcement ............................................................... 29 Summary .................................................................................................................. 30 2. Application of the Key Notions throughout the Thesis ................................................. 31 C. Effectiveness ............................................................................................................ 31 1. Fairness .................................................................................................................... 32 2. Effectiveness through fairness ................................................................................ 33 3. Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 35 IV. Contribution and Scope ....................................................................................................... 36 V. Structure .............................................................................................................................. 37 VI. CHAPTER 2: EFFECTIVENESS AND FAIRNESS IN EU CARTEL ENFORCEMENT ............................ 40 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 40 I. Legitimacy in EU cartel enforcement .................................................................................. 41 II.

28 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that even though the consumer cannot be reduced to a "homo oeconomicus", competition law is the cornerstone of consumer law and that the decentralised application of EC competition law since 1 May 2004 (pursuant to Regulation 1/2003) gives new opportunities for an effective application of the EC competition rules to the benefit of consumers.
Abstract: In this paper it is argued that even though the consumer cannot (anymore) be reduced to a “homo oeconomicus,” competition law is the cornerstone of consumer law and that the decentralised application of EC competition law since 1 May 2004 (pursuant to Regulation 1/2003) gives new opportunities for an effective application of the EC competition rules to the benefit of consumers. While the EC Treaty (and the future Constitution for Europe) aim to protect consumers in the framework of the internal market programme, as well as on the basis of a genuine “consumer protection” policy, it is submitted that an effective competition policy remains crucial for consumers in a market economy. Consumer interests are generally diffuse and therefore difficult to protect via legal procedures. Nevertheless a further development of remedies which are already available in Community law (nullity of restrictive agreements, claims for damages, actions for a cease and desist order, and so on) will contribute to an increased application of the competition rules in the interest of consumers.

24 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors assess the features of the Directive and the challenges it poses for its implementation by Member States, and assess the impact of this Directive on the enforcement of competition law.
Abstract: Directive EU/2014/104 is the latest legal instrument that crystalizes the evolution of EU competition law enforcement. This paper assesses critically the features of the Directive and the challenges it poses for its implementation by Member States. The Directive codifies the case law of the EUCJ and it encroaches upon the autonomy of Member States in setting the institutions, remedies and procedures available for victims’ of antitrust infringements. Although the Directive provides a fragmented and incomplete set of rules that only partially harmonizes antitrust damages claims in the EU, and it’s slanted towards follow-on cartel damages claims, it has publicised the availability of damages claims, creating momentum that will transform how competition law is enforced in the future.

21 citations