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Avner Shaked

Bio: Avner Shaked is an academic researcher from University of Bonn. The author has contributed to research in topics: Product differentiation & Competition (economics). The author has an hindex of 25, co-authored 55 publications receiving 6201 citations. Previous affiliations of Avner Shaked include London School of Economics and Political Science & Nuffield College.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a very particular model of a market equilibrium in which two potential entrants will choose to enter the industry, and both will make positive profits, and they will choose both the specification of their respective products, and their prices.
Abstract: Central to the problem of providing adequate foundations for the analysis of monopolistic competition, is the problem of describing market equilibria in which firms choose both the specification of their respective products, and their prices. The present paper is concerned with a-very particular-model of such a market equilibrium. In this equilibrium, exactly two potential entrants will choose to enter the industry; they will choose to produce differentiated products; and both will make positive profits.

2,069 citations

Book
01 Jan 1985
TL;DR: In this article, the relationship between advertising, R&D, and market structure has been investigated in the context of vertical product differentiation, and a simple unified framework within which to reexplore many issues that arise in considering the relationship.
Abstract: Some recent literature on "vertical product differentiation" has d eveloped the idea that if the nature of technology and tastes in some industry take a certain form, then the industry must necessarily be "concentrated" and must remain so, no matter how large the economy becomes. The present paper develops this idea further and looks at so me of its implications. This approach offers a simple unified framewo rk within which to reexplore many issues that arise in considering th e relationship between advertising, R&D, and market structure. Copyright 1987 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

439 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compared this method of predicting outcomes with that obtained from an analysis of optimal strategic behavior in a natural game theoretic model of the bargaining process, and reported that this prediction performs well in comparison with the conventional predictor.
Abstract: In the economic modeling of bargaining, outside options have often been naively treated by taking them as the disagreement payoffs in an application of the Nash bargaining solution. The paper contrasts this method of predicting outcomes with that obtained from an analysis of optimal strategic behavior in a natural game theoretic model of the bargaining process. The strategic analysis predicts that the outside options will be irrelevant to the final deal unless a bargainer would then go elsewhere. An experiment is reported which indicates that this prediction performs well in comparison with the conventional predictor.

375 citations


Cited by
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Book
01 Jan 1994
TL;DR: A Course in Game Theory as discussed by the authors presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts.
Abstract: A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

7,018 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors demonstrate that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, and demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people were motivated by either their payoff or their relative standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern, which explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is played a role and games where competitive behavior is observed.
Abstract: We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner's dilemma and gift exchange, and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand markets (JEL C78, C90, D63, D64, H41)

5,391 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed techniques for empirically analyzing demand and supply in differentiated products markets and then applied these techniques to analyze equilibrium in the U.S. automobile industry.
Abstract: This paper develops techniques for empirically analyzing demand and supply in differentiated products markets and then applies these techniques to analyze equilibrium in the U.S. automobile industry. Our primary goal is to present a framework which enables one to obtain estimates of demand and cost parameters for a class of oligopolistic differentiated products markets. These estimates can be obtained using only widely available product-level and aggregate consumer-level data, and they are consistent with a structural model of equilibrium in an oligopolistic industry. When we apply the tech- niques developed here to the U.S. automobile market, we obtain cost and demand parameters for (essentially) all models marketed over a twenty year period.

4,803 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
Elinor Ostrom1
TL;DR: The Logic of Collective Action (LCA) as mentioned in this paper was a seminal work in modern democratic thought that challenged the assumption that groups would tend to form and take collective action in democratic societies.
Abstract: With the publication of The Logic of Collective Action in 1965, Mancur Olson challenged a cherished foundation of modern democratic thought that groups would tend to form and take collective action...

3,231 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the problem of "supply-and-demand" analysis on a cross-section of oligopoly markets with differentiated products and propose estimation by "inverting" the market-share equation to find the implied mean levels of utility for each good.
Abstract: This article considers the problem of "supply-and-demand" analysis on a cross section of oligopoly markets with differentiated products. The primary methodology is to assume that demand can be described by a discrete-choice model and that prices are endogenously determined by price-setting firms. In contrast to some previous empirical work, the techniques explicitly allow for the possibility that prices are correlated with unobserved demand factors in the cross section of markets. The article proposes estimation by "inverting" the market-share equation to find the implied mean levels of utility for each good. This method allows for estimation by traditional instrumental variables techniques.

2,949 citations