Axel Legay

Bio: Axel Legay is an academic researcher from Université catholique de Louvain. The author has contributed to research in topics: Model checking & Probabilistic logic. The author has an hindex of 47, co-authored 479 publications receiving 9617 citations. Previous affiliations of Axel Legay include Microsoft & Carnegie Mellon University.

Statistical model checking: an overview

Abstract: Quantitative properties of stochastic systems are usually specified in logics that allow one to compare the measure of executions satisfying certain temporal properties with thresholds The model checking problem for stochastic systems with respect to such logics is typically solved by a numerical approach [31,8,35,22,21,5] that iteratively computes (or approximates) the exact measure of paths satisfying relevant subformulas; the algorithms themselves depend on the class of systems being analyzed as well as the logic used for specifying the properties Another approach to solve the model checking problem is to simulate the system for finitely many executions, and use hypothesis testing to infer whether the samples provide a statistical evidence for the satisfaction or violation of the specification In this tutorial, we survey the statistical approach, and outline its main advantages in terms of efficiency, uniformity, and simplicity

Uppaal SMC tutorial

Abstract: This tutorial paper surveys the main features of Uppaal SMC, a model checking approach in Uppaal family that allows us to reason on networks of complex real-timed systems with a stochastic semantic. We demonstrate the modeling features of the tool, new verification algorithms and ways of applying them to potentially complex case studies.

Model checking lots of systems: efficient verification of temporal properties in software product lines

Abstract: In product line engineering, systems are developed in families and differences between family members are expressed in terms of features. Formal modelling and verification is an important issue in this context as more and more critical systems are developed this way. Since the number of systems in a family can be exponential in the number of features, two major challenges are the scalable modelling and the efficient verification of system behaviour. Currently, the few attempts to address them fail to recognise the importance of features as a unit of difference, or do not offer means for automated verification. In this paper, we tackle those challenges at a fundamental level. We first extend transition systems with features in order to describe the combined behaviour of an entire system family. We then define and implement a model checking technique that allows to verify such transition systems against temporal properties. An empirical evaluation shows substantial gains over classical approaches.

A Bayesian Approach to Model Checking Biological Systems

Abstract: Recently, there has been considerable interest in the use of Model Checking for Systems Biology. Unfortunately, the state space of stochastic biological models is often too large for classical Model Checking techniques. For these models, a statistical approach to Model Checking has been shown to be an effective alternative. Extending our earlier work, we present the first algorithm for performing statistical Model Checking using Bayesian Sequential Hypothesis Testing. We show that our Bayesian approach outperforms current statistical Model Checking techniques, which rely on tests from Classical (aka Frequentist) statistics, by requiring fewer system simulations. Another advantage of our approach is the ability to incorporate prior Biological knowledge about the model being verified. We demonstrate our algorithm on a variety of models from the Systems Biology literature and show that it enables faster verification than state-of-the-art techniques, even when no prior knowledge is available.

Featured Transition Systems: Foundations for Verifying Variability-Intensive Systems and Their Application to LTL Model Checking

Abstract: The premise of variability-intensive systems, specifically in software product line engineering, is the ability to produce a large family of different systems efficiently. Many such systems are critical. Thorough quality assurance techniques are thus required. Unfortunately, most quality assurance techniques were not designed with variability in mind. They work for single systems, and are too costly to apply to the whole system family. In this paper, we propose an efficient automata-based approach to linear time logic (LTL) model checking of variability-intensive systems. We build on earlier work in which we proposed featured transitions systems (FTSs), a compact mathematical model for representing the behaviors of a variability-intensive system. The FTS model checking algorithms verify all products of a family at once and pinpoint those that are faulty. This paper complements our earlier work, covering important theoretical aspects such as expressiveness and parallel composition as well as more practical things like vacuity detection and our logic feature LTL. Furthermore, we provide an in-depth treatment of the FTS model checking algorithm. Finally, we present SNIP, a new model checker for variability-intensive systems. The benchmarks conducted with SNIP confirm the speedups reported previously.

The Design and Analysis of Experiments

Abstract: THE DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTS. By Oscar Kempthorne. New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1952. 631 pp. $8.50. This book by a teacher of statistics (as well as a consultant for \"experimenters\") is a comprehensive study of the philosophical background for the statistical design of experiment. It is necessary to have some facility with algebraic notation and manipulation to be able to use the volume intelligently. The problems are presented from the theoretical point of view, without such practical examples as would be helpful for those not acquainted with mathematics. The mathematical justification for the techniques is given. As a somewhat advanced treatment of the design and analysis of experiments, this volume will be interesting and helpful for many who approach statistics theoretically as well as practically. With emphasis on the \"why,\" and with description given broadly, the author relates the subject matter to the general theory of statistics and to the general problem of experimental inference. MARGARET J. ROBERTSON

Machine learning

Abstract: Machine Learning is the study of methods for programming computers to learn. Computers are applied to a wide range of tasks, and for most of these it is relatively easy for programmers to design and implement the necessary software. However, there are many tasks for which this is difficult or impossible. These can be divided into four general categories. First, there are problems for which there exist no human experts. For example, in modern automated manufacturing facilities, there is a need to predict machine failures before they occur by analyzing sensor readings. Because the machines are new, there are no human experts who can be interviewed by a programmer to provide the knowledge necessary to build a computer system. A machine learning system can study recorded data and subsequent machine failures and learn prediction rules. Second, there are problems where human experts exist, but where they are unable to explain their expertise. This is the case in many perceptual tasks, such as speech recognition, hand-writing recognition, and natural language understanding. Virtually all humans exhibit expert-level abilities on these tasks, but none of them can describe the detailed steps that they follow as they perform them. Fortunately, humans can provide machines with examples of the inputs and correct outputs for these tasks, so machine learning algorithms can learn to map the inputs to the outputs. Third, there are problems where phenomena are changing rapidly. In finance, for example, people would like to predict the future behavior of the stock market, of consumer purchases, or of exchange rates. These behaviors change frequently, so that even if a programmer could construct a good predictive computer program, it would need to be rewritten frequently. A learning program can relieve the programmer of this burden by constantly modifying and tuning a set of learned prediction rules. Fourth, there are applications that need to be customized for each computer user separately. Consider, for example, a program to filter unwanted electronic mail messages. Different users will need different filters. It is unreasonable to expect each user to program his or her own rules, and it is infeasible to provide every user with a software engineer to keep the rules up-to-date. A machine learning system can learn which mail messages the user rejects and maintain the filtering rules automatically. Machine learning addresses many of the same research questions as the fields of statistics, data mining, and psychology, but with differences of emphasis. Statistics focuses on understanding the phenomena that have generated the data, often with the goal of testing different hypotheses about those phenomena. Data mining seeks to find patterns in the data that are understandable by people. Psychological studies of human learning aspire to understand the mechanisms underlying the various learning behaviors exhibited by people (concept learning, skill acquisition, strategy change, etc.).

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index