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Balázs Szentes

Bio: Balázs Szentes is an academic researcher from London School of Economics and Political Science. The author has contributed to research in topics: Common value auction & Auction theory. The author has an hindex of 18, co-authored 44 publications receiving 1343 citations. Previous affiliations of Balázs Szentes include University of Chicago & University College London.

Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk neutral buyers who only have an estimate of their private valuations is analyzed, and the seller can release, without observing, certain additional signals that affect the buyers' valuations.
Abstract: We analyze a situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk neutral buyers who only have an estimate of their private valuations. The seller can release, without observing, certain additional signals that affect the buyers’ valuations. Our main result is that in the expected revenue maximizing mechanism, the seller makes available all the information that she can, and her expected revenue is the same as it would be if she could observe the part of the information that is “new” to the buyers. We also show that this mechanism can be implemented by what we call a handicap auction in interesting applications. In the first round of this auction, each buyer picks a price premium from a menu offered by the seller (a smaller premium costs more). Then the seller releases the additional signals. In the second round, the buyers bid in a second-price auction where the winner pays the sum of his premium and the second highest non-negative bid. In the case of a single buyer, this mechanism simplifies to a menu of European call options.

365 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the seller gives a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer and the buyer observes only a signal about her valuation, and the goal is to characterize those signal structures which maximize the buyer's expected payoff.
Abstract: This paper analyzes a bilateral trade model where the buyer's valuation for the object is uncertain and she observes only a signal about her valuation. The seller gives a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. Our goal is to characterize those signal structures which maximize the buyer's expected payoff. We identify a buyer-optimal signal structure which generates (i) efficient trade and (ii) a unit-elastic demand. Furthermore, we show that every other buyer-optimal signal structure yields the same outcome as the one we identify: in particular, the same price.

106 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Symmetric equilibria are constructed for a class of symmetric auction games that have two identical bidders bidding in three simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auctions for identical objects and appear to be a previously unknown structure.

103 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is shown that, of all mechanisms, a sequential one is optimal and works as follows: one agent at a time is selected to acquire information and report the resulting signal and the restriction to ex-post efficiency is shown to be without loss when the available signals are sufficiently imprecise.

96 citations

01 Feb 2009
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors re-examine Rogers' analysis of the biological basis of the rate of time preference and show that the functional form he uses does not generate the evolutionary equilibrium behavior.
Abstract: We reexamine Rogers’ (1994) analysis of the biological basis of the rate of time preference. Although his basic insight concerning the derivation of the felicity function holds up, the functional form he uses does not generate the evolutionary equilibrium behavior. Moreover, Rogers relies upon an interior solution for a particular kind of intergenerational transfer. We show such interior solutions do not generally arise. Hence Rogers most striking prediction, namely that the real interest rate should be about 2% per annum, does not follow.

88 citations


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Book
01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: This chapter discusses Decision-Theoretic Foundations, Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence, and the Decision-Analytic Approach to Games, which aims to clarify the role of rationality in decision-making.
Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

3,569 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: As a new kind of substrate of IIF, beta( 2)GP I transfectant can be used to detect anti-beta(2)GP-I antibodies and keep the immunofluorescent property of HEp-2 cells in IFANA test and can be use as substrate for routine IFANA detection.
Abstract: OBJECTIVE To establish an indirect immunofluorescent test so as to improve the sensitivity and specificity of examination of antibodies to beta(2)-glycoprotein METHODS Full-length beta(2)GP cDNA was obtained from human hepatocellular cancer cell line HepG2 by RT-PCR and cloned into the mammalian expression vector pEGFP-C1 The recombinant plasmid pEGFP-beta(2)GP was transfected into HEp-2 cells RT-PCR, immunoblotting (IBT), confocal fluorescence microscopy, and indirect immunofluorescent test (IIF) were used to confirm the expression, localization, and antigenicity of fusion protein of green fluorescent protein (GFP) Serum specimens from 19 patients suspected as with secondary antiphospholipid syndrome (APS), 1 patient diagnosed as with primary APS, and 10 normal persons were detected with IIF-IgG-beta(2)GP1, ELISA-IgG-ACL, and ELISA-IgG-beta(2)GP I simultaneously RESULTS (1) The HEp-beta(2)GP I cells thus obtained retained their ability of expression of beta(2)GP-I-GFP for more than ten generations This beta(2)GP-I-GFP showed the antigenicity of beta(2)GP-I with a characteristic feature (2) Seven of the 20 serum specimens from APS patients showed characteristic immunofluorescent pattern No serum specimen from normal persons showed immunofluorescent staining The comparison of results of the three methods showed that the concordance between IIF-IgG-beta(2)GP I and ELISA-IgG-beta(2)GP I was the most perfect (Kappa = 0886) (3) HEp-beta(2)GP I retained the immunofluorescent property of HEp-2 cell CONCLUSION As a new kind of substrate of IIF, beta(2)GP I transfectant can be used to detect anti-beta(2)GP-I antibodies Transfeted HEp-2 cells keep the immunofluorescent property of HEp-2 cells in IFANA test and can be used as substrate for routine IFANA detection

777 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors survey the recent literature on sovereign debt and relate it to the evolu- tion of the legal principles underlying the sovereign debt market and the experience of the most recent debt crises and defaults.
Abstract: This paper surveys the recent literature on sovereign debt and relates it to the evolu- tion of the legal principles underlying the sovereign debt market and the experience of the most recent debt crises and defaults. It finds limited support for theories that explain the feasibility of sovereign debt based on either external sanctions or exclu- sion from the international capital market and more support for explanations that emphasize domestic costs of default. The paper concludes that there remains a case for establishing institutions that reduce the cost of default but the design of such institutions is not a trivial task.

525 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A survey of experimental research on these three canonical contests can be found in this paper, where the basic structure of contests, including the contest success function, number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, and incomplete information are investigated.
Abstract: Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, including the contest success function, number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, and incomplete information. Second, we discuss dynamic contests and multi-battle contests. Then we review research on sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, and contests between groups, as well as real-effort and field experiments. Finally, we discuss applications of contests to the study of legal systems, political competition, war, conflict avoidance, sales, and charities, and suggest directions for future research.

522 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a small open economy model to study sovereign default and debt renegotiation within a dynamic borrowing framework and found that both equilibrium debt recovery rates and sovereign bond prices decrease with the level of debt.

461 citations