Bart Meuleman

Bio: Bart Meuleman is an academic researcher from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. The author has contributed to research in topics: European Social Survey & Welfare state. The author has an hindex of 28, co-authored 141 publications receiving 3427 citations. Previous affiliations of Bart Meuleman include Catholic University of Leuven & Research Foundation - Flanders.

Measurement Equivalence in Cross-National Research

Abstract: Determining whether people in certain countries score differently in measurements of interest or whether concepts relate differently to each other across nations can indisputably assist in testing theories and advancing our sociological knowledge. However, meaningful comparisons of means or relationships between constructs within and across nations require equivalent measurements of these constructs. This is especially true for subjective attributes such as values, attitudes, opinions, or behavior. In this review, we first discuss the concept of cross-group measurement equivalence, look at possible sources of nonequivalence, and suggest ways to prevent it. Next, we examine the social science methodological literature for ways to empirically test for measurement equivalence. Finally, we consider what may be done when equivalence is not supported by the data and conclude with a review of recent developments that offer exciting directions and solutions for future research in cross-national measurement equiva...

Values and Support for Immigration : A Cross-Country Comparison

Abstract: In this article, we estimate and compare the effects of two value dimensions taken from the theory of basic human values-namely, self-transcendence and conservation-on attitudes toward immigration in 19 countries. Data from the first wave (2002-03) of the European Social Survey (ESS) is utilized for the analyses. This cross-national survey measures basic human values with a new 21-item instrument. Attitudes toward immigration are operationalized using two dimensions: willingness to allow immigrants into the country and rejection of conditions to allow them. Effects of the value dimensions on immigration attitudes are compared across 19 nations using multiple-group multiple-indicators structural equation modelling (MGSEM). We hypothesize that these effects are equal across countries. The critical statistical legitimacy for comparing these effects across countries is discussed in detail, and partial measurement invariance is evidenced. The MGSEM provides strong support for our hypotheses in 17 countries: self-transcendence displays a positive effect on support for immigration, and conservation a negative effect. This result is robust also after accounting for several individual and contextual variables. Effects are found to differ a little across countries. It is shown that clusters of countries with equal effect sizes can be distinguished, and possible explanations for effect size differences are discussed.

A Monte Carlo sample size study: How many countries are needed for accurate multilevel SEM?

Abstract: Recently, there has been growing scientific interest for cross-national survey research. Various scholars have used multilevel techniques to link individual characteristics to aspects of the national context. At first sight, multilevel SEM seems to be a promising tool for this purpose, as it integrates multilevel modeling within a latent variable framework. However, due to the fact that the number of countries in most international surveys does not exceed 30, the application of multilevel SEM in cross-national research is problematic. Taking European Social Survey (ESS) data as a point of departure, this paper uses Monte Carlo studies to assess the estimation accuracy of multilevel SEM with small group sample sizes. The results indicate that a group sample size of 20 ‐ a situation common in cross-national research ‐ does not guarantee accurate estimation at all. Unacceptable amounts of parameter and standard error bias are present for the between-level estimates. Unless the standardized e ect is very large (0.75), statistical power for detecting a significant between-level structural e ect is seriously lacking. Required group sample sizes depend strongly on the specific interests of the researcher, the expected e ect sizes and the complexity of the model. If the between-level model is relatively simple and one is merely interested in the between-level factor structure, a group sample size of 40 could be su cient. To detect large (>0.50) structural e ects at the between level, at least 60 groups are required. To have an acceptable probability of detecting smaller e ects, more than 100 groups are needed. These guidelines are shown to be quite robust for varying cluster sizes and intra-class correlations (ICCs).

Migration to European Countries: A Structural Explanation of Patterns, 1980–2004†

Abstract: Various theoretical approaches have provided us with insights to explain the pattern of migration flows. Economic theory considers migration to be a reaction to labor market and economic incentives. Cultural theories predict that migration flows will occur according to a center-periphery pattern, while social network analysis assumes that migrants follow already established migration networks. We test these three approaches simultaneously, using OECD and Eurostat data on the migrant inflow into the European countries between 1980 and 2004. The analysis demonstrates that migration flows react to economic incentives, mainly with regard to the labor market, but also to cultural and colonial linkages. There is no indication that the importance of the colonial past is declining over time. The response of migration patterns to shortages in the labor market is shown to be highly efficient, while the analysis shows that immigrants are not attracted by high levels of social expenditure.

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.

Abstract: Originally published in Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 1994, Vol 39(2), 225. Reviews the book, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion by John Zaller (1992). The author's commendable effort to specify a model of mass opinion formation offers readers an introduction to the prevailing vi

Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany.

Abstract: Preface Introduction: Traditions of Nationhood in France and Germany I. The Institution of Citizenship 1. Citizenship as Social Closure 2. The French Revolution and the Invention of National Citizenship 3. State, State-System, and Citizenship in Germany II. Defining The Citizenry: The Bounds of Belonging 4. Citizenship and Naturalization in France and Germany 5. Migrants into Citizens: The Crystallization of Jus Soli in Late-Nineteenth-Century France 6. The Citizenry as Community of Descent: The Nationalization of Citizenship in Wilhelmine Germany 7. \"Etre Francais, Cela se Merite\": Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in France in the 1980s 8. Continuities in the German Politics of Citizenship Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index

A General Multilevel SEM Framework for Assessing Multilevel Mediation

Abstract: Several methods for testing mediation hypotheses with 2-level nested data have been proposed by researchers using a multilevel modeling (MLM) paradigm. However, these MLM approaches do not accommodate mediation pathways with Level-2 outcomes and may produce conflated estimates of between- and within-level components of indirect effects. Moreover, these methods have each appeared in isolation, so a unified framework that integrates the existing methods, as well as new multilevel mediation models, is lacking. Here we show that a multilevel structural equation modeling (MSEM) paradigm can overcome these 2 limitations of mediation analysis with MLM. We present an integrative 2-level MSEM mathematical framework that subsumes new and existing multilevel mediation approaches as special cases. We use several applied examples and accompanying software code to illustrate the flexibility of this framework and to show that different substantive conclusions can be drawn using MSEM versus MLM.

Power, approach, and inhibition. Власть, напористость и подавленность

Abstract: Статья посвящена вопросам влияния власти на поведение человека. Авторы рассматривают данные различных источников, в которых увеличение власти связывается с напористостью, а ее уменьшение - с подавленностью. Конкретно, власть ассоциируется с: а) позитивным аффектом; б) вниманием к вознаграждению и к свойствам других, удовлетворяющим личные цели; в) автоматической переработкой информации и резкими суждениями; г) расторможенным социальным поведением. Уменьшение власти, напротив, ассоциируется с: а) негативным аффектом; б) вниманием к угрозам и наказаниям, к интересам других и к тем характеристикам я, которые отвечают целям других; в) контролируемой переработкой информации и совещательным типом рассуждений; г) подавленным социальным поведением. Обсуждаются также последствия этих паттернов поведения, связанных с властью, и потенциальные модераторы.