Ben Lockwood

Bio: Ben Lockwood is an academic researcher from University of Warwick. The author has contributed to research in topics: Value-added tax & Indirect tax. The author has an hindex of 42, co-authored 167 publications receiving 6136 citations. Previous affiliations of Ben Lockwood include Economic Policy Institute & Birkbeck, University of London.

Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization

Abstract: This paper studies the choice between centralization and decentralization of fiscal policy in a political economy setting. With centralization, regional delegates vote over agendas comprising sets of region-specific projects. The outcome is inefficient because the choice of projects is insufficiently sensitive to within-region benefits. The number of projects funded may be non-monotonic in the strength of project externalities. The efficiency gains from decentralization, and the performance of "constitutional rules" (such as majority voting) which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization, are then discussed in this framework. Weaker externalities and more heterogeneity between regions need not increase the efficiency gain from decentralization.

Information Externalities in the Labour Market and the Duration of Unemployment

Abstract: A matching model is analysed in which firms imperfectly test workers prior to hiring them. If (some) firms hire only workers who pass the test, there is an informational externality; unemployment duration is a signal of productivity. In equilibrium, if it is profitable for a firm to test, it is also profitable for it to condition its hiring decision on duration, hiring those whose duration is less than a critical value. This testing equilibrium is inefficient, with too much testing and too low a critical duration value. Sensitivity analysis of the latter suggests explanations for the dependence of re-employment probabilities on duration and the instability of the U- V curve.

Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm

Abstract: This paper studies the Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) "property rights" approach to the theory of the firm under alternating-offers bargaining. When managers can pursue other occupations while negotiating over the division of the gains from cooperation, the GHM results obtain. If taking the best alternative job terminates bargaining, outcomes are very different. Sometimes an agent with an important investment decision should not own the assets he works with; sometimes independent assets should be owned together; sometimes strictly complementary assets should be owned separately.

Equilibrium Unemployment Theory

Abstract: Part 1 Unemployment in the model of balanced growth: the labour market long-run equilibrium and balanced growth adjustment dynamics. Part 2 further ananlysis of the labour market: search intensity and job advertising.

Does Globalization Affect Growth? : evidence from a new Index of Globalization

Abstract: The study develops an index of globalization covering its three main dimensions: economic integration, social integration, and political integration. Using panel data for 123 countries in 1970–2000 it is analysed empirically whether the overall index of globalization as well as sub-indexes constructed to measure the single dimensions affect economic growth. As the results show, globalization indeed promotes growth. The dimensions most robustly related with growth refer to actual economic flows and restrictions in developed countries. Although less robustly, information flows also promote growth whereas political integration has no effect.

Monetary Theory and Policy

Abstract: Part 1 Empirical evidence on money and output: introduction some basic correlations estimating the effect of money on output summary. Part 2 Money in a general equilibrium framework: introduction the Tobin effect money in the utility function summary appendix - the MIU approximation problems. Part 3 Money and transactions: introduction shopping-time models cash-in-advance models other approaches summary appendix - the CIA approximation problems. Part 4 Money and public finance: introduction bugdet accounting equilibrium seigniorage optimal taxation and seigniorage Friedman's rule revisited nonindexed tax systems problems. Part 5 Money and output in the short run: introduction flexible prices sticky prices and wages a framework for monetary analysis inflation persistence summary appendix problems. Part 6 Money and the open economy: introduction the Obstfeld-Rogoff two-country model policy coordination the small open economy summary appendix problems. Part 7 The credit channel of monetary policy: introduction imperfect information in credit markets macroeconomic implications does credit matter? summary. Part 8 Discretionary policy and time inconsistency: introduction inflation under discretionary policy solutions to the inflation bias is the inflation bias important? do central banking institutions matter? lessons and conclusions problems. Part 9 Monetary-policy operating procedures: introduction from instruments to goals the instrument-choice problem operating procedures and policy measures problems. Part 10 Interest rates and monetary policy: introduction interest-rate rule and the price level interest rate policies in general equilibrium models the term structure of interest rates a model for policy analysis summary problems.

Theories of Tax Competition

Abstract: A central message of the tax competition literature is that independent governments engage in wasteful competition for scarce capital through reductions in tax rates and public expendi- ture levels. This paper discusses many of the contributions to this literature, ranging from early demonstrations of wasteful tax com- petition to more recent contributions that identify efficiency- enhancing roles for competition among governments. Such roles involve considerations not present in earlier models, including im- perfectly-competitive market structures, government commitment problems, and political economy considerations.

Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm

Abstract: We combine Simon's conception of relational contracts with Grossman and Hart's focus on asset ownership. We analyze whether transactions should occur under vertical integration or non-integration, and with or without self-enforcing relational contracts. These four models allow us to re-run the horse race Coase proposed between markets and firms as alternative governance structures, but with four horses rather than two. We find that efficient ownership patterns are determined in part by the relational contracts that ownership facilitates, that vertical integration is an efficient response to widely varying supply prices, and that high-powered incentives create bigger reneging temptations under integration than under non-integration. Note: this paper was formerly titled "Implicit Contracts and the Theory of the Firm"