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Benjamin Eva

Bio: Benjamin Eva is an academic researcher from University of Konstanz. The author has contributed to research in topics: Topos theory & Argument. The author has an hindex of 5, co-authored 24 publications receiving 108 citations. Previous affiliations of Benjamin Eva include Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich & University of Bristol.

Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A major generalization of extant Bayesian approaches to argumentation is presented that utilizes a new class of Bayesian learning methods that are better suited to modeling dynamic and conditional inferences than standard Bayesian conditionalization.
Abstract: According to the Bayesian paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, the norms by which everyday human cognition is best evaluated are probabilistic rather than logical in character. Recently, the Bayesian paradigm has been applied to the domain of argumentation, in which the fundamental norms are traditionally assumed to be logical. Here, we present a major generalization of extant Bayesian approaches to argumentation that (a) utilizes a new class of Bayesian learning methods that are better suited to modeling dynamic and conditional inferences than standard Bayesian conditionalization, (b) is able to characterize the special value of logically valid argument schemes in uncertain reasoning contexts, (c) greatly extends the range of inferences and argumentative phenomena that can be adequately described in a Bayesian framework, and (d) undermines some influential theoretical motivations for dual function models of human cognition. We conclude that the probabilistic norms given by the Bayesian approach to rationality are not necessarily at odds with the norms given by classical logic. Rather, the Bayesian theory of argumentation can be seen as justifying and enriching the argumentative norms of classical logic. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

24 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Apr 2020-Mind
TL;DR: It is argued that a core set of widely accepted Bayesian norms is sufficient to uniquely identify a single rational updating procedure for this kind of learning and justifies a privileged formalisation of the notion of `epistemic conservativity'.
Abstract: In this article, we address a major outstanding question of probabilistic Bayesian epistemology: `How should a rational Bayesian agent update their beliefs upon learning an indicative conditional?'. A number of authors have recently contended that this question is fundamentally underdetermined by Bayesian norms, and hence that there is no single update procedure that rational agents are obliged to follow upon learning an indicative conditional. Here, we resist this trend and argue that a core set of widely accepted Bayesian norms is sufficient to uniquely identify a single rational updating procedure for this kind of learning. Along the way, we justify a privileged formalisation of the notion of `epistemic conservativity', offer a new analysis of the Judy Benjamin problem and emphasise the distinction between interpreting the content of new evidence and updating one's beliefs on the basis of that content.

17 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an alternative rehabilitation of the principle of indifference in terms of the epistemology of comparative confidence judgements of the form ''I am more confident in the truth of p than I am in truth q'' or "I am equally confident in p and q''.
Abstract: The principle of indifference (PI) states that in the absence of any relevant evidence, a rational agent will distribute their credence (or `degrees of belief') equally amongst all the possible outcomes under consideration. Despite its intuitive plausibility, PI famously falls prey to paradox, and so is widely rejected as a principle of ideal rationality. Some authors have attempted to show that by conceiving of the epistemic states of agents in terms of imprecise credences, it is possible to overcome these paradoxes and thus to achieve a consistent rehabilitation of PI. In this article, I present an alternative rehabilitation of PI in terms of the epistemology of comparative confidence judgements of the form `I am more confident in the truth of p than I am in the truth q' or `I am equally confident in the truth of p and q'. In particular, I consider two natural comparative reformulations of PI, and argue that while one of them prescribes the adoption of patently irrational epistemic states, the other (which is only available when we drop the standard but controversial `Opinionation' assumption from the comparative confidence framework) provides a consistent formulation of PI that overcomes the fundamental limitations of all existing formulations.

16 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the extent to which TQT can really be characterised as a realist formulation of the theory, and examined the question of whether the kind of realism that is provided by Topos Quantum Theory satisfies the philosophical motivations that are usually associated with the search for realist reformulation of quantum theory.
Abstract: Topos Quantum Theory (TQT) is standardly portrayed as a kind of ‘neo-realist’ reformulation of quantum mechanics. In this paper, we study the extent to which TQT can really be characterised as a realist formulation of the theory, and examine the question of whether the kind of realism that is provided by TQT satisfies the philosophical motivations that are usually associated with the search for a realist reformulation of quantum theory. Specifically, we show that the notion of the quantum state is problematic for those who view TQT as a realist reformulation of quantum theory.

11 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors introduce a probabilistic approach to measure the explanatory power that a given explanans exerts over a corresponding explanandum, which does not capture the way in which the causal explanatory power of a given explanatory power varies with background knowledge.
Abstract: Schupbach and Sprenger (2011) introduce a novel probabilistic approach to measuring the explanatory power that a given explanans exerts over a corresponding explanandum. Though we are sympathetic to their general approach, we argue that it does not (without revision) adequately capture the way in which the causal explanatory power that c exerts on e varies with background knowledge. We then amend their approach so that it does capture this variance. Though our account of explanatory power is less ambitious than Schupbach and Sprenger's in the sense that it is limited to causal explanatory power, it is also more ambitious because we do not limit its domain to cases where c genuinely explains e. Instead, we claim that c causally explains e if and only if our account says that c explains e with some positive amount of causal explanatory power.

10 citations


Cited by
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Book ChapterDOI
18 Jul 2014

380 citations

01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: The probability of any event is the ratio between the value at which an expectation depending on the happening of the event ought to be computed, and the value of the thing expected upon it’s 2 happening.
Abstract: Problem Given the number of times in which an unknown event has happened and failed: Required the chance that the probability of its happening in a single trial lies somewhere between any two degrees of probability that can be named. SECTION 1 Definition 1. Several events are inconsistent, when if one of them happens, none of the rest can. 2. Two events are contrary when one, or other of them must; and both together cannot happen. 3. An event is said to fail, when it cannot happen; or, which comes to the same thing, when its contrary has happened. 4. An event is said to be determined when it has either happened or failed. 5. The probability of any event is the ratio between the value at which an expectation depending on the happening of the event ought to be computed, and the value of the thing expected upon it’s 2 happening.

368 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a theory of strict implication based on criticism of Russell and Whitebread's concept of implication is presented, as well as historical information on the history and application of algebra to developments in symbolic logic.
Abstract: Modern interest in modal logic began with this seminal work by the American C.I. Lewis. As well as developing a theory of strict implication based on criticism of Russell and Whitebread's concept of implication, it contains historical information on the history and application of algebra to developments in symbolic logic.

347 citations

01 Jan 2005
TL;DR: A1 Regular and Cartesian Closed Categories A2 Toposes - Basic Theory A3 Allegories A4 Geometric Morphisms - Basic theory B1 Fibrations and Indexed Categories B2 Internal and Locally Internal Categories B3 Toposes over a base B4 BTop/S as a 2-category as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: A1 Regular and Cartesian Closed Categories A2 Toposes - Basic Theory A3 Allegories A4 Geometric Morphisms - Basic Theory B1 Fibrations and Indexed Categories B2 Internal and Locally Internal Categories B3 Toposes over a base B4 BTop/S as a 2-Category

346 citations