Bernard Grofman

Bio: Bernard Grofman is an academic researcher from University of California, Irvine. The author has contributed to research in topics: Voting & Cardinal voting systems. The author has an hindex of 57, co-authored 382 publications receiving 11713 citations. Previous affiliations of Bernard Grofman include University of Chicago & Stony Brook University.

Thirteen theorems in search of the truth

Abstract: We review recent work on the accuracy of group judgmental processes as a function of (a) the competences (judgmental accuracies) of individual group members, (b) the group decision procedure, and (c) group size. This work on individual competence and group accuracy represents an important contribution to democratic theory and a useful complement to the usual emphasis in the social choice literature on individual preference and preference aggregation mechanisms. The work reported on is rooted in a tradition which goes back to scholars such as Condorcet, Poisson, and Bayes.

Modeling Negative Campaigning

Abstract: Negative campaigning is an important aspect of campaign competition but plays little or no role in existing models of campaigns. Within the context of plurality elections for a single office we model the incentives that affect the use of negative campaigning. Under simplifying but still quite general assumptions we show a number of results, including the following key conclusions: (1) for two-candidate competition the front-runner will engage in more positive and less negative campaigning than the opponent; (2) in a three-candidate contest with one candidate clearly trailing by a large margin and playing mainly a spoiler role, that candidate will only engage in positive campaigning; and (3) in any three-candidate contest, no candidate engages in negative campaigning against the weaker of his two opponents, so that to the extent there is negative campaigning, it will be directed against the front-runner or it will come from the front-runner. These results have direct empirical applications to multicandidate primaries and nonpartisan contests and can provide insight into recent general elections as well.

Rousseau's general will: a condorcetian perspective

Abstract: general will: (1) there is a common good; (2) citizens are not always accurate in their judgments about what is in the common good; and (3) when citizens strive to identify the common good and vote in accordance with their perceptions of it, the vote of the Assembly of the People can be taken to be the most reliable means for ascertaining the common good. We then show that Condorcet's (1785) model of collective judgment shares these assumptions with Rousseau and that understanding the implications of Condorcet's (1785) "jury theorem" enables us to clarify many of the most obscure aspects of Rousseau's treatment of the general will, including his discussion of the debilitating effects of factions and his confidence in the ability of the Assembly of the People to discern the general will by means of voting.

A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models

Abstract: 1. Introduction Part I. Models of Voter Behavior: 2. Alternative models of issue voting 3. A unified model of issue voting: proximity, direction, and intensity 4. Comparing the empirical fit of the directional and proximity models for voter utility functions 5. Empirical model fitting using the unified model: voter utility 6. Empirical fitting of probabilistic models of voter choice in two-party electorates 7. Empirical fitting of probabilistic models of voter choice in multiparty electorates Part II. Models of Party or Candidate Behavior and Strategy: 8. Equilibrium strategies for two-candidate directional spatial models 9. Long-term dynamics of voter choice and party strategy 10. Strategy and equilibrium in multicandidate elections 11. Strategy under alternative multicandidate voting procedures.

A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors

Abstract: 1. Modeling party competition 2. How voters decide: the components of the unified theory of voting 3. Linking voter choice to party strategies: illustrating the role of non-policy factors 4. Factors influencing the link between party strategy and the variables 5. Policy competition under the unified theory: empirical applications to the 1988 French Presidential Election 6. Policy competition under the unified voting model: empirical applications to the 1989 Norwegian parliamentary election 7. The threat of abstention: candidate strategies and policy representation in US presidential elections 8. Candidate strategies with voter abstention in US presidential elections: 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996, and 2000 9. Policy competition in Britain: the 1997 general election 10. The consequences of voter projection: assimilation and contrast effects 11. Policy-seeking motivations of parties in two-party elections: theory 12. Policy-seeking motivations of parties in two-party elections: empirical analysis 13. Concluding remarks.

Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work

Abstract: List of Figures ix List of Tables xi Preface and Acknowledgments xiii Introduction 1 PART I: VETO PLAYERS THEORY 17 One: Individual Veto Players 19 Two: Collective Veto Players 38 PART II: VETO PLAYERS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 65 Three: Regimes: Nondemocratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary 67 Four: Governments and Parliaments 91 Five: Referendums 116 Six: Federalism, Bicameralism, and Qualified Majorities 136 PART III: POLICY EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 161 Seven: Legislation 165 Eight: Macroeconomic Policies 187 PART IV: SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 207 Nine: Government Stability 209 Ten: Judiciary and Bureaucracies 222 Eleven: Veto Players Analysis of European Union Institutions 248 Conclusion 283 Bibliography 291 Index 309

Combining Pattern Classifiers

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Ensemble based systems in decision making

Abstract: In matters of great importance that have financial, medical, social, or other implications, we often seek a second opinion before making a decision, sometimes a third, and sometimes many more. In doing so, we weigh the individual opinions, and combine them through some thought process to reach a final decision that is presumably the most informed one. The process of consulting "several experts" before making a final decision is perhaps second nature to us; yet, the extensive benefits of such a process in automated decision making applications have only recently been discovered by computational intelligence community. Also known under various other names, such as multiple classifier systems, committee of classifiers, or mixture of experts, ensemble based systems have shown to produce favorable results compared to those of single-expert systems for a broad range of applications and under a variety of scenarios. Design, implementation and application of such systems are the main topics of this article. Specifically, this paper reviews conditions under which ensemble based systems may be more beneficial than their single classifier counterparts, algorithms for generating individual components of the ensemble systems, and various procedures through which the individual classifiers can be combined. We discuss popular ensemble based algorithms, such as bagging, boosting, AdaBoost, stacked generalization, and hierarchical mixture of experts; as well as commonly used combination rules, including algebraic combination of outputs, voting based techniques, behavior knowledge space, and decision templates. Finally, we look at current and future research directions for novel applications of ensemble systems. Such applications include incremental learning, data fusion, feature selection, learning with missing features, confidence estimation, and error correcting output codes; all areas in which ensemble systems have shown great promise

From the Achievement Gap to the Education Debt: Understanding Achievement in U.S. Schools

Abstract: The achievement gap is one of the most talked-about issues in U.S. education. The term refers to the disparities in standardized test scores between Black and White, Latina/o and White, and recent immigrant and White students. This article argues that a focus on the gap is misplaced. Instead, we need to look at the “education debt” that has accumulated over time. This debt comprises historical, economic, sociopolitical, and moral components. The author draws an analogy with the concept of national debt—which she contrasts with that of a national budget deficit—to argue the significance of the education debt.

Decision Making in Political Systems Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism

Abstract: The article compares different political systems with respect to one property: their capacity to produce policy change. I define the basic concept of the article, the ‘veto player’: veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change of the status quo. Two categories of veto players are identified in the article: institutional and partisan. Institutional veto players (president, chambers) exist in presidential systems while partisan veto players (parties) exist at least in parliamentary systems. Westminster systems, dominant party systems and single-party minority governments have only one veto player, while coalitions in parliamentary systems, presidential or federal systems have multiple veto players. The potential for policy change decreases with the number of veto players, the lack of congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto players) and the cohesion (similarity of policy positions among the constituent units of each veto player) of these players. The veto player framework produces results different from existing theories in comparative politics, but congruent with existing empirical studies. In addition, it permits comparisons across different political and party systems. Finally, the veto player framework enables predictions about government instability (in parliamentary systems) or regime instability (in presidential systems); these predictions are supported by available evidence.