Showing papers by "Bertrand Quelin published in 2009"

The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities

Abstract: To what extent should public utilities regulation be expected to converge across countries? When it occurs, will it generate good outcomes? Building on the core proposition of the New Institutional Economics that similar regulations generate different outcomes depending on their fit with the underlying domestic institutions, we develop a simple model and explore its implications by examining the diffusion of local loop unbundling (LLU) regulations. We argue that: one should expect some convergence in public utility regulation but with still a significant degree of local experimentation; this process will have very different impacts of regulation.

Does Regulation Impact the Entry in a Mature Regulated Industry? An Econometric Analysis of MVNOs

Abstract: Since 1998, the European telecommunications industry is entered into a liberalization phase. In mobile markets, the liberalization policy induces the introduction of competition between a larger number of competitors and a decrease in retail prices. However, the assessment of national markets reveals insufficient competition between network operators and a new regulation was proposed to facilitate private investments into this mature industry.This paper investigates the determinants of the fringe entry into European mobile telecommunications markets between 1998 and 2005. More precisely, we intend to answer the following question: how do cross-national differences in the market structure and the regulatory design (regulatory incentives and governance) affect the number of Mobile Virtual Network Operators’ (MVNOs) in mobile markets? We test a set of hypothesis using internationally comparable variables of economic and regulatory determinants and allowing for ten European Member States and temporal fixed effects on 8 years. We infer the hypotheses to predict cross-national variations in the number of MVNOs entries. We then control for the potential effects of the contractual governance of the MVNOs’ access to the incumbents’ mobile networks. We demonstrate that the amount of fringe entry into a mature industry is the result of both the strategic behavior of the incumbents towards hosting MVNOs on their networks and the adoption of credible regulations to prevent the exercise of strategic entry-deterring activities. Our findings are salient for policymakers and practitioners alike.

The political economy of regulatory convergence in public utilities

Abstract: To what extent should public utilities regulation be expected to converge across countries? When it occurs, will regulatory convergence lead to positive outcomes for utility sectors? This paper attempts to provide new answers to these questions. Building on the core proposition of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) that similar regulations generate different outcomes depending on their fit with the underlying domestic institutions, we develop a simple theoretical model and explore its implications by examining the diffusion of local loop unbundling (LLU) regulations in the telecommunications sector. We find support for the ideas (1) that once institutional factors are taken into account, one should expect some convergence in public utility regulation but with still a significant degree of local experimentation, and (2) this process will lead to very different results regarding the impact of regulation.

The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities

Abstract: To what extent should public utilities regulation be expected toconverge across countries? When it occurs, will it generate good outcomes?Building on the core proposition of the New Institutional Economics thatsimilar regulations generate different outcomes depending on their fit withthe underlying domestic institutions, we develop a simple model and exploreits implications by examining the diffusion of local loop unbundling (LLU)regulations. We argue that? one should expect some convergence in public utility regulation but withstill a significant degree of local experimentation? this process will have very different impacts of regulation.

International Expansion, Diversification and Regulated Firm Nonmarket Strategy

Abstract: Previous studies have shown that regulated firms diversify for reasons that are different than for unregulated firms. We explore some of these differences by providing a theoretical model that starts by considering the firm-regulator relationship as an incomplete information issue, in which a regulated incumbent has knowledge that the regulator does not have, but the firm cannot convey hard information about this knowledge. The incumbent faces both market and nonmarket competition from a new entrant. In that context, we show that when the firm faces tough nonmarket competition domestically, going abroad can create a mechanism that makes information transmission to the regulator more credible. International expansion can thus be a way to solve domestic nonmarket issues in addition to being a catalyst for growth