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Bin Li

Bio: Bin Li is an academic researcher from University of Electronic Science and Technology of China. The author has contributed to research in topics: Common value auction & Revenue. The author has an hindex of 6, co-authored 12 publications receiving 134 citations.

Papers
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Proceedings Article
10 Feb 2017
TL;DR: Wang et al. as discussed by the authors proposed a novel auction mechanism called information diffusion mechanism (IDM), which incentivizes the buyers to not only truthfully report their valuations on the commodity to the seller, but also further propagate the auction information to all their neighbors.
Abstract: This paper studies an auction design problem for a seller to sell a commodity in a social network, where each individual (the seller or a buyer) can only communicate with her neighbors. The challenge to the seller is to design a mechanism to incentivize the buyers, who are aware of the auction, to further propagate the information to their neighbors so that more buyers will participate in the auction and hence, the seller will be able to make a higher revenue. We propose a novel auction mechanism, called information diffusion mechanism (IDM), which incentivizes the buyers to not only truthfully report their valuations on the commodity to the seller, but also further propagate the auction information to all their neighbors. In comparison, the direct extension of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism in social networks can also incentivize the information diffusion, but it will decrease the seller's revenue or even lead to a deficit sometimes. The formalization of the problem has not yet been addressed in the literature of mechanism design and our solution is very significant in the presence of large-scale online social networks.

61 citations

Proceedings Article
09 Jul 2018
TL;DR: This paper designs a novel promotion mechanism that incentivizes all buyers, who are aware of the sale, to invite all their neighbours to join thesale, even though there is no guarantee that their efforts will be paid.
Abstract: We consider a market where a seller sells multiple units of a commodity in a social network. Each node/buyer in the social network can only directly communicate with her neighbours, i.e. the seller can only sell the commodity to her neighbours if she could not find a way to inform other buyers. In this paper, we design a novel promotion mechanism that incentivizes all buyers, who are aware of the sale, to invite all their neighbours to join the sale, even though there is no guarantee that their efforts will be paid. While traditional sale promotions such as sponsored search auctions cannot guarantee a positive return for the advertiser (the seller), our mechanism guarantees that the seller's revenue is better than not using the advertising. More importantly, the seller does not need to pay if the advertising is not beneficial to her.

52 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: This paper proposes a novel auction mechanism, called information diffusion mechanism (IDM), which incentivizes the buyers to not only truthfully report their valuations on the commodity to the seller, but also further propagate the auction information to all their neighbors.
Abstract: This paper studies an auction design problem for a seller to sell a commodity in a social network, where each individual (the seller or a buyer) can only communicate with her neighbors. The challenge to the seller is to design a mechanism to incentivize the buyers, who are aware of the auction, to further propagate the information to their neighbors so that more buyers will participate in the auction and hence, the seller will be able to make a higher revenue. We propose a novel auction mechanism, called information diffusion mechanism (IDM), which incentivizes the buyers to not only truthfully report their valuations on the commodity to the seller, but also further propagate the auction information to all their neighbors. In comparison, the direct extension of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism in social networks can also incentivize the information diffusion, but it will decrease the seller's revenue or even lead to a deficit sometimes. The formalization of the problem has not yet been addressed in the literature of mechanism design and our solution is very significant in the presence of large-scale online social networks.

28 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
01 Jul 2018
TL;DR: A novel mechanism called customer sharing mechanism (CSM) is developed which incentivized all sellers to share each other's sale information to their private customer groups and also incentivizes all customers to truthfully participate in the sale.
Abstract: In an economic market, sellers, infomediaries and customers constitute an economic network. Each seller has her own customer group and the seller's private customers are unobservable to other sellers. Therefore, a seller can only sell commodities among her own customers unless other sellers or infomediaries share her sale information to their customer groups. However, a seller is not incentivized to share others' sale information by default, which leads to inefficient resource allocation and limited revenue for the sale. To tackle this problem, we develop a novel mechanism called customer sharing mechanism (CSM) which incentivizes all sellers to share each other's sale information to their private customer groups. Furthermore, CSM also incentivizes all customers to truthfully participate in the sale. In the end, CSM not only allocates the commodities efficiently but also optimizes the seller's revenue.

21 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: This work identifies a sufficient and necessary condition for all dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) diffusion auctions, formulates the monotonic allocation policies in such multidimensional problems and shows that any monotony allocation policy can be implemented in a DSIC diffusion auction mechanism.
Abstract: Diffusion auction is a new model in auction design. It can incentivize the buyers who have already joined in the auction to further diffuse the sale information to others via social relations, whereby both the seller's revenue and the social welfare can be improved. Diffusion auctions are essentially non-typical multidimensional mechanism design problems and agents' social relations are complicatedly involved with their bids. In such auctions, incentive-compatibility (IC) means it is best for every agent to honestly report her valuation and fully diffuse the sale information to all her neighbors. Existing work identified some specific mechanisms for diffusion auctions, while a general theory characterizing all incentive-compatible diffusion auctions is still missing. In this work, we identify a sufficient and necessary condition for all dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) diffusion auctions. We formulate the monotonic allocation policies in such multidimensional problems and show that any monotonic allocation policy can be implemented in a DSIC diffusion auction mechanism. Moreover, given any monotonic allocation policy, we obtain the optimal payment policy to maximize the seller's revenue.

10 citations


Cited by
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Journal ArticleDOI

784 citations

Book
01 Jan 1997

437 citations

ReportDOI
13 Jan 1978
TL;DR: This report briefly summarizes research on the following topics: game theory and energy; scheduling of large research and development programs; bimatrix games; cost/benefit analyses; measures of worth of weapons systems; hybrid primal algorithm; branch and round algorithm.
Abstract: : This report briefly summarizes research on the following topics: game theory and energy; scheduling of large research and development programs; bimatrix games; cost/benefit analyses; measures of worth of weapons systems; hybrid primal algorithm; branch and round algorithm. A listing of papers prepared and published is included. (Author)

340 citations

Book
01 Jan 1984
TL;DR: It is argued that the time has come for PIMS even though the approach requires a sharp turn from previous models based on the monetisation of personal data.
Abstract: Population protocols (Angluin et al., PODC 2004) are a formal model of sensor networks consisting of identical mobile devices. When two devices come into the range of each other, they interact and change their states. Computations are infinite sequences of pairwise interactions where the interacting processes are picked by a fair scheduler. A population protocol is well specified if for every initial configuration C of devices and for every fair computation starting at C, all devices eventually agree on a consensus value that only depends on C. If a protocol is well-specified, then it is said to compute the predicate that assigns to each initial configuration its consensus value. The main two verification problems for population protocols are: Is a given protocol well-specified? Does a given protocol compute a given predicate? While the class of predicates computable by population protocols was already established in 2007 (Angluin et al., Distributed Computing), the decidability of the verification problems remained open until 2015, when my colleagues and I finally managed to prove it (Esparza et al., CONCUR 2015, improved version to appear in Acta Informatica). In the talk I report on our results and discuss some new developments. Personal Information Management Systems and Knowledge Integration David Montoya, Thomas Pellissier Tanon, and Serge Abiteboul 1 Engie Ineo & ENS Cachan & Inria 2 ENS Lyon 3 INRIA & ENS Cachan Abstract. Personal data is constantly collected, either voluntarily by users in emails, social media interactions, multimedia objects, calendar items, contacts, etc., or passively by various applications such as GPS of mobile devices, transactions, quantified self sensors, etc. The processing of personal data is complicated by the fact that such data is typically stored in silos with different terminologies/ontologies, formats and access protocoles. Users are more and more loosing control over their data; they are sometimes not even aware of the data collected about them and how it is used. We discuss the new concept of Personal Information Management Systems (PIMS for short) that allows each user to be in a position to manage his/her personal information. Some applications are run directly by the PIMS, so are under direct control of the user. Others are in separate systems, that are willing to share with the PIMS the data they collect about that particular user. In that later case, the PIMS is a system for distributed data management. We argue that the time has come for PIMS even though the approach requires a sharp turn from previous models based on the monetisation of personal data. We consider research issues raised by PIMS, either new or that acquire a new avor in a PIMS context. We also present works on the integration of users data from different sources (such as email messages, calendar, contacts, and location history) into a PIMS. The PIMS we consider is a Knowledge Base System based on Semantic Web standards, notably RDF and schema.org. Some of the knowledge is episodical (typically related to spatio-temporal events) and some is semantic (knowledge that holds irrelative to any such event). Of particular interest is the cross enrichment of these two kinds of knowledge based on the alignment of concepts, e.g., enrichment between a calendar and a geographical map using the location history. The goal is to enable users via the PIMS to query and perform analytics over their personal information within and across different dimensions. Personal data is constantly collected, either voluntarily by users in emails, social media interactions, multimedia objects, calendar items, contacts, etc., or passively by various applications such as GPS of mobile devices, transactions, quantified self sensors, etc. The processing of personal data is complicated by the fact that such data is typically stored in silos with different terminologies/ontologies, formats and access protocoles. Users are more and more loosing control over their data; they are sometimes not even aware of the data collected about them and how it is used. We discuss the new concept of Personal Information Management Systems (PIMS for short) that allows each user to be in a position to manage his/her personal information. Some applications are run directly by the PIMS, so are under direct control of the user. Others are in separate systems, that are willing to share with the PIMS the data they collect about that particular user. In that later case, the PIMS is a system for distributed data management. We argue that the time has come for PIMS even though the approach requires a sharp turn from previous models based on the monetisation of personal data. We consider research issues raised by PIMS, either new or that acquire a new avor in a PIMS context. We also present works on the integration of users data from different sources (such as email messages, calendar, contacts, and location history) into a PIMS. The PIMS we consider is a Knowledge Base System based on Semantic Web standards, notably RDF and schema.org. Some of the knowledge is episodical (typically related to spatio-temporal events) and some is semantic (knowledge that holds irrelative to any such event). Of particular interest is the cross enrichment of these two kinds of knowledge based on the alignment of concepts, e.g., enrichment between a calendar and a geographical map using the location history. The goal is to enable users via the PIMS to query and perform analytics over their personal information within and across different dimensions. Matching and Covering in Streaming Graphs

121 citations