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Bruno De Witte

Bio: Bruno De Witte is an academic researcher from European University Institute. The author has contributed to research in topics: European union & European Union law. The author has an hindex of 22, co-authored 128 publications receiving 1408 citations. Previous affiliations of Bruno De Witte include Katholieke Universiteit Leuven & University of California, Berkeley.


Papers
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Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland, The Attorney General and The Minister for Foreign Affairs and theAttorney General, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Full Court) of 27 November 2012.
Abstract: Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland, The Attorney General, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Full Court) of 27 November 2012.

62 citations

01 Jan 2011
TL;DR: In this paper, the Lisbon reform of the Treaty revision procedures is described in general terms and two other initiatives for post-Lisbon treaty revision are mentioned; both relate to the composition of the European Parliament and do not involve the use of the simplified revision procedure.
Abstract: On 25 March 2011, the European Council adopted a decision aiming at the amendment of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by the addition of a new paragraph to Article 136 of that Treaty. The additional paragraph, consisting of two short sentences, runs as follows: “The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.” This is the first use made of one of the two ‘simplified’ Treaty revision procedures which were created by the Lisbon Treaty. In this paper, the Lisbon reform of the Treaty revision procedures will first be described in general terms. Two other initiatives for post-Lisbon treaty revision will then be mentioned; both relate to the composition of the European Parliament and do not involve the use of the simplified revision procedure. The paper will then explain the reasons why the European Council considered it necessary to amend the TFEU in order to contribute to the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union. Finally, there will be a discussion of the various steps taken so far in this amendment process which is scheduled to be finished by January 2013, after approval of the amendment from the side of each of the 27 EU states. Introduction On 25 March 2011, the European Council adopted a decision aiming at the amendment of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by the addition of a new paragraph to Article 136 of that Treaty. The additional paragraph, consisting of two short sentences, runs as follows: “3. The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.” Further steps at the European level are not required, but the amendment will enter into force only if approved by the 27 member states of the EU according to their own constitutional requirements and procedures. The European Council, in Article 2 of its decision of 25 March, indicates that it shall enter into force on 1 January 2013, provided that all the national approval

47 citations

Book
08 Dec 2005
TL;DR: The European Social Charter and EU Anti-Discrimination Law in the field of Disability: Two Gravitational Fields with One Common Purpose as mentioned in this paper have been discussed in the context of economic globalization.
Abstract: I 1. The Future of Social Rights Protection in Europe 2. Social Rights in European Constitutions II THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 3. The Supervisory Machinery of the European Social Charter: Recent Developments and Their Impact 4. Assessing the Strengths and Weaknesses of the European Social Charter's Supervisory System 5. Domestic Enforcement of the European Social Charter: The Way Forward 6. The Material Impact of the Jurisprudence of the European Committee of Social Rights III THE EUROPEAN UNION 7. Anchoring the European Union to the European Social Charter: The Case for Accession 8. The Trajectory of Fundamental Social Rights in the European Union 9. Social and Labour Rights under the EU Constitution 10. Fundamental Labour Rights after the Lisbon Agenda 11. How to Be Fundamental with Soft Procedures? The Open Method of Coordination and Fundamental Social Rights IV ESC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE EU ACQUIS: THE COMMON CORE AND THE ADDED VALUE? 12. The Right to Work 13. Walking in the Same Direction? The Contribution of the European Social Charter and the European Union to Combating Discrimination 14. The European Social Charter and EU Anti-discrimination Law in the Field of Disability: Two Gravitational Fields with One Common Purpose 15. We Don't See a Connection: The 'Right to Health' in the EU Charter and European Social Charter V BEYOND EUROPE'S BORDERS 16. The Integration of Social Rights Concerns in the External Relations of the European Union 17. European Fundamental Social Rights in the Context of Economic Globalization

40 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Euro crisis reforms as major example of interstitial institutional change in the EU as mentioned in this paper, and forms of institutional change : unusual sources of law, new tasks for the EU institutions, new organs, competence creep, institutional hybrids, and more differentiated integration.
Abstract: Euro crisis reforms as major example of interstitial institutional change in the EU - Forms of institutional change : unusual sources of law, new tasks for the EU institutions, new organs, competence creep, institutional hybrids, and more differentiated integration - Question whether some or all of this amounts to a ‘constitutional mutation’ of the EU legal order - Reasons to doubt whether the constitutional fundamentals have changed - Alternative thesis: increased institutional variation, deepening the differences between EMU law and the rest of EU law.

39 citations


Cited by
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Book
01 Jan 2005
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explained the EU political system and the decision-making procedures of the European Union, focusing on the role of the Single Market and the single market's role in the political system.
Abstract: Introduction: Explaining the EU Political System PART I: GOVERNMENT Executive Politics Legislative Politics Judicial Politics PART II: POLITICS Public Opinion Democracy, Parties and Elections Interest Representation PART III: POLICY-MAKING Regulation of the Single Market Expenditure Policies Economic and Monetary Union Citizen Freedom and Security Policies Foreign Policies Conclusions: Rethinking the European Union Appendix: Decision-making Procedures of the European Union Bibliography

1,282 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that current widespread characterisations of EU governance as multi-level and networked overlook the emergent architecture of the EU's public rule making, and they trace its emergence and diffusion across a wide range of policy domains, including telecommunications, energy, drug authorisation, occupational health and safety, employment promotion, social inclusion, pensions, health care, environmental protection, food safety, maritime safety, financial services, competition policy, state aid, anti-discrimination policy and fundamental rights.
Abstract: This article argues that current widespread characterisations of EU governance as multi-level and networked overlook the emergent architecture of the EU's public rule making. In this architecture, framework goals (such as full employment, social inclusion, 'good water status', a unified energy grid) and measures for gauging their achievement are established by joint action of the Member States and EU institutions. Lower-level units (such as national ministries or regulatory authorities and the actors with whom they collaborate) are given the freedom to advance these ends as they see fit. But in return for this autonomy, they must report regularly on their performance and participate in a peer review in which their results are compared with those pursuing other means to the same general ends. Finally, the framework goals, performance measures, and decision-making procedures themselves are periodically revised by the actors, including new participants whose views come to be seen as indispensable to full and fair deliberation. Although this architecture cannot be read off from either Treaty provisions or textbook accounts of the formal competences of EU institutions, the article traces its emergence and diffusion across a wide range of policy domains, including telecommunications, energy, drug authorisation, occupational health and safety, employment promotion, social inclusion, pensions, health care, environmental protection, food safety, maritime safety, financial services, competition policy, state aid, anti-discrimination policy and fundamental rights.

696 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that integration through law does have a liberalizing and deregulatory impact on the socioeconomic regimes of European Union member states, but this effect is generally compatible with the status quo in liberal market economies, but it tends to undermine the institutions and policy legacies of Continental and Scandinavian social market economies.
Abstract: Judge-made law has played a crucial role in the process of European integration. In the vertical dimension, it has greatly reduced the range of autonomous policy choices in the member states, and it has helped to expand the reach of European competences. At the same time, however, ‘integration through law’ does have a liberalizing and deregulatory impact on the socio-economic regimes of European Union member states. This effect is generally compatible with the status quo in liberal market economies, but it tends to undermine the institutions and policy legacies of Continental and Scandinavian social market economies. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, this structural asymmetry cannot be corrected through political action at the European level.

435 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that EU democratic conditionality is a strategy of reinforcement by reward which works through intergovernmental material bargaining and that its efficacy depends on the candidate governments' domestic political costs of compliance.
Abstract: ‘Democratic conditionality’ is the core strategy of the EU to induce candidate states to comply with its human rights and democracy standards. How does it work and when is it effective? This article reports findings of a comparative study of ‘hard cases’: Slovakia under Meciar; Turkey; and Latvia. We argue that EU democratic conditionality is a strategy of ‘reinforcement by reward’ which works through intergovernmental material bargaining. Its efficacy depends on the candidate governments’ domestic political costs of compliance. By contrast, social influence and transnational mobilization have proved ineffective.

411 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
Judith G. Kelley1
TL;DR: Zurn et al. as discussed by the authors compared traditional rational choice mechanisms such as membership conditionality with more socialization-based efforts, arguing that conditionality motivated most behavior changes, but that socialization based efforts often guided them.
Abstract: International relations scholars increasingly debate when and how international institutions influence domestic policy. This examination of ethnic politics in four Baltic and East European countries during the 1990s shows how European institutions shaped domestic policy, and why these institutions sometimes failed. Comparing traditional rational choice mechanisms such as membership conditionality with more socialization-based efforts, I argue that conditionality motivated most behavior changes, but that socialization-based efforts often guided them. Furthermore, using new case studies, statistics, and counterfactual analysis, I find that domestic opposition posed far greater obstacles to socialization-based methods than it did to conditionality: when used alone, socialization-based methods rarely changed behavior; when they did, the domestic opposition was usually low and the effect was only moderate. In contrast, incentive-based methods such as membership conditionality were crucial in changing policy: As domestic opposition grew, membership conditionality was not only increasingly necessary to change behavior, but it was also surprisingly effective.Many panel and seminar participants have offered useful comments on this work, but my thanks goes in particular to Michael Zurn, Alexandra Gheciu, Frank Schimmelfennig, Jeff Checkel, Robert Keohane, Steven Wilkinson, Robert Putnam, Milada Vachudova, and the editors and anonymous reviewers of International Organization. I also thank Princeton University Press for allowing me to use material from my book Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives. The usual caveats apply. This research was funded by a grant from the Danish Research Academy (former Forskerakademiet), and by travel support from the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard.

381 citations