Author
Bryan W. Husted
Other affiliations: IE University, York University, EGADE Business School
Bio: Bryan W. Husted is an academic researcher from Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education. The author has contributed to research in topics: Corporate social responsibility & Business ethics. The author has an hindex of 40, co-authored 104 publications receiving 7369 citations. Previous affiliations of Bryan W. Husted include IE University & York University.
Papers published on a yearly basis
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TL;DR: This paper examined the impact of national wealth, income distribution, government size, and four cultural variables on the perceived level of corruption in a country and found that corruption is significantly correlated to GNP per capita, power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance.
Abstract: This paper examines the impact of national wealth, income distribution, government size, and four cultural variables on the perceived level of corruption in a country. The study finds that corruption is significantly correlated to GNP per capita, power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. Significant interaction effects occur in collectivistic and high power-distance countries. Suggestions for future research are developed.
819 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors apply the strategic logic of the Bartlett and Ghoshal typology to the realm of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to international organizational strategy and find that institutional pressures, rather than strategic analysis of social issues and stakeholders, are guiding decision-making with respect to CSR.
Abstract: What is the relationship of global and local (country-specific) corporate social responsibility (CSR) to international organizational strategy? Applying the strategic logic of the Bartlett and Ghoshal typology to the realm of CSR, multinational firms should respond to pressures for integration and responsiveness from salient stakeholders. However, an institutional logic would suggest that multinational firms will simply replicate the existing product-market organizational strategy (multidomestic, transnational, global) in their management of CSR. These alternative approaches are tested with a survey instrument sent to MNEs operating in Mexico. The results of this study are consistent with the proposition that institutional pressures, rather than strategic analysis of social issues and stakeholders, are guiding decision-making with respect to CSR. We develop implications for MNE management and research, as well as public policy.
745 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the situation of firms that have two objectives: profit maximization and social performance, and show that it is wiser for the firm to act strategically than to be coerced into making investments in corporate social responsibility.
Abstract: This paper examines the situation of firms that have two objectives: profit maximization and social performance. By looking comparatively at the cases of altruism, coerced egoism, and strategy, this paper uses the tools of microeconomics to define the optimal level of social output that should be produced in each case. We show that it is wiser for the firm to act strategically than to be coerced into making investments in corporate social responsibility. In addition, we argue that greater overall social output will be achieved by the strategic approach, than by the altruistic approach.
624 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the impact of three strategic CSR variables ( visibility, appropriability, and voluntarism) on value creation among large Spanish corporations was examined, and the conclusions from these findings suggest that managers need to understand how CSR is similar to and different from other traditional corporate market activities if they are to pursue value creation through CSR.
438 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the impact of economic development, income inequality, and five cultural variables on the rate of software piracy at the country level and found that software piracy is significantly correlated to GNP per capita, income inequalities, and individualism.
Abstract: This paper examines the impact of the level of economic development, income inequality, and five cultural variables on the rate of software piracy at the country level. The study finds that software piracy is significantly correlated to GNP per capita, income inequality, and individualism. Implications for anti-piracy programs and suggestions for future research are developed.
393 citations
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6,977 citations
TL;DR: This article conducted a meta-analysis of 52 studies and found that corporate virtue in the form of social responsibility and, to a lesser extent, environmental responsibility is likely to pay off, although the operationalizations of CSP and CFP also moderate the positive association.
Abstract: Most theorizing on the relationship between corporate social/environmental performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP) assumes that the current evidence is too fractured or too variable to draw any generalizable conclusions. With this integrative, quantitative study, we intend to show that the mainstream claim that we have little generalizable knowledge about CSP and CFP is built on shaky grounds. Providing a methodologically more rigorous review than previous efforts, we conduct a meta-analysis of 52 studies (which represent the population of prior quantitative inquiry) yielding a total sample size of 33,878 observations. The meta-analytic findings suggest that corporate virtue in the form of social responsibility and, to a lesser extent, environmental responsibility is likely to pay off, although the operationalizations of CSP and CFP also moderate the positive association. For example, CSP appears to be more highly correlated with accounting-based measures of CFP than with market-based ...
6,493 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that people are much more likely to believe stories that favor their preferred candidate, especially if they have ideologically segregated social media networks, and that the average American adult saw on the order of one or perhaps several fake news stories in the months around the 2016 U.S. presidential election, with just over half of those who recalled seeing them believing them.
Abstract: Following the 2016 U.S. presidential election, many have expressed concern about the effects of false stories (“fake news”), circulated largely through social media. We discuss the economics of fake news and present new data on its consumption prior to the election. Drawing on web browsing data, archives of fact-checking websites, and results from a new online survey, we find: (i) social media was an important but not dominant source of election news, with 14 percent of Americans calling social media their “most important” source; (ii) of the known false news stories that appeared in the three months before the election, those favoring Trump were shared a total of 30 million times on Facebook, while those favoring Clinton were shared 8 million times; (iii) the average American adult saw on the order of one or perhaps several fake news stories in the months around the election, with just over half of those who recalled seeing them believing them; and (iv) people are much more likely to believe stories that favor their preferred candidate, especially if they have ideologically segregated social media networks.
3,959 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors classify the main CSR theories and related approaches in four groups: (1) instrumental theories, in which the corporation is seen as only an instrument for wealth creation, and its social activities are only a means to achieve economic results; (2) political theories, which concern themselves with the power of corporations in society and a responsible use of this power in the political arena; (3) integrative theories, focusing on the satisfaction of social demands; and (4) ethical theories based on ethical responsibilities of corporations to society.
Abstract: The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) field presents not only a landscape of theories but also a proliferation of approaches, which are controversial, complex and unclear. This article tries to clarify the sit- uation, ''mapping the territory'' by classifying the main CSR theories and related approaches in four groups: (1) instrumental theories, in which the corporation is seen as only an instrument for wealth creation, and its social activities are only a means to achieve economic results; (2) political theories, which concern themselves with the power of corporations in society and a responsible use of this power in the political arena; (3) integrative theories, in which the corporation is focused on the satisfaction of social demands; and (4) ethical theories, based on ethical responsibilities of corporations to society. In practice, each CSR theory presents four dimensions related to profits, political performance, social demands and ethical values. The findings suggest the necessity to develop a new theory on the business and society relationship, which should integrate these four dimensions.
3,629 citations
Book•
01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: This chapter discusses Decision-Theoretic Foundations, Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence, and the Decision-Analytic Approach to Games, which aims to clarify the role of rationality in decision-making.
Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index
3,569 citations