scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
Author

Carlo Blundo

Bio: Carlo Blundo is an academic researcher from University of Salerno. The author has contributed to research in topics: Key distribution & Secret sharing. The author has an hindex of 33, co-authored 142 publications receiving 6518 citations.


Papers
More filters
Book ChapterDOI
16 Aug 1992
TL;DR: This paper considers the model where interaction is allowed in the common key computation phase, and shows a gap between the models by exhibiting an interactive scheme in which the user's information is only k + t - 1 times the size of the commonKey.
Abstract: A key distribution scheme for dynamic conferences is a method by which initially an (off-line) trusted server distributes private individual pieces of information to a set of users. Later any group of users of a given size (a dynamic conference) is able to compute a common secure key. In this paper we study the theory and applications of such perfectly secure systems. In this setting, any group of t users can compute a common key by each user computing using only his private piece of information and the identities of the other t - 1 group users. Keys are secure against coalitions of up to k users, that is, even if k users pool together their pieces they cannot compute anything about a key of any t-size conference comprised of other users.First we consider a non-interactive model where users compute the common key without any interaction. We prove a lower hound on the size of the user's piece of information of (k+t-1 t-1) times the size of the common key. We then establish the optimality of this bound, by describing and analyzing a scheme which exactly meets this limitation (the construction extends the one in [2]). Then, we consider the model where interaction is allowed in the common key computation phase, and show a gap between the models by exhibiting an interactive scheme in which the user's information is only k + t - 1 times the size of the common key. We further show various applications and useful modifications of our basic scheme. Finally, we present its adaptation to network topologies with neighborhood constraints.

1,181 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper examines graph-based access structures, i.e., access structures in which any qualified set of participants contains at least an edge of a given graph whose vertices represent the participants of the scheme, and provides a novel technique for realizing threshold visual cryptography schemes.
Abstract: A visual cryptography scheme for a set P ofnparticipants is a method of encoding a secret imageSIintonshadow images called shares, where each participant in P receives one share. Certain qualified subsets of participants can “visually” recover the secret image, but other, forbidden, sets of participants have no information (in an information-theoretic sense) onSI. A “visual” recovery for a setX?P consists of xeroxing the shares given to the participants inXonto transparencies, and then stacking them. The participants in a qualified setXwill be able to see the secret image without any knowledge of cryptography and without performing any cryptographic computation. In this paper we propose two techniques for constructing visual cryptography schemes for general access structures. We analyze the structure of visual cryptography schemes and we prove bounds on the size of the shares distributed to the participants in the scheme. We provide a novel technique for realizingkout ofnthreshold visual cryptography schemes. Our construction forkout ofnvisual cryptography schemes is better with respect to pixel expansion than the one proposed by M. Naor and A. Shamir (Visual cryptography,in“Advances in Cryptology?Eurocrypt '94” CA. De Santis, Ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 950, pp. 1?12, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1995) and for the case of 2 out ofnis the best possible. Finally, we consider graph-based access structures, i.e., access structures in which any qualified set of participants contains at least an edge of a given graph whose vertices represent the participants of the scheme.

639 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
Carlo Blundo, Alfredo De Santis, Ugo Vaccaro, Amir Herzberg1, Shay Kutten1, Moti Yong 
TL;DR: This paper considers the model where interaction is allowed in the common key computation phase and shows a gap between the models by exhibiting a one-round interactive scheme in which the user's information is only k + t −1 times the size of the commonKey.
Abstract: In this paper we analyze perfectly secure key distribution schemes for dynamic conferences. In this setting, any member of a group of t users can compute a common key using only his private initial piece of information and the identities of the other t −1 users in the group. Keys are secure against coalitions of up to k users; that is, even if k users pool together their pieces they cannot compute anything about a key of any conference comprised of t other users. First we consider a noninteractive model where users compute the common key without any interaction. We prove the tight bound on the size of each user's piece of information of[formula]times the size of the common key. Then, we consider the model where interaction is allowed in the common key computation phase and show a gap between the models by exhibiting a one-round interactive scheme in which the user's information is only k + t −1 times the size of the common key. Finally, we present its adaptation to network topologies with neighbourhood constraints and to asymmetric (e.g., client-server) communication models.

473 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: An extended visual cryptography scheme, for an access structure (ΓQual,ΓForb) on a set of n participants, is a technique to encode n images in such a way that when the authors stack together the transparencies associated to participants in any set X∈�Qual they get the secret message with no trace of the original images, but any X∈Γ forb has no information on the shared image.

423 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: This paper analyzes the contrast of the reconstructed image in k out of n visual cryptography schemes and gives a complete characterization of schemes having optimal contrast and minimum pixel expansion in terms of certain balanced incomplete block designs.
Abstract: A visual cryptography scheme is a method to encode a secret image SI into shadow images called shares such that certain qualified subsets of shares enable the ``visual'' recovery of the secret image. The ``visual'' recovery consists of xeroxing the shares onto transparencies, and then stacking them. The shares of a qualified set will reveal the secret image without any cryptographic computation. In this paper we analyze the contrast of the reconstructed image in k out of n visual cryptography schemes. (In such a scheme any k shares will reveal the image, but no set of k-1 shares gives any information about the image.) In the case of 2 out of n threshold schemes we give a complete characterization of schemes having optimal contrast and minimum pixel expansion in terms of certain balanced incomplete block designs. In the case of k out of n threshold schemes with $k\geq 3$ we obtain upper and lower bounds on the optimal contrast.

239 citations


Cited by
More filters
Book
01 Jan 1996
TL;DR: A valuable reference for the novice as well as for the expert who needs a wider scope of coverage within the area of cryptography, this book provides easy and rapid access of information and includes more than 200 algorithms and protocols.
Abstract: From the Publisher: A valuable reference for the novice as well as for the expert who needs a wider scope of coverage within the area of cryptography, this book provides easy and rapid access of information and includes more than 200 algorithms and protocols; more than 200 tables and figures; more than 1,000 numbered definitions, facts, examples, notes, and remarks; and over 1,250 significant references, including brief comments on each paper.

13,597 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
18 Nov 2002
TL;DR: A key-management scheme designed to satisfy both operational and security requirements of DSNs is presented, which relies on probabilistic key sharing among the nodes of a random graph and uses simple protocols for shared-key discovery and path-key establishment, and for key revocation, re-keying, and incremental addition of nodes.
Abstract: Distributed Sensor Networks (DSNs) are ad-hoc mobile networks that include sensor nodes with limited computation and communication capabilities. DSNs are dynamic in the sense that they allow addition and deletion of sensor nodes after deployment to grow the network or replace failing and unreliable nodes. DSNs may be deployed in hostile areas where communication is monitored and nodes are subject to capture and surreptitious use by an adversary. Hence DSNs require cryptographic protection of communications, sensor-capture detection, key revocation and sensor disabling. In this paper, we present a key-management scheme designed to satisfy both operational and security requirements of DSNs. The scheme includes selective distribution and revocation of keys to sensor nodes as well as node re-keying without substantial computation and communication capabilities. It relies on probabilistic key sharing among the nodes of a random graph and uses simple protocols for shared-key discovery and path-key establishment, and for key revocation, re-keying, and incremental addition of nodes. The security and network connectivity characteristics supported by the key-management scheme are discussed and simulation experiments presented.

3,900 citations

Book ChapterDOI
04 Oct 2019
TL;DR: Permission to copy without fee all or part of this material is granted provided that the copies arc not made or distributed for direct commercial advantage.
Abstract: Usually, a proof of a theorem contains more knowledge than the mere fact that the theorem is true. For instance, to prove that a graph is Hamiltonian it suffices to exhibit a Hamiltonian tour in it; however, this seems to contain more knowledge than the single bit Hamiltonian/non-Hamiltonian.In this paper a computational complexity theory of the “knowledge” contained in a proof is developed. Zero-knowledge proofs are defined as those proofs that convey no additional knowledge other than the correctness of the proposition in question. Examples of zero-knowledge proof systems are given for the languages of quadratic residuosity and 'quadratic nonresiduosity. These are the first examples of zero-knowledge proofs for languages not known to be efficiently recognizable.

1,962 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
26 Apr 2004
TL;DR: It is demonstrated that the Sybil attack can be exceedingly detrimental to many important functions of the sensor network such as routing, resource allocation, misbehavior detection, etc.
Abstract: Security is important for many sensor network applications. A particularly harmful attack against sensor and ad hoc networks is known as the Sybil attack based on J.R. Douceur (2002), where a node illegitimately claims multiple identities. This paper systematically analyzes the threat posed by the Sybil attack to wireless sensor networks. We demonstrate that the attack can be exceedingly detrimental to many important functions of the sensor network such as routing, resource allocation, misbehavior detection, etc. We establish a classification of different types of the Sybil attack, which enables us to better understand the threats posed by each type, and better design countermeasures against each type. We then propose several novel techniques to defend against the Sybil attack, and analyze their effectiveness quantitatively.

1,402 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
27 Oct 2003
TL;DR: In this paper, a general framework for establishing pairwise keys between sensors on the basis of a polynomial-based key predistribution protocol is presented, and two efficient instantiations of the general framework are presented: a random subset assignment key pre-distribution scheme and a grid-based pre-disposition scheme.
Abstract: Pairwise key establishment is a fundamental security service in sensor networks; it enables sensor nodes to communicate securely with each other using cryptographic techniques. However, due to the resource constraints on sensors, it is infeasible to use traditional key management techniques such as public key cryptography and key distribution center (KDC). To facilitate the study of novel pairwise key predistribution techniques, this paper presents a general framework for establishing pairwise keys between sensors on the basis of a polynomial-based key predistribution protocol [2]. This paper then presents two efficient instantiations of the general framework: a random subset assignment key predistribution scheme and a grid-based key predistribution scheme. The analysis in this paper indicates that these two schemes have a number of nice properties, including high probability (or guarantee) to establish pairwise keys, tolerance of node captures, and low communication overhead. Finally, this paper presents a technique to reduce the computation at sensors required by these schemes.

1,391 citations