lations theory is inductively derived from the European experience of the past four centuries, during which Europe was the locus and generator of war, innovation, and wealth. According to Kenneth Waltz, “The theory of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era. It would be . . . ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica. . . . A general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers.”1 If international relations theorists paid attention to other regions of the globe, it was to study subjects considered peripheral such as third world security or the behavior of small states.2 Accordingly, international relations scholarship has focused on explaining the European experience, including, for example, the causes of World Wars I and II, as well as the Cold War and U.S.-Soviet relations.3 Although this is still true, other parts of the world have become increasingly signiacant. Accordingly, knowledge of European Getting Asia Wrong

Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks

This fourth edition of David P Forsythe's successful textbook provides an authoritative and timely analysis of the place of human rights in an age of upheaval in international politics Human rights standards are examined at the global, regional and national levels, with separate chapters on transnational corporations and advocacy groups Completely updated and revised, the fourth edition takes account of new sources and recent scholarship, as well as recent events, such as the Syrian war, the rise of ISIS, refugee flows, South Sudan crises, and the resurgence of nationalism A new chapter has been added on the media and human rights, covering both traditional and social media Examining attempts to protect human rights by various actors, such as the United Nations, the European Union, transnational corporations, and the media, the book stresses that the open-ended fate of universal human rights depends on human agency in this context Containing further reading suggestions and discussion questions, this textbook is a vital resource for courses on human rights in an international context

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Human Rights in International Relations

The small and medium-sized states in Southeast Asia have faced significant geostrategic changes with the end of the Cold War and the rise of China. Over the last decade, scholars have debated how these countries would cope with growing Chinese power, and how their relations with the other major powers in the region would change. Some analysts have suggested that the region is shifting toward a more China-centered order, but this view is premature. Eschewing the simple dichotomy of balancing versus bandwagoning, Southeast Asian countries do not want to choose between the two major powers, the United States and China. This avoidance strategy is not merely tactical or time-buying; instead, Southeast Asian states have actively tried to influence the shape of the new regional order. Key Southeast Asian states are pursuing two main pathways to order in the region: the “omni-enmeshment” of major powers and complex balance of influence. They have helped to produce an interim power distribution outcome, which is a...

Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies

Vietnam's firms contract without the shadow of the law and only partly in the shadow of the future. Although contracting rests in part on the threat of loss of future business, firms often are willing to renegotiate following a breach, so the retaliation is not as forceful as in the standard repeated-game story and not as effective a sanction. To ensure agreements are kept, firms rely on other devices to supplement repeated-game incentives. Firms scrutinize their trading partners. Community sanctions are occasionally invoked. Transactions with greater risk of reneging are supported by more elaborate governance structures. Ongoing relationships among firms serve to reduce the transaction costs of the market: the costs of locating trading partners, of negotiating and monitoring contracts, and of enforcing agreements and settling disputes. In an economy in the midst of deep reform, transaction costs are especially severe because the normal market-supporting institutions are still being built. We examine in this article how Vietnam's firms use ongoing relationships to maintain agreements. For a snapshot of an economy in the process of building institutions, we use a 1995-1997 survey of privately owned manufacturing firms in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. The new ways of doing business in Vietnam have been devised at ground level. The bottom-up reform process has relied on de facto decentralization of economic activity, while leaving in place the formal institutions of central planning. Although Vietnam's government has introduced few policies to foster the private sector, "the owners of private business have worked out their own ad hoc strategy for economic development which is popular, oral rather than in the

https://www.jstor.org/stable/info/3555085

Dispute Prevention Without Courts in Vietnam

Recent scholarship argues that one solution to ensure longevity and economic growth in an authoritarian regime is to co-opt potential opposition by offering them limited policy influence in a national legislature. While co-option theory generates a number of predictions for delegate behavior within an authoritarian parliament, the opacity of such regimes has made empirical confirmation difficult. We resolve this problem by exploiting the transcripts of query sessions in the Vietnamese National Assembly, where delegates question the Prime Minister and Cabinet Members on important issues of the day. Using a content analysis of queries, we offer the first empirical test of delegate behavior in non-democratic parliaments. We find that some delegates exhibit behavior consistent with co-option theory by actively participating in sessions, demonstrating criticism of authorities, and responding to the needs of local constituents. Such responsiveness, however, is parameterized by regime rules for nominating, electing, and assigning parliamentary responsibilities to individual delegates.

Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament

The study of contemporary Vietnamese politics has been dominated by two main paradigms: “everyday politics” and civil society. This article argues that “everyday politics” and civil society paradigms have marginalized the study of pro-democracy groups that have contested the hegemonic role of the Vietnam Communist Party. It is argued that political change in Vietnam will be significantly determined by how Vietnam’s one-party state manages the challenges posed by political civil society. Political civil society refers to the network of political groups that coalesced into a nascent social movement known as Bloc 8406. Overseas Vietnamese groups, such as the Viet Tan party, play an increasingly important role in providing financial and moral support for political civil society. The civil society paradigm is criticized for its exclusive preoccupation with so-called “non-governmental organizations” and community-based organizations as the prime agents of political change. The article concludes with an assessment of the future impact of political civil society on Vietnam and likely future scenarios.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/41288787.pdf

Vietnam and the Challenge of Political Civil Society

This article focuses on the challenges to the authority of Vietnam’s one-party state that emerged in 2009 and state responses. Three separate challenges are discussed: opposition to bauxite mining in the Central Highlands; mass protests by the Catholic Church over land ownership issues; and revived political dissent by pro-democracy activists and bloggers. The Vietnam Communist Party bases its claims to political legitimacy on multiple sources. The bauxite mining controversy challenged the state’s claim to political legitimacy on the basis of performance. The Catholic land dispute challenged the state’s claim to legitimacy on rational-legal grounds. Revived political dissent, including the linkage of demands for democracy with concerns over environmental issues and relations with China, challenged the state’s claim to legitimacy based on nationalism. Vietnam responded in a “soft authoritarian” manner. Future challenges and state responses will be debated as Vietnam moves to convene its eleventh national party congress in 2010.

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/186810340902800403

Political Legitimacy of Vietnam’s One Party-State: Challenges and Responses

This article examines the challenges to the ideological basis of Vietnam's one-party state and the state's responses to these challenges in the period from 1986 to the present. First, a brief historical overview of Vietnam's political system since formal reunification in 1976 is presented. Next, the article considers six major challenges to the political legitimacy of one-party rule mounted by southern war veterans, communist intelligentsia, nonparty elites, peasants, retired senior generals, and pro-democracy activists. Taken together, the regime's legitimacy was challenged in three main areas: ideology, economic performance, and political reform. The article concludes with a discussion of regime responses to each of these challenges. Although the regime's normal default position has been repression, the regime also has accommodated and adjusted its policies in response to criticisms from below. In sum, Vietnam's one-party state rests on multiple sources of legitimacy and party elites are negotiating the pace and scope of political change.

Este articulo examina los desafios a las bases ideologicas del estado de partido unico de Vietnam y las respuestas de este en el periodo de 1986 a la fecha. Primero, se presenta una breve vision general historica del sistema politico de Vietnam desde su reunificacion oficial en 1976. Despues, el articulo considera los seis mayores desafios para la legitimidad politica del gobierno de partido unico, estos son: los veteranos de guerra surenos, la inteligencia comunista, las elites no-partidistas, los obreros, los generales de alto rango retirados, y los activistas pro-democracia. En conjunto la legitimidad del regimen fue desafiada en tres areas principales: ideologia, desempeno economico, y la reforma politica. El articulo concluye con una discusion de las respuestas del regimen a cada uno de estos desafios. Aunque la posicion natural del regimen ha sido la represion, el regimen tambien ha acomodado y ajustado sus politicas en respuesta a las criticas de los grupos sociales mencionados. En suma, el estado de partido unico de Vietnam descansa en multiples fuentes de legitimidad y las elites partidistas se encuentran negociando el ritmo y el alcance del cambio politico.

Political Legitimacy in Vietnam: Challenge and Response

An analysis of contemporary Laos since the Communist victories in Indo-China in April 1975, based on extensive field trips and interviews with government and party officials. It covers the political history of the Lao state, its social structure, political system, economic system, domestic and foreign policies. Argues that Vietnamese involvement has been, and will continue to be, the most salient feature of the Lao revolution; the most important benefit has been the unification of what remains of the Lao state under indigenous government for the first time since the end of the 17th century. There have also been important economic benefits through Vietnam's aid programme. Drawbacks include the exclusion, even in discussion, of alternative policy options, and the close identity of Lao with Vietnamese national interests within the Indochinese solidarity bloc has meant a close link in their foreign and defence policy. -from Author

Laos: Politics, Economics and Society.

This article reviews Chinese assertive behaviour towards the Philippines and Vietnam over South China Sea issues in 2011. The article compares and contrasts Chinese diplomatic behaviour in the period before and after the adoption by ASEAN member states and China of Guidelines for the Implementation the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in July. In the first period China aggressively asserted its claims to sovereignty by interfering with commercial fishing and oil exploration activities of vessels operating in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Vietnam and the Philippines. Both states resisted Chinese actions. The Philippines allocated increased funding for defence modernization, lobbied ASEAN states and shored up its alliance with the United States. Vietnam too protested Chinese action and undertook symbolic steps to defend national sovereignty. In the second period all states moved to contain South China Sea tensions from affecting their larger bilateral relations. It remains to be seen, however, if proposed confidence building measures will ameliorate Chinese assertiveness.

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/186810341103000205

Carlyle A. Thayer

Papers

Vietnam and the Challenge of Political Civil Society

Political Legitimacy of Vietnam’s One Party-State: Challenges and Responses

Political Legitimacy in Vietnam: Challenge and Response

Laos: Politics, Economics and Society.

Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea and Southeast Asian Responses