Showing papers by "Cass R. Sunstein published in 2011"
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In recent years, social scientists have been incorporating empirical findings about human behavior into economic models as mentioned in this paper, and they also offer some suggestions about the appropriate design of effective, low-cost, choice-preserving approaches to regulatory problems, including disclosure requirements, default rules, and simplification.
Abstract: In recent years, social scientists have been incorporating empirical findings about human behavior into economic models. These findings offer important insights for thinking about regulation and its likely consequences. They also offer some suggestions about the appropriate design of effective, low-cost, choice-preserving approaches to regulatory problems, including disclosure requirements, default rules, and simplification. A general lesson is that small, inexpensive policy initiatives can have large and highly beneficial effects. In the United States, a large number of recent practices and reforms reflect an appreciation of this lesson. They also reflect an understanding of the need to ensure that regulations have strong empirical foundations, both through careful analysis of costs and benefits in advance and through retrospective review of what works and what does not.
112 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on a range of environmental risks to show the following: (1) Fear leads us to neglect probability of occurrence; (2) As fearsome environmental risks are usually imposed by others (as externalities), indignation stirs excess reaction; (3) We often misperceive or miscalculate such risks.
Abstract: When risks threaten, cognitive mechanisms bias people toward action or inaction. Fearsome risks are highly available. The availability bias tells us that this leads people to overestimate their frequency. Therefore, they also overreact to curtail the likelihood or consequences of such risks. More generally, fear can paralyze efforts to think clearly about risks. We draw on a range of environmental risks to show the following: (1) Fear leads us to neglect probability of occurrence; (2) As fearsome environmental risks are usually imposed by others (as externalities), indignation stirs excess reaction; (3) We often misperceive or miscalculate such risks. Two experiments demonstrate probability neglect when fearsome risks arise: (a) willingness-to-pay to eliminate the cancer risk from arsenic in water (described in vivid terms) did not vary despite a 10-fold variation in risk; (b) the willingness-to-accept price for a painful but non dangerous electric shock did not vary between a 1 and 100% chance. Possible explanations relate to the role of the amygdala in impairing cognitive brain function. Government and the law, both made by mortals and both responding to public pressures, similarly neglect probabilities for fearsome risks. Examples relating to shark attacks, Love Canal, alar and terrorism are discussed.
95 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In recent years, social scientists have been incorporating empirical findings about human behavior into economic models as discussed by the authors, and they also offer some suggestions about the appropriate design of effective, low-cost, choice-preserving approaches to regulatory problems, including disclosure requirements, default rules, and simplification.
Abstract: In recent years, social scientists have been incorporating empirical findings about human behavior into economic models. These findings offer important insights for thinking about regulation and its likely consequences. They also offer some suggestions about the appropriate design of effective, low-cost, choice-preserving approaches to regulatory problems, including disclosure requirements, default rules, and simplification. A general lesson is that small, inexpensive policy initiatives can have large and highly beneficial effects. In the United States, a large number of recent practices and reforms reflect an appreciation of this lesson. They also reflect an understanding of the need to ensure that regulations have strong empirical foundations, both through careful analysis of costs and benefits in advance and through retrospective review of what works and what does not.
75 citations
01 Jan 2011
TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify choice architects as "the people who organize the context in which people make decisions" (p. 3) and define a choice architect as "a person who can choose an arrangement or environment which provides individuals with the freedom to choose, but still "influence people's behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better".
Abstract: How many people skip the introduction of a book and jump right into Chapter 1? Doing so would be a mistake with this book. In the Introduction, the authors identify choice architects. “A choice architect has responsibility for organizing the context in which people make decisions” (p. 3). Choice architecture and traditional architecture both require planning and following guidelines/restrictions. The devil really is in the details. Every little thing matters! A choice architect can choose an arrangement or environment which provides individuals with the freedom to choose, but still “influence people’s behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better” (p. 5). Thus, a nudge.
65 citations
27 Jul 2011
TL;DR: In an extraordinary decision, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has provided a new approach to social and economic rights, one that respects the fact of limited resources while also requiring governmental attention to basic needs as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Do social and economic rights belong in a democratic constitution? Skeptics have wondered whether it is possible to constitutionalize such rights without imposing an untenable managerial responsibility on courts. In an extraordinary decision, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has provided a new approach to social and economic rights, one that respects the fact of limited resources while also requiring governmental attention to basic needs. This new approach might be called an administrative law model of constitutional rights. It contains considerable promise, because it recognize rights to reasonable programs, rather than to protection of each individual, a path that might well be beyond governmental capacities.
27 citations
TL;DR: In the last twenty months, the Obama Administration has been taking an approach to regulation that is distinctive in three ways as mentioned in this paper, which is not with dogma or guesswork, but with the best available evidence of how people really behave.
Abstract: In the last twenty months, the Obama Administration has been taking an approach to regulation that is distinctive in three ways. First, we have approached regulatory problems not with dogma or guesswork, but with the best available evidence of how people really behave. Second, we have used cost-benefit analysis in a highly disciplined way, not to reduce difficult questions to problems of arithmetic, but as a pragmatic tool for cataloguing, assessing, reassessing, and publicizing the human consequences of regulation – and for obtaining public comment on our analysis. This emphasis on human consequences – on reducing or eliminating unjustified burdens on the private sector and on ensuring that high costs are justified by high benefits – is especially important in a period of economic difficulty. We have worked to put into place important safeguards while also making regulation compatible with the economic recovery, and while reducing the risk that costly regulations will have adverse effects on job creation, wages, prices, and economic growth as a whole.
13 citations