Probability Distributions.- Linear Models for Regression.- Linear Models for Classification.- Neural Networks.- Kernel Methods.- Sparse Kernel Machines.- Graphical Models.- Mixture Models and EM.- Approximate Inference.- Sampling Methods.- Continuous Latent Variables.- Sequential Data.- Combining Models.

Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning

Improving the design and implementation of evidence-based practice depends on successful behaviour change interventions. This requires an appropriate method for characterising interventions and linking them to an analysis of the targeted behaviour. There exists a plethora of frameworks of behaviour change interventions, but it is not clear how well they serve this purpose. This paper evaluates these frameworks, and develops and evaluates a new framework aimed at overcoming their limitations. A systematic search of electronic databases and consultation with behaviour change experts were used to identify frameworks of behaviour change interventions. These were evaluated according to three criteria: comprehensiveness, coherence, and a clear link to an overarching model of behaviour. A new framework was developed to meet these criteria. The reliability with which it could be applied was examined in two domains of behaviour change: tobacco control and obesity. Nineteen frameworks were identified covering nine intervention functions and seven policy categories that could enable those interventions. None of the frameworks reviewed covered the full range of intervention functions or policies, and only a minority met the criteria of coherence or linkage to a model of behaviour. At the centre of a proposed new framework is a 'behaviour system' involving three essential conditions: capability, opportunity, and motivation (what we term the 'COM-B system'). This forms the hub of a 'behaviour change wheel' (BCW) around which are positioned the nine intervention functions aimed at addressing deficits in one or more of these conditions; around this are placed seven categories of policy that could enable those interventions to occur. The BCW was used reliably to characterise interventions within the English Department of Health's 2010 tobacco control strategy and the National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence's guidance on reducing obesity. Interventions and policies to change behaviour can be usefully characterised by means of a BCW comprising: a 'behaviour system' at the hub, encircled by intervention functions and then by policy categories. Research is needed to establish how far the BCW can lead to more efficient design of effective interventions.

/pdf/the-behaviour-change-wheel-a-new-method-for-characterising-4vp816z23u.pdf

The behaviour change wheel: a new method for characterising and designing behaviour change interventions.

Norms have never been absent from the study of international politics, but the sweeping “ideational turn” in the 1980s and 1990s brought them back as a central theoretical concern in the field. Much theorizing about norms has focused on how they create social structure, standards of appropriateness, and stability in international politics. Recent empirical research on norms, in contrast, has examined their role in creating political change, but change processes have been less well-theorized. We induce from this research a variety of theoretical arguments and testable hypotheses about the role of norms in political change. We argue that norms evolve in a three-stage “life cycle” of emergence, “norm cascades,” and internalization, and that each stage is governed by different motives, mechanisms, and behavioral logics. We also highlight the rational and strategic nature of many social construction processes and argue that theoretical progress will only be made by placing attention on the connections between norms and rationality rather than by opposing the two.

/pdf/international-norm-dynamics-and-political-change-37ig9r9dlq.pdf

International Norm Dynamics and Political Change

Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfield of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.

Risk as Feelings

Early studies of intuitive judgment and decision making conducted with the late Amos Tversky are reviewed in the context of two related concepts: an analysis of accessibility, the ease with which thoughts come to mind; a distinction between effortless intuition and deliberate reasoning. Intuitive thoughts, like percepts, are highly accessible. Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explain the central results of prospect theory, framing effects, the heuristic process of attribute substitution, and the characteristic biases that result from the substitution of nonextensional for extensional attributes. Variations in the accessibility of rules explain the occasional corrections of intuitive judgments. The study of biases is compatible with a view of intuitive thinking and decision making as generally skilled and successful.

https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/JudgementAndChoice.MappingBoundedRationality.DKahneman2003.pdf

A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality.

The communications revolution has thrown into question the value of public interest obligations for television broadcasters. But the distinctive nature of this unusual market--with "winner- take-all" features, with viewers as a commodity, with pervasive externalities from private choices, and with market effects on preferences as well as the other way around--justifies a continuing role for government regulation in the public interest. At the same time, regulation best takes the form, not of anachronistic command-and-control regulation, but of (1) disclosure requirements, (2) economic incentives ("pay or play"), and (3) voluntary self-regulation through a privately administered code. Some discussion is devoted to free speech and antitrust issues, and to the different possible shapes of liability and property rules in this context, treating certain programming as a public "good" akin to pollution as a public bad.

/pdf/private-broadcasters-and-the-public-interest-notes-toward-a-h22xm6uvff.pdf

Private Broadcasters and the Public Interest: Notes Toward a 'Third Way'

Preferences and politics

American constitutional law is at a crossroads As it is currently interpreted, the Constitution is partial, Sunstein asserts It is, first of all, biased Contemporary constitutional law treats the status quo as neutral and just, and any departure as necessarily partisan But when the status quo is neither neutral nor just, Sunstein argues, reasoning of this sort produces injustice The Constitution is partial in another sense: its meaning has come to be identified solely with the decisions of the Supreme Court This was not always the case, as Sunstein demonstrates; nor was it the intention of the country's founders Instead, the Constitution often served as a catalyst for public deliberation about its general terms and aspirations - and Sunstein makes a strong case for reviving this broader understanding of the Constitution's role In light of this analysis, Sunstein proposes solutions to some of the most hotly disputed issues of our time, including affirmative action, sex discrimination, pornography, "hate speech", and government funding of religious schools and the arts In an especially striking argument, he claims that the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment - not the right to privacy - protects a woman's right to choose abortion Sunstein connects these and other debates to the Constitution's historic commitment to public deliberation among political equals - and in doing so, he reconceives many of our most basic constitutional rights, such as free speech and equality under law He urges that public deliberation about the meaning of the Constitution in turn be freed from a principle of neutrality based on the status quo His work points to a historically sound but fundamentally new understanding of the American constitutional process as an exercise in deliberative democracy

/pdf/the-partial-constitution-31izdomu8e.pdf

The Partial Constitution

This review-essay explores the uses and limits of cost-benefit analysis in the context of environmental protection, focusing on three recent books: Priceless, by Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling; Cellular Phones, Public Fears, and A Culture of Precaution, by Adam Burgess; and Catastrophe: Risk and Response, by Richard A. Posner. The review-essay emphasizes three principal limitations on the use of cost-benefit analysis. First, it is important to distinguish between the easy cases for cost-benefit analysis, in which the beneficiaries of regulation pay all or almost all of its cost, from the harder cases, in which the beneficiaries pay little for the environmental protection that they receive. In the harder cases, net welfare gains and distributional advantages are possible even if environmental regulation fails cost-benefit analysis. Second, there are possible uses, in the environmental context, of maximin rather than cost-benefit analysis, especially when regulators are attempting to control catastrophic risks where probabilities cannot be assigned. An Anti-Catastrophe Principle makes sense for such situations. Third, human beings are citizens, not merely consumers, and this point requires abandonment of the willingness to pay criterion in some contexts.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID604581_code249436.pdf?abstractid=604581&mirid=1

Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment

This paper urges that one of the great, quasi-theological debates in legal theory depends on answers to empirical questions. The debate is whether courts should be "formalistic," that is, whether they should interpret statutory terms in accordance with their literal meaning, or whether they should be permitted to reject literal meaning by reference to "purposes," or canons of constructions, or considerations of policy. Any good answer turns on what approach will minimize decision costs and error costs, and that depends on empirical judgments about the likely performance of courts and legislatures. There is discussion as well of information-eliciting and market-mimicking default rules in the interpretation of contracts and statutes.

/pdf/must-formalism-be-defended-empirically-3fg390rzf4.pdf

Cass R. Sunstein

Papers

Private Broadcasters and the Public Interest: Notes Toward a 'Third Way'

Preferences and politics

The Partial Constitution

Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment

Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically