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Charalambos D. Aliprantis

Bio: Charalambos D. Aliprantis is an academic researcher from Purdue University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Riesz representation theorem & Riesz space. The author has an hindex of 30, co-authored 153 publications receiving 9392 citations. Previous affiliations of Charalambos D. Aliprantis include Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis & University of Maine.


Papers
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Book
12 Mar 2014
TL;DR: In this paper, Riesz spaces are used to represent the topology of the space of sequences of sequences and correspondences of correspondences in Markov transitions, where the correspondences correspond to Markov transition.
Abstract: Odds and ends- Topology- Metrizable spaces- Measurability- Topological vector spaces- Normed spaces- Convexity- Riesz spaces- Banach lattices- Charges and measures- Integrals- Measures and topology- Lp-spaces- Riesz Representation Theorems- Probability measures- Spaces of sequences- Correspondences- Measurable correspondences- Markov transitions- Ergodicity

2,221 citations

Book
05 Sep 2008
TL;DR: Book of positive operators, as an amazing reference becomes what you need to get, and book, as a source that may involve the facts, opinion, literature, religion, and many others are the great friends to join with.
Abstract: New updated! The latest book from a very famous author finally comes out. Book of positive operators, as an amazing reference becomes what you need to get. What's for is this book? Are you still thinking for what the book is? Well, this is what you probably will get. You should have made proper choices for your better life. Book, as a source that may involve the facts, opinion, literature, religion, and many others are the great friends to join with.

1,337 citations

Book
01 Jan 1994

1,080 citations

Posted Content
01 Jan 2006

903 citations

Book
01 Jan 2002
TL;DR: In this article, the Daugavet equation is used to describe operators on $AL$-and $AM$-spaces. But this is not the case for all operators.
Abstract: Odds and ends Basic operator theory Operators on $AL$- and $AM$-spaces Special classes of operators Integral operators Spectral properties Some special spectra Positive matrices Irreducible operators Invariant subspaces The Daugavet equation Bibliography Index.

541 citations


Cited by
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Book
01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: This chapter discusses Decision-Theoretic Foundations, Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence, and the Decision-Analytic Approach to Games, which aims to clarify the role of rationality in decision-making.
Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

3,569 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the EM algorithm converges to a local maximum or a stationary value of the (incomplete-data) likelihood function under conditions that are applicable to many practical situations.
Abstract: Two convergence aspects of the EM algorithm are studied: (i) does the EM algorithm find a local maximum or a stationary value of the (incomplete-data) likelihood function? (ii) does the sequence of parameter estimates generated by EM converge? Several convergence results are obtained under conditions that are applicable to many practical situations Two useful special cases are: (a) if the unobserved complete-data specification can be described by a curved exponential family with compact parameter space, all the limit points of any EM sequence are stationary points of the likelihood function; (b) if the likelihood function is unimodal and a certain differentiability condition is satisfied, then any EM sequence converges to the unique maximum likelihood estimate A list of key properties of the algorithm is included

3,414 citations

Book
05 Sep 2008
TL;DR: Book of positive operators, as an amazing reference becomes what you need to get, and book, as a source that may involve the facts, opinion, literature, religion, and many others are the great friends to join with.
Abstract: New updated! The latest book from a very famous author finally comes out. Book of positive operators, as an amazing reference becomes what you need to get. What's for is this book? Are you still thinking for what the book is? Well, this is what you probably will get. You should have made proper choices for your better life. Book, as a source that may involve the facts, opinion, literature, religion, and many others are the great friends to join with.

1,337 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The standard envelope theorems apply to choice sets with convex and topological structure, providing sufficient conditions for the value function to be differentiable in a parameter and characterizing its derivative as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The standard envelope theorems apply to choice sets with convex and topological structure, providing sufficient conditions for the value function to be differentiable in a parameter and characterizing its derivative. This paper studies optimization with arbitrary choice sets and shows that the traditional envelope formula holds at any differentiability point of the value function. We also provide conditions for the value function to be, variously, absolutely continuous, left- and right-differentiable, or fully differentiable. These results are applied to mechanism design, convex programming, continuous optimization problems, saddle-point problems, problems with parameterized constraints, and optimal stopping problems.

1,183 citations