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Charles Issawi

Bio: Charles Issawi is an academic researcher from Princeton University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Middle East & Population. The author has an hindex of 21, co-authored 59 publications receiving 1682 citations.


Papers
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Book
01 Jan 1982
TL;DR: A challenge and response, 1800-1980 1 Impact II Expansion of Foreign Trade 17 III Development of Transport 44 IV The Influx of Foreign Capital 62 V Migration and Minorities 77 Response VI Population, Level of Living, and Social Development 93 VII Agricultural Expansion 118 VIII Deindustrialization and Reindustrialization 150 IX Institutions and Policy, Money and Prices, Savings and Investment 170 X Petroleum: Transformation or Exposion? 194 XI The Balance Sheet 210 Statistical Appendix 229 Notes 239 Selected Bibliography 265 Subject Index 299 Index of Principal Names and Places 301 as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Abbreviations and Symbols viii Preface xi I Challenge and Response, 1800-1980 1 Impact II Expansion of Foreign Trade 17 III Development of Transport 44 IV The Influx of Foreign Capital 62 V Migration and Minorities 77 Response VI Population, Level of Living, and Social Development 93 VII Agricultural Expansion 118 VIII Deindustrialization and Reindustrialization 150 IX Institutions and Policy, Money and Prices, Savings and Investment 170 X Petroleum: Transformation or Exposion? 194 XI The Balance Sheet 210 Statistical Appendix 229 Notes 239 Selected Bibliography 265 Subject Index 299 Index of Principal Names and Places 301

169 citations


Cited by
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Book
18 Jan 2001
TL;DR: A great divide had developed within "the rest", the lines drawn according to prewar manufacturing experience and equality in income distribution by 2000 as mentioned in this paper, and a select number of countries outside Japan and the West had built their own national manufacturing enterprises that were investing heavily in R&D.
Abstract: After World War II a select number of countries outside Japan and the West-those that Alice Amsden calls "the rest"-gained market share in modern industries and altered global competition. By 2000, a great divide had developed within "the rest", the lines drawn according to prewar manufacturing experience and equality in income distribution. China, India, Korea and Taiwan had built their own national manufacturing enterprises that were investing heavily in R&D. Their developmental states had transformed themselves into champions of science and technology. By contrast, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico had experienced a wave of acquisitions and mergers that left even more of their leading enterprises controlled by multinational firms. The developmental states of Mexico and Turkey had become hand-tied by membership in NAFTA and the European Union. Which model of late industrialization will prevail, the "independent" or the "integrationist," is a question that challenges the twenty-first century.

1,097 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a parable about the curse of African exports: Once upon a time, a servant of the ruler discovered a miraculous plant, which grew readily in that country, and whose seeds could be woven into fine cloth, so desirable that it became prized all over the world and fetched a high price.
Abstract: A frican economies export primary commodities, and most export little else. Policymakers as well as economists and historians of African economic development have seen these exports as both a hope and a curse. The following parable tells the story: Once upon a time, a servant of the ruler discovered a miraculous plant, which grew readily in that country, and whose seeds could be woven into fine cloth. So desirable was this fabric that it became prized all over the world and fetched a high price. After two-score years, the plant accounted for most of the country's trade with the world. The ruler ordered the peasants to grow the plant, paid them only a fraction of its price, and he and his nobles became fabulously wealthy. Because the ruler wished to be remembered as a great ruler, and as the father of his country, he used his wealth to build a great army, and brought machines from foreign countries to make the fine goods that previously could only be obtained from foreign merchants. But the machines often broke down, and the goods that they made were of poor quality, and after the ruler died, they were left to rust. Under the ruler's successor, there was a war in a foreign land where the plant also grew, so that there was a great shortage, and its price increased threefold in only three seasons. The new ruler spent his newfound riches on "fantastic extravagance" while "immense sums were expended on public works after the manner of the East, and on productive works carried out in the wrong way or too soon." Not even the threefold increase in prices could support these expenditures, and the country soon found itself deeply in debt. When the war ended, and the price fell, the country could no longer pay the interest on its debt, or borrow more money, even after it had sold its only useful public work to a foreign power. So that power sent a mission to the country, the publication of whose report (from which the above

561 citations

Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that the Iranian plateau accommodates the 35 mrn/yr convergence rate be- tween the Eurasian and Arabian plates by strike-slip and reverse faults with relatively low slip rates in a zone 1000 km across.
Abstract: The Iranian plateau accommodates the 35 mrn/yr convergence rate be- tween the Eurasian and Arabian plates by strike-slip and reverse faults with relatively low slip rates in a zone 1000 km across. Although these faults have only locally been the subject of paleoseismological studies, a rich historical and archeological record spans several thousand years, long enough to establish recurrence intervals of 1000 to 5000 yr on individual fault segments. Several clusters of earthquakes provide evidence of interaction among reverse and strike-slip faults, probably due to adjacent faults being loaded by individual earthquakes. The Dasht-e-Bayaz sequence of 1936 to 1997 includes earthquakes on left-lateral, right-lateral, and reverse faults. The Neyshabur sequence of four earthquakes between 1209 and 1405 respected the seg- ment boundary between the Neyshabur and Binalud reverse fault systems. The two pairs of earthquakes may have ruptured different faults in each segment, similar to the 1971 and 1994 San Fernando, California, earthquakes. The 1978 Tabas reverse- fault earthquake was preceded by the 1968 Ferdows earthquake, part of the Dasht- e-Bayaz sequence. The North Tabriz fault system ruptured from southeast to north- west in three earthquakes from 1721 to 1786; a previous cluster may have struck this region in 855 to 958. The Mosha fault north of Tehran ruptured in three earthquakes in 958, 1665, and 1830. Five large earthquakes struck the Tehran region from 743 to 1177, but only two that large have struck the area since 1177. Other earthquakes occurred in pairs in the Talesh Mountains near the Caspian Sea (1863, 1896), the Iran-Turkey border (1840, 1843), and the Nayband-Gowk fault system (both 1981). Other historical events did not occur as parts of sequences. The historic seismic moment release in Iran accounts for only a small part of the plate convergence rate, which may be due to aseismic slip or to the Iranian historical record, long as it is, being too short to sample long-term deformation across the plateau. No historic earthquakes of M --> 8 have struck Iran. However, several long, straight strike-slip faults (Doruneh, West Neh, East Neh, and Nayband) have not sustained large historical earthquakes, raising the possibility that these long faults could produce earthquakes of M => 8, thereby removing at least part of the apparent slip deficit. An increased understanding of Iran's seismic hazard could be obtained by an extensive paleoseismology program and space-geodetic arrays, supplementing the abundant historical and archaeological record.

466 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A comparative study of the three best-known groups of religious terror groups, the Thugs, Assassins, and Zealots-Sicarii, is presented in this paper.
Abstract: As the first comparative study of religious terror groups, the article provides detailed analyses of the different doctrines and methods of the three best-known groups: the Thugs, Assassins, and Zealots-Sicarii. Despite a primitive technology, each developed much more durable and destructive organizations than has any modern secular group.The differences among the groups reflect the distinguishing characteristics of their respective originating religious communities: Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism. The distinctive characteristics of religious terror are discussed, and relationships between religious and secular forms of terror are suggested.

393 citations

Book
Karen Barkey1
01 Jan 2008
TL;DR: Barkey as discussed by the authors examines the Ottoman Empire's social organization and mechanisms of rule at key moments of its history, emergence, imperial institutionalization, remodeling, and transition to nation state, revealing how the empire managed these moments, adapted, and averted crises and what changes made it transform dramatically.
Abstract: This book is a comparative study of imperial organization and longevity that assesses Ottoman successes as well as failures against those of other empires with similar characteristics. Barkey examines the Ottoman Empire's social organization and mechanisms of rule at key moments of its history, emergence, imperial institutionalization, remodeling, and transition to nation-state, revealing how the empire managed these moments, adapted, and averted crises and what changes made it transform dramatically. The flexible techniques by which the Ottomans maintained their legitimacy, the cooperation of their diverse elites both at the center and in the provinces, as well as their control over economic and human resources were responsible for the longevity of this particular 'negotiated empire'. Her analysis illuminates topics that include imperial governance, imperial institutions, imperial diversity and multiculturalism, the manner in which dissent is handled and/or internalized, and the nature of state society negotiations.

393 citations