Charles J.P. Chen

TL;DR: The authors examined whether comprehensive financial disclosures, used as a proxy for corporate board's responsiveness, are positively associated with the proportion of independent non-executive directors (INDs) on corporate boards, and whether family control of the firm has an impact on this association.

TL;DR: The authors examined how the rent-seeking incentives of local government motivate private firms 1 listed in China to establish political connections, and whether such connections lead to more concentrated corporate control structures, and found that such firms are more likely to build political connections in regions in which the local economy is less market-oriented or where the government has more discretion in allocating economic resources.

TL;DR: The authors examined the linkages between discretionary accruals (DAs), managerial share ownership, management compensation, and audit fees and found that managers with high management ownership are likely to use DAs to communicate value-relevant information, while managers of firms with high accounting-based compensation are opportunistically to manage earnings to improve their compensation.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the relationship between a firm's high-level political connections and earnings forecasts made by financial analysts, an important group of financial intermediaries, and find that after controlling for other determinants of forecast accuracy, analysts experience greater difficulty in predicting the earnings of firms with political connections than those of no such connections.

TL;DR: Li et al. as mentioned in this paper used a sample of all listed firms in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 1991 to 1997 with available data to obtain evidence of value relevance of accounting information in China based on a return and a price model.