This paper studies the cross-sectional properties of return forecasts derived from Fama-MacBeth regressions. These forecasts mimic how an investor could, in real time, combine many firm characteristics to obtain a composite estimate of a stockâs expected return. Empirically, the forecasts vary substantially across stocks and have strong predictive power for actual returns. For example, using ten-year rolling estimates of Fama- MacBeth slopes and a cross-sectional model with 15 firm characteristics (all based on low-frequency data), the expected-return estimates have a cross-sectional standard deviation of 0.87% monthly and a predictive slope for future monthly returns of 0.74, with a standard error of 0.07.

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The Cross-section of Expected Stock Returns

. This study investigates firms subject to accounting enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission for alleged violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. We investigate: (i) the extent to which the alleged earnings manipulations can be explained by extant earnings management hypotheses; (ii) the relation between earnings manipulations and weaknesses in firms' internal governance structures; and (iii) the capital market consequences experienced by firms when the alleged earnings manipulations are made public. We find that an important motivation for earnings manipulation is the desire to attract external financing at low cost. We show that this motivation remains significant after controlling for contracting motives proposed in the academic literature. We also find that firms manipulating earnings are: (i) more likely to have boards of directors dominated by management; (ii) more likely to have a Chief Executive Officer who simultaneously serves as Chairman of the Board; (iii) more likely to have a Chief Executive Officer who is also the firm's founder, (iv) less likely to have an audit committee; and (v) less likely to have an outside blockholder. Finally, we document that firms manipulating earnings experience significant increases in their costs of capital when the manipulations are made public.

Resume. Les auteurs analysent les entreprises assujetties aux mesures d'execution prises par la Securities and Exchange Commission dans les cas de presomption de transgression des principes comptables generalement reconnus. Ils s'interessent aux aspects suivants de la question: i) la mesure dans laquelle les presomptions de manipulations des benefices peuvent etre expliquees par les hypotheses existantes de gestion des benefices; ii) la relation entre les manipulations de benefices et les faiblesses des structures de regie interne des entreprises; et iii) la reaction du marche financier a l'endroit des entreprises au sujet desquelles les presomptions de manipulation des benefices sont rendues publiques. Les auteurs constatent qu'un incitatif majeur a la manipulation des benefices est le desir d'obtenir du financement externe a moindre cout. Ils demontrent que cet incitatif demeure important meme apres le controle des motifs contractuels que mettent de l'avant les travaux theoriques. Ils constatent egalement que les entreprises qui manipulent les benefices sont: i) davantage susceptibles d'avoir des conseils d'administration domines par la direction; ii) davantage susceptibles d'avoir un chef de la direction qui joue simultanement le role de president du conseil; iii) davantage susceptibles d'avoir un chef de la direction qui est egalement le fondateur de l'entreprise; iv) moins susceptibles d'avoir un comite de verification; et v) moins susceptibles d'avoir un bloc de titres detenus par un actionnaire exterieur. Enfin, les auteurs etablissent le fait que le cout du capital, pour les entreprises qui manipulent les benefices, enregistre des hausses appreciables lorsque ces manipulations sont rendues publiques.

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Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC*

This study investigates whether marketwide liquidity is a state variable important for asset pricing. We find that expected stock returns are related cross-sectionally to the sensitivities of returns to fluctuations in aggregate liquidity. Our monthly liquidity measure, an average of individual-stock measures estimated with daily data, relies on the principle that order flow induces greater return reversals when liquidity is lower. From 1966 through 1999, the average return on stocks with high sensitivities to liquidity exceeds that for stocks with low sensitivities by 7.5 percent annually, adjusted for exposures to the market return as well as size, value, and momentum factors. Furthermore, a liquidity risk factor accounts for half of the profits to a momentum strategy over the same 34-year period.

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Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock Returns

The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) that has been widely documented appears to be a short-run phenomenon. Issuing firms during 1975-84 substantially underperformed a sample of matching firms from the closing price on the first day of public trading to their three-year anniversaries. There is substantial variation in the underperformance year-to-year and across industries, with companies that went public in high-volume years faring the worst. The patterns are consistent with an IPO market in which (1) investors are periodically overoptimistic about the earnings potential of young growth companies, and (2) firms take advantage of these "windows of opportunity." NUMEROUS STUDIES HAVE DOCUMENTED two anomalies in the pricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock: (1) the (short-run) underpricing phenomenon, and (2) the "hot issue" market phenomenon. Measured from the offering price to the market price at the end of the first day of trading, IPOs produce an average initial return that has been estimated at 16.4%.1 Furthermore, the extent of this underpricing is highly cyclical, with some periods, lasting many months at a time, in which the average initial return is much higher.2 In this paper, I document a third anomaly: in the long-run, initial public offerings appear to be overpriced. Using a sample of 1,526 IPOs that went public in the U.S. in the 1975-84 period, I find that in the 3 years after going public these firms significantly underperformed a set of comparable firms matched by size and industry.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2328687.pdf

The Long‐Run Performance of initial Public Offerings

We study how investor sentiment affects the cross-section of stock returns. We predict that a wave of investor sentiment has larger effects on securities whose valuations are highly subjective and difficult to arbitrage. Consistent with this prediction, we find that when beginning-of-period proxies for sentiment are low, subsequent returns are relatively high for small stocks, young stocks, high volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, non-dividend-paying stocks, extreme growth stocks, and distressed stocks. When sentiment is high, on the other hand, these categories of stock earn relatively low subsequent returns.

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Investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock returns

This paper evaluates alternative methods for classifying individual trades as market buy or market sell orders using intraday trade and quote data. We document two potential problems with quote-based methods of trade classification: quotes may be recorded ahead of trades that triggered them, and trades inside the spread are not readily classifiable. These problems are analyzed in the context of the interaction between exchange floor agents. We then propose and test relatively simple procedures for improving trade classifications. THE INCREASING AVAILABILITY OF intraday trade and quote data is opening new frontiers for financial market research. The improved ability to discern whether a trade was a buy order or a sell order is of particular importance. In Hasbrouck (1988), the classification of trades as buys or sells is used to test asymmetric-information and inventory-control theories of specialist behavior. In Blume, MacKinlay, and Terker (1989), a buy-sell classification is used to measure order imbalance in tests of breakdowns in the linkage between S&P stocks and non-S&P stocks during the crash of October, 1987. In Harris (1989), an increase in the ratio of buys to sells is used to explain the anomalous behavior of closing prices. In Lee (1990), the imbalance in buy-sell orders is used to measure the market response to an information event. In Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987), a buy-sell classification is used to examine the differential effect of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated block trades. Most past studies have classified trades as buys or sells by comparing the trade price to the quote prices in effect at the time of the trade. In this paper, we identify two serious potential problems with this method, namely, that quotes are often recorded ahead of the trade that triggered them, and that

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb02683.x

Inferring Trade Direction from Intraday Data

This paper examines the proposition that fluctuations in discounts on closed end funds are driven by changes in individual investor sentiment toward closed end funds and other securities The theory implies that discounts on various funds must move together, that new funds get started when seasoned funds sell at a premium or a small discount, and that discounts on the funds fluctuate together with prices of securities affected by the same investor sentiment The evidence supports these predictions In particular, we find that discounts on closed end funds narrow when small stocks do well, as would be expected if closed end funds were subject to the same sentiment as small stocks, whim tern also to be held by individual investors The evidence thus suggests that investor sentiment affects security returns

Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle

This paper examines the proposition that fluctuations in discounts of closed-end funds are driven by changes in individual investor sentiment. The theory implies that discounts on various funds move together, that new funds get started when seasoned funds sell at a premium or a small discount, and that discounts are correlated with prices of other securities affected by the same investor sentiment. The evidence supports these predictions. In particular, we find that both closed-end funds and small stocks tend to be held by individual investors, and that the discounts on closed-end funds narrow when small stocks do well.

http://andreisimonov.com/NES/BF/Lee,%20Charles%20M.C.,%20Andrei%20Shleifer,%20and%20Richard%20H.%20Thaler,%201991,%20Investor%20Sentiment%20and%20the%20Closed-End%20fund%20Puzzle.pdf

In this study, we propose an alternative technique for estimating the cost of equity capital. Specifically, we use a discounted residual income model to generate a market implied cost-of-capital. We then examine firm characteristics that are systematically related to this estimate of cost-of-capital. We show that a firm's implied cost-of-capital is a function of its industry membership, B/M ratio, forecasted long-term growth rate, and the dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts. Together, these variables explain around 60% of the cross-sectional variation in future (two-year-ahead) implied costs-of-capital. The stability of these long-term relations suggests they can be exploited to estimate future costs-of-capital. We discuss the implications of these findings for capital budgeting, investment decisions, and valuation research.

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Toward an Implied Cost of Capital

This study shows that past trading volume provides an important link between “momentum” and “value” strategies. Specifically, we find that firms with high ~low! past turnover ratios exhibit many glamour ~value! characteristics, earn lower ~higher! future returns, and have consistently more negative ~positive! earnings surprises over the next eight quarters. Past trading volume also predicts both the magnitude and persistence of price momentum. Specifically, price momentum effects reverse over the next five years, and high ~low! volume winners ~losers! experience faster reversals. Collectively, our findings show that past volume helps to reconcile intermediate-horizon “underreaction” and long-horizon “overreaction” effects. FINANCIAL ACADEMICS AND PRACTITIONERS have long recognized that past trading volume may provide valuable information about a security. However, there is little agreement on how volume information should be handled and interpreted. Even less is known about how past trading volume interacts with past returns in the prediction of future stock returns. Stock returns and trading volume are jointly determined by the same market dynamics, and are inextricably linked in theory ~e.g., Blume, Easley, and O’Hara ~1994!!. Yet prior empirical studies have generally accorded them separate treatment. In this study, we investigate the usefulness of trading volume in predicting cross-sectional returns for various price momentum portfolios. The study is organized into two parts. In the first part, we document the interaction between past returns and past trading volume in predicting future returns

/pdf/price-momentum-and-trading-volume-54rhe3qzo2.pdf

Charles M.C. Lee

Papers

Inferring Trade Direction from Intraday Data

Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle

Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle

Toward an Implied Cost of Capital

Price Momentum and Trading Volume