Charles W. Mills

Bio: Charles W. Mills is an academic researcher from The Graduate Center, CUNY. The author has contributed to research in topics: Political philosophy & Economic Justice. The author has an hindex of 23, co-authored 91 publications receiving 3628 citations. Previous affiliations of Charles W. Mills include University of Oklahoma & Northwestern University.

The Racial Contract

Abstract: Introduction1. Overview The Racial Contract is political, moral, and epistemological The Racial Contract is a historical actuality The Racial Contract is an exploitation contract2. Details The Racial Contract norms (and races) space The Racial Contract norms (and races) the individual The Racial Contract underwrites the modern social contract The Racial Contract has to be enforced through violence and ideological conditioning3. "Naturalized" Merits The Racial Contract historically tracks the actual moral/political consciousness of (most) white moral agents The Racial Contract has always been recognized by nonwhites as the real moral/political agreement to be challenged The "Racial Contract" as a theory is explanatorily superior to the raceless social contractNotes Index -- Cornell University Press

“Ideal Theory” as Ideology

Abstract: individual subsume the workers, women, and nonwhites who are also persons-even if, admittedly, they were not historically recognized as such? I think the problem here is a failure to appreciate the nature and magnitude of the obstacles to the cognitive rethinking required, and the mistaken moveespecially easy for analytic philosophers, used to the effortless manipulation of variables, the shifting about of p's and q's, in the frictionless plane (redux!) of symbolic logic-from the ease of logical implication to the actual inferential patterns of human cognizers who have been socialized by these systems of domination. (This failure is itself, reflexively, a manifestation of the idealism of ideal theory.) To begin with the obvious empirical objection: if it were as easy as all that, just a matter of modus ponens or some other simple logical rule, then why was it so hard to do? If it were obvious that women were equal moral persons, meant to be fully included in the variable "men," then why was it not obvious to virtually every male political philosopher and ethicist up to a few decades ago? Why has liberalism, supposedly committed to normative equality and a foundational opposition to ascriptive hierarchy, found it so easy to exclude women and nonwhites from its egalitarian promise? The actual working of human cognitive processes, as manifested in the sexism and sometimes racism of such leading figures in the canon as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Hume, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and the rest, itself constitutes the simplest illustration of the mistakenness of such an analysis. Moreover, it is another familiar criticism from feminism that the inclusion of women cannot be a merely terminological gender neutrality, just adding and stirring, but requires a rethinking of what, say, equal rights and freedoms will require in the context of female subordination. Susan Moller Okin argued years ago that once one examines the real-life family, it becomes obvious that women's exit options from marriage are far more restricted than men's, because of the handicaps of sacrificing one's career to childrearing (Okin 1989). So a commitment to fairness, equal rights, and justice in the family arguably requires special measures to compensate for these burdens, and reform social structures accordingly. But such measures cannot be spun out, a priori, from the concept of equality as such (and certainly they cannot be generated on the basis of assuming the ideal family, as Rawls did in A Theory of Justice). Rather, they require empirical input and an awareness of how the real-life, nonideal family actually works. But insofar as such input is crucial and guides theory (which is why it's incorrect to see this as just "applied" ethics), the theory ceases to be ideal. So either ideal theory includes the previously excluded in a purely nominal way, which would be a purely formal rather than substantive inclusion, or-to the extent that it does make the dynamic of oppression central and theory-guiding-it is doing nonideal theory without calling it such. (Compare the conservative appeal to a superficially fair "color-blindness" in the treatment of people of color, whose practical effect is to guarantee a blindness to the distinctive measures required to redress and overcome the legacy of white supremacy.) 178 This content downloaded from 157.55.39.56 on Tue, 18 Oct 2016 04:58:54 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race

Abstract: PrefaceChapter 1 Non-Cartesian Sums: Philosophy and the African-American ExperienceChapter 2 Alternative EpistemologiesChapter 3 "But What Are You Really?' The Metaphysics of RaceChapter 4 Dark Ontologies: Blacks, Jews, and White SupremacyChapter 5 Revisionist Ontologies: Theorizing White SupremacyChapter 6 The Racial PolityChapter 7 White Right: The Idea of a Herrenvolk EthicsChapter 8 Whose Fourth of July? Frederick Douglass and "Original Intent"Notes Index

Contract and Domination

Abstract: * Contents * Acknowledgments * Introduction * 1. Contract and Social Change: A Dialogue between Carole Pateman * and Charles Mills * 2. The Settler Contract (Carole Pateman) * 3. The Domination Contract (Charles Mills) * 4. Contract of Breach: Repairing the Racial Contract (Charles Mills) * 5. Race, Sex, and Indifference (Carole Pateman) * 6. Intersecting Contracts (Charles Mills) * 7. On Critics and Contract (Carole Pateman) * 8. Reply to Critics (Charles Mills) * * Notes * References * Index * *

In a Different Voice. Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge, MA (Harvard University Press) 1982.

Abstract: Introduction 1. Woman's Place in Man's Life Cycle 2. Images of Relationship 3. Concepts of Self and Morality 4. Crisis and Transition 5. Women's Rights and Women's Judgment 6. Visions of Maturity References Index of Study Participants General Index

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Abstract: Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.

Two Treatises of Government.

Abstract: All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.

반도체 공정 overview

Abstract: With digital equipment becoming increasingly networked, either on wired or wireless networks, for personal and professional use alike, distributed software systems have become a crucial element in information and communications technologies. The study of these systems forms the core of the ARLES' work, which is specifically concerned with defining new system software architectures, based on the use of emerging networking technologies. In this context, we concentrate on the study of distributed systems which bring to life the vision of ubiquitous computing systems, also known as ambient intelligence.