Chauncey Starr

Bio: Chauncey Starr is an academic researcher from Electric Power Research Institute. The author has contributed to research in topics: Nuclear power & Risk analysis. The author has an hindex of 14, co-authored 59 publications receiving 2186 citations.

Philosophical Basis for Risk Analysis

Abstract: The chapter focuses on the risk portion of the risk-benefit balance because comparative risk analysis is the issue of primary national concern. New technical systems initially appear to be replacements for existing systems (nuclear for coal power), so public policy is generally concerned with comparative risk levels rather than comparative benefits. Three areas of application of risk-benefit analysis have been identified. The most fundamental application concerns the societal choice of expanding or curtailing the development of our existing technological capabilities, an example being a mass or individual transportation system. A second risk-benefit analysis is in setting performance targets for existing technologies where trade-offs between safety, environmental effects, and cost can produce major social and economic impacts, an example being air quality criteria. The third application involves decisions between competitive technical systems that produce a similar beneficial function but with differing societal costs, such as the selection of either coal or uranium as a fuel system for a new electrical power plant based on a comparison of their social costs, since the same output of electricity would be generated by both. The uncertainty principle is discussed in an Appendix. 27 references. (MCW)

Risks of Risk Decisions

Abstract: The analytical approaches utilized for evaluating the acceptability of technological risk originate from analogies to financial cost-benefit risk analysis. These analogies appear generally valid for viewing risk from a societal basis, but are not applicable to individual risk assessments. Conflicts arising from these different views of risk assessment provide insights to the origins of individual, intuitive evaluations. Societal risk decisions made under conflict represent political compromises, and the resulting decision process creates substantial conflict costs. The pragmatic use of quantitative risk criteria (safety targets) may be useful in reducing these costs.

Risk Management, Assessment, and Acceptability

Abstract: Health and safety are moral sentiments generally given very high priority in most societies and by individuals. Like other moral sentiments — such as peace, freedom, and happiness — health and safety are not absolutes that can be defined in a quantitative sense or specified in detail. They are, in fact, intangibly measured by the absence of undesirable elements which tend to reduce these objectives. Good health is considered a state of physical and emotional well being which is achieved by the absence of detectable disease, physical malfunctions or early death. Safety is considered a circumstance of living in which physical injury or imminent threat of such injury is absent.

Energy sources: a realistic outlook.

Abstract: Projections to the middle of the next century indicate that unabated historical global energy trends would lead to an annual global energy demand about four times present levels, primarily due to population and economic growth. But extensive global conservation and energy-efficient systems might reduce this value by half. The cumulative effect of the coming half century9s use may strain the world9s low-cost resources, particularly oil. The future fuel mix is further complicated by the environmental thrust to reduce the global use of carbon-based fuels. The interaction of the principal factors influencing future energy resource and technology options are projected.

Perception of risk.

Abstract: Studies of risk perception examine the judgements people make when they are asked to characterize and evaluate hazardous activities and technologies. This research aims to aid risk analysis and policy-making by providing a basis for understanding and anticipating public responses to hazards and improving the communication of risk information among lay people, technical experts, and decision-makers. This work assumes that those who promote and regulate health and safety need to understand how people think about and respond to risk. Without such understanding, well-intended policies may be ineffective.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Abstract: A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.

Abstract: Perhaps the simplest and the most basic qualitative law of probability is the conjunction rule: The probability of a conjunction, P (A&B) cannot exceed the probabilities of its constituents, P (A) and P (B), because the extension (or the possibility set) of the conjunction is included in the extension of its constituents. Judgments under uncertainty, however, are often mediated by intuitive heuristics that are not bound by the conjunction rule. A conjunction can be more representative than one of its constituents, and instances of a specific category can be easier to imagine or to retrieve than instances of a more inclusive category. The representativeness and availability heuristics therefore can make a conjunction appear more probable than one of its constituents. This phenomenon is demonstrated in a variety of contexts including estimation of word frequency, personality judgment, medical prognosis, decision under risk, suspicion of criminal acts, and political forecasting. Systematic violations of the conjunction rule are observed in judgments of lay people and of experts in both between-subjects and within-subjects comparisons. Alternative interpretations of the conjunction fallacy are discussed and attempts to combat it are explored.

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

Abstract: Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives

Abstract: A theory of norms and normality is presented and applied to some phenomena of emotional responses, social judgment, and conversations about causes. Norms are assumed to be constructed ad hoc by recruiting specific representations. Category norms are derived by recruiting exemplars. Specific objects or events generate their own norms by retrieval of similar experiences stored in memory or by construction of counterfactual alternatives. The normality of a stimulus is evaluated by comparing it to the norms that it evokes after the fact, rather than to precomputed expectations. Norm theory is applied in analyses of the enhanced emotional response to events that have abnormal causes, of the generation of predictions and inferences from observations of behavior, and of the role of norms in causal questions and answers. This article is concerned with category norms that represent knowledge of concepts and with stimulus norms that govern comparative judgments and designate experiences as surprising. In the tradition of adaptation level theory (Appley, 1971; Helson, 1964), the concept of norm is applied to events that range in complexity from single visual displays to social interactions. We first propose a model of an activation process that produces norms, then explore the role of norms in social cognition. The central idea of the present treatment is that norms are computed after the event rather than in advance. We sketch a supplement to the generally accepted idea that events in the stream of experience are interpreted and evaluated by consulting precomputed schemas and frames of reference. The view developed here is that each stimulus selectively recruits its own alternatives (Garner, 1962, 1970) and is interpreted in a rich context of remembered and constructed representations of what it could have been, might have been, or should have been. Thus, each event brings its own frame of reference into being. We also explore the idea that knowledge of categories (e.g., "encounters with Jim") can be derived on-line by selectively evoking stored representations of discrete episodes and exemplars. The present model assumes that a number of representations can be recruited in parallel, by either a stimulus event or an