Chengyi Xia

Bio: Chengyi Xia is an academic researcher from Tianjin University of Technology. The author has contributed to research in topics: Population & Complex network. The author has an hindex of 38, co-authored 152 publications receiving 4614 citations. Previous affiliations of Chengyi Xia include Tianjin University & Chinese Ministry of Education.

Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma games.

Abstract: In realistic world individuals with high reputation are more likely to influence the collective behaviors. Due to the cost and error of information dissemination, however, it is unreasonable to assign each individual with a complete cognitive power, which means that not everyone can accurately realize others’ reputation situation. Here we introduce the mechanism of inferring reputation into the selection of potential strategy sources to explore the evolution of cooperation. Before the game each player is assigned with a randomly distributed parameter p denoting his ability to infer the reputation of others. The parameter p of each individual is kept constant during the game. The value of p indicates that the neighbor possessing highest reputation is chosen with the probability p and randomly choosing an opponent is left with the probability 1−p. We find that this novel mechanism can be seen as an universally applicable promoter of cooperation, which works on various interaction networks and in different types of evolutionary game. Of particular interest is the fact that, in the early stages of evolutionary process, cooperators with high reputation who are easily regarded as the potential strategy donors can quickly lead to the formation of extremely robust clusters of cooperators that are impervious to defector attacks. These clusters eventually help cooperators reach their undisputed dominance, which transcends what can be warranted by the spatial reciprocity alone. Moreover, we provide complete phase diagrams to depict the impact of uncertainty in strategy adoptions and conclude that the effective interaction topology structure may be altered under such a mechanism. When the estimation of reputation is extended, we also show that the moderate value of evaluation factor enables cooperation to thrive best. We thus present a viable method of understanding the ubiquitous cooperative behaviors in nature and hope that it will inspire further studies to resolve social dilemmas.

Dynamics of interacting diseases

Abstract: Current modeling of infectious diseases allows for the study of complex and realistic scenarios that go from the population to the individual level of description. Most epidemic models however assume that the spreading process takes place on a single level (be it a single population, a meta-population system or a network of contacts). The latter is in part a consequence of our still limited knowledge about the interdependency of the many mechanisms and factors involved in disease spreading. In particular, interdependent contagion phenomena can only be addressed if we go beyond the scheme one pathogen-one network. In this paper, we study a model that allows describing the spreading dynamics of two concurrent diseases and apply it to a paradigmatic case of disease-disease interaction: the interaction between AIDS and Tuberculosis. Specifically, we characterize analytically the epidemic thresholds of the two diseases for different scenarios and also compute the temporal evolution characterizing the unfolding dynamics. Results show that there are regions of the parameter space in which the onset of a disease’s outbreak is conditioned to the prevalence levels of the other disease. Moreover, we show that under certain circumstances, finite and not vanishing epidemic thresholds are found even at the thermodynamic limit for scale-free networks. Finally, we apply the formalism to qualitatively reproduce the incidence levels of the two persistent diseases that motivate our work. PACS numbers:

Impact of Social Punishment on Cooperative Behavior in Complex Networks

Abstract: Social punishment is a mechanism by which cooperative individuals spend part of their resources to penalize defectors. In this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation in 2-person evolutionary games on networks when a mechanism for social punishment is introduced. Specifically, we introduce a new kind of role, punisher, which is aimed at reducing the earnings of defectors by applying to them a social fee. Results from numerical simulations show that different equilibria allowing the three strategies to coexist are possible as well as that social punishment further enhance the robustness of cooperation. Our results are confirmed for different network topologies and two evolutionary games. In addition, we analyze the microscopic mechanisms that give rise to the observed macroscopic behaviors in both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks. Our conclusions might provide additional insights for understanding the roots of cooperation in social systems.

Impact of Social Punishment on Cooperative Behavior in Complex

Abstract: Social punishment is a mechanism by which cooperative individuals spend part of their resources to penalize defectors In this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation in 2-person evolutionary games on networks when a mechanism for social punishment is introduced Specifically, we introduce a new kind of role, punisher, which is aimed at reducing the earnings of defectors by applying to them a social fee Results from numerical simulations show that different equilibria allowing the three strategies to coexist are possible as well as that social punishment further enhance the robustness of cooperation Our results are confirmed for different network topologies and two evolutionary games In addition, we analyze the microscopic mechanisms that give rise to the observed macroscopic behaviors in both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks Our conclusions might provide additional insights for understanding the roots of cooperation in social systems

疟原虫var基因转换速率变化导致抗原变异[英]／Paul H, Robert P, Christodoulou Z, et al//Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A

Abstract: 抗原变异可使得多种致病微生物易于逃避宿主免疫应答。表达在感染红细胞表面的恶性疟原虫红细胞表面蛋白1（PfPMP1）与感染红细胞、内皮细胞、树突状细胞以及胎盘的单个或多个受体作用，在黏附及免疫逃避中起关键的作用。每个单倍体基因组var基因家族编码约60种成员，通过启动转录不同的var基因变异体为抗原变异提供了分子基础。

Random graphs

Abstract: We will review some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems. We will cover algorithmic and structural questions. We will touch on newer models, including those related to the WWW.

Evolution and the Theory of Games

Abstract: In the Hamadryas baboon, males are substantially larger than females. A troop of baboons is subdivided into a number of ‘one-male groups’, consisting of one adult male and one or more females with their young. The male prevents any of ‘his’ females from moving too far from him. Kummer (1971) performed the following experiment. Two males, A and B, previously unknown to each other, were placed in a large enclosure. Male A was free to move about the enclosure, but male B was shut in a small cage, from which he could observe A but not interfere. A female, unknown to both males, was then placed in the enclosure. Within 20 minutes male A had persuaded the female to accept his ownership. Male B was then released into the open enclosure. Instead of challenging male A , B avoided any contact, accepting A’s ownership.

Multilayer Networks

Abstract: In most natural and engineered systems, a set of entities interact with each other in complicated patterns that can encompass multiple types of relationships, change in time, and include other types of complications Such systems include multiple subsystems and layers of connectivity, and it is important to take such "multilayer" features into account to try to improve our understanding of complex systems Consequently, it is necessary to generalize "traditional" network theory by developing (and validating) a framework and associated tools to study multilayer systems in a comprehensive fashion The origins of such efforts date back several decades and arose in multiple disciplines, and now the study of multilayer networks has become one of the most important directions in network science In this paper, we discuss the history of multilayer networks (and related concepts) and review the exploding body of work on such networks To unify the disparate terminology in the large body of recent work, we discuss a general framework for multilayer networks, construct a dictionary of terminology to relate the numerous existing concepts to each other, and provide a thorough discussion that compares, contrasts, and translates between related notions such as multilayer networks, multiplex networks, interdependent networks, networks of networks, and many others We also survey and discuss existing data sets that can be represented as multilayer networks We review attempts to generalize single-layer-network diagnostics to multilayer networks We also discuss the rapidly expanding research on multilayer-network models and notions like community structure, connected components, tensor decompositions, and various types of dynamical processes on multilayer networks We conclude with a summary and an outlook