Chris Luigjes

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study eight countries in which the regulation of unemployment benefits and related benefits and the concomitant activation of unemployed individuals has a multi-tiered architecture and assess their experiences and try to understand possible problems of "institutional moral hazard" that may emerge in the context of a hypothetical European Unemployment Benefit Scheme.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors study eight countries in which the regulation of unemployment benefits and related benefits and the concomitant activation of unemployed individuals has a multi-tiered architecture and assesses their experiences and tries to understand possible problems of "institutional moral hazard" that may emerge in the context of a hypothetical European Unemployment Benefit Scheme.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that European minimum standards are the place to start, including principles for minimum social security and minimum wages, as the European social objectives cannot be attained without guaranteeing adequate incomes to those in and out of work, and social coordination should thus go beyond broad outcome goals such as the reduction of the number of households at risk of poverty or social exclusion.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use the concept of institutional moral hazard to analyse intergovernmental relations within multi-tiered welfare states, specifically the domain of in unemployment-related benefits and related activation policies.

TL;DR: Subnational governments have become more involved in the "regulation of unemployment" (the design, implementation and financing of unemployment-related benefits and activation), partly because they....