Christina L. Davis

Bio: Christina L. Davis is an academic researcher from Harvard University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Free trade & Globalization. The author has an hindex of 14, co-authored 27 publications receiving 1271 citations. Previous affiliations of Christina L. Davis include Princeton University.

International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization

Abstract: This article explains how the institutional context of international negotiations influences their outcomes. I argue that issue linkage counteracts domestic obstacles to liberalization by broadening the negotiation stakes. Institutions bolster the credibility of the linkage to make it more effective. I test the argument in the agricultural sector, which has been among the most difficult sectors for governments to liberalize. Statistical analysis of U.S. negotiations with Japan and the EU from 1970 to 1999 indicates that an institutionalized linkage between agricultural and industrial issues encourages agricultural liberalization in both Japan and Europe. Through case studies of key negotiations, I first examine why countries choose to link issues, then show how the linkage changes interest group mobilization and shifts the policy process to promote liberalization.

Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication

Abstract: The potential for international law to reduce power asymmetries depends on weaker countries learning to navigate the legal system. This paper examines the use of courts by developing countries to defend their trade interests. Power relations and low capacity may prevent these countries from fully participating in the international trade system. Yet some developing countries have been among the most active participants in GATT/WTO adjudication. We argue that high startup costs for using trade litigation are a barrier to developing country use of the dispute settlement process. Analysis of dispute initiation from 1975 to 2003 shows that past experience in trade adjudication, as either a complainant or a defendant, increases the likelihood that a developing country will initiate disputes. As weaker countries overcome these initial capacity constraints they will increasingly benefit from the international legal structures they have joined.

Why Adjudicate?: Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO

Abstract: The expansion of international law raises the problem of enforcing rules in the absence of a centralized prosecutor and police. What leads some states to challenge violations of their rights through legal action? This book argues that the answer lies in domestic accountability mechanisms and the role of law to facilitate communication. Democratic checks and balances encourage representation of domestic interests and place emphasis on public lawsuits over informal settlements. Whereas demands driven by domestic pressure could imperil international cooperation, adjudication offers a solution. Turning to legal dispute settlement helps states to signal resolve more effectively for better bargaining outcomes. Christina Davis tests this argument with analysis of trade disputes in the World Trade Organization, where democracies lead in the use of dispute settlement as both complainants and defendants. Statistical analysis shows that shifts in domestic political balance that empower the legislature lead to more adjudication. Qualitative evidence based on extensive interviews reveals how trade officials use legal complaints to manage domestic politics without risk of trade war. Case studies of the United States and Japan compare the role of legislative constraints in the trade policy process with detailed examination of disputes ranging from the Boeing-Airbus dispute over aircraft subsidies to Chinese intellectual property rights and U.S. anti-dumping policies for the steel industry. This book demonstrates that enforcement of trade rules is not just the realm of technocrats making decisions based on law and economics. Lobbying by industries, demands from the legislature, and political relations between countries influence which countries and cases appear in court. The politicized selection of legal complaints generates aspects of political theater in trade disputes, but proves effective nonetheless. In analysis of foreign trade barriers against U.S. exports, Davis shows that the United States gains better outcomes for cases taken to formal dispute settlement than for those negotiated. Case studies of Peru and Vietnam reveal that the law can also be an effective tool for developing countries. The power of law arises from the information it provides to actors at home and abroad about resolve to take action and mobilize the legitimacy of rule-based enforcement. Why do states turn to international courts to resolve their disputes? Liberal protesters on the streets condemn international organizations as servants of corporate interests, while conservative skeptics of international law reject intervention into state decision-making by international bureaucrats. Governments of both large and small states have reason to avoid courts. Powerful states like the United States and EU have tools for leverage in bilateral negotiations. Whether offering side-payments or threatening unilateral sanctions, they can influence the behavior of smaller states without need for a third party. At the same time, small developing countries fear legalization will merely introduce another tool where they lack capacity and cannot defend their interests. It is not as if filing a law suit mobilizes a police force. For all of their “court-like” appearance, international courts are fundamentally different from domestic courts because they lack the authority to impose their rulings in an anarchic international system. Moreover, using courts is costly. Hiring lawyers, preparing formal briefs, and taking a dispute into the public arena costs time and money and it also risks injuring diplomatic relations. Nonetheless, we observe a clear trend toward legalization as more areas of international affairs are regulated by international law and the number and authority of international courts has grown. States are increasingly turning to courts to solve disputes. They do so in order to achieve better outcomes. The choice of adjudication represents a shift in process – not abdication of sovereignty. Governments negotiate international rules and decide when and how to enforce them. Often states retain gatekeeper status over which legal complaints are filed. They have discretion over whether to comply with rulings issued against them by international judges. Governments give up some control when they enter formal dispute settlement and open themselves to third party involvement, but this sacrifice of autonomy comes as a deliberate choice. Understanding the decision to use legal enforcement is critical for evaluating how international institutions shape state behavior. The effectiveness of any legal system depends upon the actions of the police, prosecutor, and judge. One must consider the interaction of law with the probability of enforcement. Given the same set of legal commitments and punishment standard, challenges to every small infraction push the system towards strict compliance while imperfect enforcement induces weak compliance. In the absence of a central prosecutor or police force, most international The literature interchangeably uses the terms litigation and adjudication. Following Abbott et al. (2000) and Trachtman (1999) I will generally use the term adjudication.

Food Fights over Free Trade: How International Institutions Promote Agricultural Trade Liberalization

Abstract: This detailed account of the politics of opening agricultural markets explains how the institutional context of international negotiations alters the balance of interests at the domestic level to favor trade liberalization despite opposition from powerful farm groups. Historically, agriculture stands out as a sector in which countries stubbornly defend domestic programs, and agricultural issues have been the most frequent source of trade disputes in the postwar trading system. While much protection remains, agricultural trade negotiations have resulted in substantial concessions as well as negotiation collapses. "Food Fights over Free Trade" shows that the liberalization that has occurred has been due to the role of international institutions. Christina Davis examines the past thirty years of U.S. agricultural trade negotiations with Japan and Europe based on statistical analysis of an original dataset, case studies, and in-depth interviews with over one hundred negotiators and politicians. She shows how the use of issue linkage and international law in the negotiation structure transforms narrow interest group politics into a more broad-based decision process that considers the larger stakes of the negotiation. Even when U.S. threats and the spiraling budget costs of agricultural protection have failed to bring policy change, the agenda, rules, and procedures of trade negotiations have often provided the necessary leverage to open Japanese and European markets. This book represents a major contribution to understanding the negotiation process, agricultural politics, and the impact of international institutions on domestic politics.

Business as Usual? Economic Responses to Political Tensions

Abstract: Do political tensions harm economic relations? Theories claim that trade prevents war and political relations motivate trade, but less is known about whether smaller shifts in political relations impact economic exchange. Looking at two major economies, we show that negative events have not hurt U.S. or Japanese trade or investment flows. We then examine specific incidents of tensions in U.S.-French and Sino-Japanese relations over the past decade—two case pairs that allow us to compare varying levels of political tension given high existing economic interdependence and different alliance relations. Aggregate economic flows and high salience sectors like wine and autos are unaffected by the deterioration of political relations. In an era of globalization, actors lack incentives to link political and economic relations. We argue that sunk costs in existing trade and investment make governments, firms, and consumers unlikely to change their behavior in response to political disputes. D o political tensions have economic consequences? The relationship between economic interdependence and conflict has been a central debate in international relations. Leading scholars contend that “states with good relations should have more trade than states with poor relations” and import decisions of firms will respond to “the climate of friendliness orhostilitythatexistsbetweentheimporterandexporter” (Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998, 650; Pollins 1989b, 739). Analysis of trade and conflict in a simultaneous equations model concludes that “political relations are driving commerce, not the other way around” (Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny 2004, 1175). We reexamine these arguments in the current globalization era to show that sunk costs reduce incentives for state and private actors to link political and economic relations. 1

Export Versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms

Abstract: Multinational sales have grown at high rates over the last two decades, outpacing the remarkable expansion of trade in manufactures. Consequently, the trade literature has sought to incorporate the mode of foreign market access into the “new” trade theory. This literature recognizes that Ž rms can serve foreign buyers through a variety of channels: they can export their products to foreign customers, serve them through foreign subsidiaries, or license foreign Ž rms to produce their products. Our work focuses on the Ž rm’s choice between exports and “horizontal” foreign direct investment (FDI). Horizontal FDI refers to an investment in a foreign production facility that is designed to serve customers in the foreign market. Firms invest abroad when the gains from avoiding trade costs outweigh the costs of maintaining capacity in multiple markets. This is known as the proximity-concentration tradeoff. We introduce heterogeneous Ž rms into a simple multicountry, multisector model, in which Ž rms face a proximity-concentration trade-off. Every Ž rm decides whether to serve a foreign market, and whether to do so through exports or local subsidiary sales. These modes of market access have different relative costs: exporting involves lower Ž xed costs while FDI involves lower variable costs. Our model highlights the important role of within-sector Ž rm productivity differences in explaining the structure of international trade and investment. First, only the most productive Ž rms engage in foreign activities. This result mirrors other Ž ndings on Ž rm heterogeneity and trade; in particular, the results reported in Melitz (2003). Second, of those Ž rms that serve foreign markets, only the most productive engage in FDI. Third, FDI sales relative to exports are larger in sectors with more Ž rm heterogeneity. Using U.S. exports and afŽ liate sales data that cover 52 manufacturing sectors and 38 countries, we show that cross-sectoral differences in Ž rm heterogeneity predict the composition of trade and investment in the manner suggested by our model. We construct several measures of Ž rm heterogeneity, using different data sources, and show that our results are robust across all these measures. In addition, we conŽ rm the predictions of the proximityconcentration trade-off. That is, Ž rms tend to substitute FDI sales for exports when transport * Helpman: Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, Tel Aviv University, and CIAR (e-mail: ehelpman@harvard.edu); Melitz: Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, National Bureau of Economic Research, and Centre for Economic Policy Research (e-mail: mmelitz@ harvard.edu); Yeaple: Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104, and National Bureau of Economic Research (e-mail: snyeapl2@ssc.upenn.edu). The statistical analysis of Ž rmlevel data on U.S. Multinational Corporations reported in this study was conducted at the International Investment Division, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, under an arrangement that maintained legal conŽ dentiality requirements. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily re ect those of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Elhanan Helpman thanks the NSF for Ž nancial support. We also thank Daron Acemoglu, Roberto Rigobon, Yona Rubinstein, and Dani Tsiddon for comments on an earlier draft, and Man-Keung Tang for excellent research assistance. 1 See Wilfred J. Ethier (1986), Ignatius Horstmann and James R. Markusen (1987), and Ethier and Markusen (1996) for models that incorporate the licensing alternative. We therefore exclude “vertical” motives for FDI that involve fragmentation of production across countries. See Helpman (1984, 1985), Markusen (2002, Ch. 9), and Gordon H. Hanson et al. (2002) for treatments of this form of FDI. 3 See, for example, Horstmann and Markusen (1992), S. Lael Brainard (1993), and Markusen and Anthony J. Venables (2000). 4 See also Andrew B. Bernard et al. (2003) for an alternative theoretical model and Yeaple (2003a) for a model based on worker-skill heterogeneity. James R. Tybout (2003) surveys the recent micro-level evidence on trade that has motivated these theoretical models. 5 This result is loosely connected to the documented empirical pattern that foreign-owned afŽ liates are more productive than domestically owned producers. See Mark E. Doms and J. Bradford Jensen (1998) for the United States and Sourafel Girma et al. (2002) for the United Kingdom.

The Oxford Handbook of Innovation

Abstract: This handbook looks to provide academics and students with a comprehensive and holistic understanding of the phenomenon of innovation. Innovation spans a number of fields within the social sciences and humanities: Management, Economics, Geography, Sociology, Politics, Psychology, and History. Consequently, the rapidly increasing body of literature on innovation is characterized by a multitude of perspectives based on, or cutting across, existing disciplines and specializations. Scholars of innovation can come from such diverse starting points that much of this literature can be missed, and so constructive dialogues missed. The editors of The Oxford Handbook of Innovation have carefully selected and designed twenty-one contributions from leading academic experts within their particular field, each focusing on a specific aspect of innovation. These have been organized into four main sections, the first of which looks at the creation of innovations, with particular focus on firms and networks. Section Two provides an account of the wider systematic setting influencing innovation and the role of institutions and organizations in this context. Section Three explores some of the diversity in the working of innovation over time and across different sectors of the economy, and Section Four focuses on the consequences of innovation with respect to economic growth, international competitiveness, and employment. An introductory overview, concluding remarks, and guide to further reading for each chapter, make this handbook a key introduction and vital reference work for researchers, academics, and advanced students of innovation. Contributors to this volume - Jan Fagerberg, University of Oslo William Lazonick, INSEAD Walter W. Powell, Stanford University Keith Pavitt, SPRU Alice Lam, Brunel University Keith Smith, INTECH Charles Edquist, Linkoping David Mowery, University of California, Berkeley Mary O'Sullivan, INSEAD Ove Granstrand, Chalmers Bjorn Asheim, University of Lund Rajneesh Narula, Copenhagen Business School Antonello Zanfei, Urbino Kristine Bruland, University of Oslo Franco Malerba, University of Bocconi Nick Von Tunzelmann, SPRU Ian Miles, University of Manchester Bronwyn Hall, University of California, Berkeley Bart Verspagen , ECIS Francisco Louca, ISEG Manuel M. Godinho, ISEG Richard R. Nelson, Mario Pianta, Urbino Bengt-Ake Lundvall, Aalborg

Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics

Abstract: This volume argues that international human rights law has made a positive contribution to the realization of human rights in much of the world. Although governments sometimes ratify human rights treaties, gambling that they will experience little pressure to comply with them, this is not typically the case. Focusing on rights stakeholders rather than the United Nations or state pressure, Beth Simmons demonstrates through a combination of statistical analyses and case studies that the ratification of treaties leads to better rights practices on average. Simmons argues that international human rights law should get more practical and rhetorical support from the international community as a supplement to broader efforts to address conflict, development, and democratization.

The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods: Homogeneous clubs and local public goods

Abstract: A club is a voluntary group of individuals who derive mutual benefit from sharing one or more of the following: production costs, the members' characteristics, or a good characterized by excludable benefits. When production costs are shared and the good is purely private, a private good club is being analyzed (McGuire 1972; Wiseman 1957). If membership characteristics differ and motivate sharing, then membership fees will differ among members (DeSerpa 1977; Scotchmer 1994b; Scotchmer and Wooders 1987). Such fees are nonanonymous , inasmuch as a fee structure is related to the identity and attributes of a member. The focus of our analysis is the sharing of an excludable (rivalrous) public good, which we term a club good . Unless otherwise specified, crowding is assumed to be independent of the individual and hence anonymous. A number of aspects of the club definition deserve highlighting. Privately owned and operated clubs must be voluntary; members choose to belong because they anticipate a net benefit from membership. Thus, the utility jointly derived from membership and from the consumption of other goods must exceed the utility associated with nonmembership status. Furthermore, the net gain in utility from membership must exceed or equal membership fees or toll payments. This voluntarism serves as the first characteristic by which to distinguish between pure public goods and club goods. In the case of a pure public good, voluntarism may be absent, since the good might harm some recipients (e.g., defense to a pacifist, fluoridation to someone who opposes its use).

국제정치이론 = Theory of international politics

Abstract: Therefore, the seeker after the truth is not one who studies the writings of the ancients and, following his natural disposition, puts his trust in them, but rather the one who suspects his faith in them and questions what he gathers from them, the one who submits to argument and demonstration, and not to the sayings of a human being whose nature is fraught with all kinds of imperfection and de‹ciency. Thus the duty of the man who investigates the writings of scientists, if learning the truth is his goal, is to make himself the enemy of all that he reads, and, applying his mind to the core and margins of its content, attack it from every side. He should also suspect himself as he performs his critical examination of it, so that he may avoid falling into either prejudice or leniency. (Ibn al-Haytham)1