Christophe J. Godlewski

Bio: Christophe J. Godlewski is an academic researcher from EM Strasbourg Business School. The author has contributed to research in topics: Loan & Syndicate. The author has an hindex of 22, co-authored 109 publications receiving 1644 citations. Previous affiliations of Christophe J. Godlewski include International Monetary Fund & University of Strasbourg.

Bank capital and credit risk taking in emerging market economies

Abstract: The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between bank capital and credit risk taking in emerging market economies. It also investigates the influence of several regulatory, institutional and legal features on the relationship between risk and capital. The paper applies a simultaneous equations framework following Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Jacques and Nigro (1997). The results corroborate the existing findings for US and other industrial economies, putting forward the impact of capital regulation on banks' behaviour. The paper also shows empirical evidence on the role of the regulatory, institutional and legal environment in driving bank capitalisation and credit risk-taking behaviour in emerging market economies.

Does Collateral Help Mitigate Adverse Selection? A Cross-Country Analysis

Abstract: We investigate whether collateral helps to solve adverse selection problems. Theory predicts a negative relationship between presence of collateral and risk premium, as collateral constitutes a signalling instrument for the borrower to be charged with a lower risk premium. However, bankers’ view and most empirical evidence contradict this prediction in accordance with the observed-risk hypothesis. We provide new evidence with loan-level data and country-level data for a sample of 5843 bank loans from 43 countries. We test whether the degree information asymmetries affects the link between the presence of collateral and risk premium. We include five proxies for the degree of information asymmetries, measuring opacity of financial information, trust, and development. We find that a greater degree of information asymmetries reduces the positive relationship between the presence of collateral and the risk premium. This finding provides support for the adverse selection and observed-risk hypotheses, as both hypotheses may be empirically validated depending of the degree of information asymmetries in the country.

Does Collateral Help Mitigate Adverse Selection ? A Cross-Country Analysis

Abstract: In this paper, we empirically investigate whether collateral mitigates adverse selection problems in a loan market. Theory predicts a negative relation between the presence of collateral and the interest spread of a loan. However, bankers’view and most empirical evidence contradict this prediction and support the observed-risk hypothesis instead. We provide new evidence from a sample of 4,940 bank loans from 31 countries. We test whether the degree of information asymmetry affects the positive link between collateral and the loan spread and find that a greater degree of information asymmetry reduces this positive relation. This finding provides support for both the adverse selection and observed-risk hypotheses.

Bank Competition and Collateral: Theory and Evidence

Abstract: We investigate the impact of bank competition on the use of collateral in loan contracts. We analyze asymmetric information about the borrowers’ type in a Salop model in which banks choose between screening the borrower and asking for collateral. We show that the presence of collateral is more likely when bank competition is low. We then test this prediction empirically on a sample of bank loans from 70 countries. We perform logit regressions of the presence of collateral on bank competition, measured by the Lerner index. Our empirical tests corroborate the theoretical predictions that bank competition reduces the presence of collateral. These findings survive several robustness checks.

Estimation and Inference in Econometrics

Abstract: Offering a unifying theoretical perspective not readily available in any other text, this innovative guide to econometrics uses simple geometrical arguments to develop students' intuitive understanding of basic and advanced topics, emphasizing throughout the practical applications of modern theory and nonlinear techniques of estimation. One theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification. Explaining how estimates can be obtained and tests can be carried out, the authors go beyond a mere algebraic description to one that can be easily translated into the commands of a standard econometric software package. Covering an unprecedented range of problems with a consistent emphasis on those that arise in applied work, this accessible and coherent guide to the most vital topics in econometrics today is indispensable for advanced students of econometrics and students of statistics interested in regression and related topics. It will also suit practising econometricians who want to update their skills. Flexibly designed to accommodate a variety of course levels, it offers both complete coverage of the basic material and separate chapters on areas of specialized interest.

The Limits of Organization

Abstract: (1975). The Limits of Organization. Journal of Economic Issues: Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 543-544.

比较金融系统 = Comparing financial systems

Abstract: Financial systems are crucial to the allocation of resources in a modern economy. They channel household savings to the corporate sector and allocate investment funds among firms; they allow intertemporal smoothing of consumption by households and expenditures by firms; and they enable households and firms to share risks. These functions are common to the financial systems of most developed economies. Yet the form of these financial systems varies widely. In the United States and the United Kingdom competitive markets dominate the financial landscape, whereas in France, Germany, and Japan banks have traditionally played the most important role. Why do different countries have such different financial systems? Is one system better than all the others? Do different systems merely represent alternative ways of satisfying similar needs? Is the current trend toward market-based systems desirable? Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale argue that the view that market-based systems are best is simplistic. A more nuanced approach is necessary. For example, financial markets may be bad for risk sharing; competition in banking may be inefficient; financial crises can be good as well as bad; and separation of ownership and control can be optimal. Financial institutions are not simply veils, disguising the allocation mechanism without affecting it, but are crucial to overcoming market imperfections. An optimal financial system relies on both financial markets and financial intermediaries.