Christopher Harding

Bio: Christopher Harding is an academic researcher from Aberystwyth University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cartel & Criminal law. The author has an hindex of 8, co-authored 35 publications receiving 276 citations.

Punishment--rhetoric, rule, and practice

Abstract: This interdisciplinary analysis looks at punishment not simply as a sanction employed by the state, but as a pervasive feature of social organization in past and contemporary societies. This book should be of interest to students and teachers of legal and social philosophy.

Human Rights in the Market Place: The Exploitation of Rights Protection by Economic Actors

Abstract: Contents: Preface Introduction: rights talk in the domain of supply and demand. Part I Theoretical Issues: A fracas in the cosmetics market: competing rights and the spectrum of economic actors The Sun, Liverpudlians and 'the truth': a corporate right to human rights? Profit in the beef industry and human health: consumer rights as basic human rights Taking the WTO to task in Seattle: basic rights protection as a legal strategy and the political and legal leverage of rights argument. Part II Testing Grounds: Antitrust recidivists as rights crusaders: fashioning producer rights in Europe The European laboratory: the construction of consumer rights in Europe Transatlantic trade wars: producer and consumer rights on the global stage Freedom of expression in the market place. Part III Concluding Comments: Rights talk in the marketplace: 'nonsense on stilts'? Select bibliography Index.

Member State Enforcement of European Community Measures: The Chimera of "effective" Enforcement

Abstract: In the general field of international law it is increasingly common to find obligations on States to apply to individuals rules and policies agreed at the international level, by making use of enforcement powers and procedures at the national level. Such arrange­ ments have been usually entered into under treaties dealing with problems of wide international concern, when States themselves have a clear interest in the enforcement of norms originally worked out in a spirit of cooperation at the international level; the control of terrorist activity and dealing with extreme forms of material damage to the environment, such as oil pollution, provide typical examples of international responses to problems which find their implementation in national rules.1 However, despite the existence of obligations at the international level for States to deal with different kinds of individual delinquency, there would seem to be little in the way of systematic moni­ toring of the effectiveness of national enforcement or indeed many established pro­ cedures for carrying out such scrutiny.2 There may thus be a significant gap between standard-setting and enforcement, which is neither very evident nor easily remedied, on account of the dislocation between norm-setting at the international level and the respon­ sibility for rule-application at the national level. Questions relating to the effectiveness

Cartel Deterrence: The Search for Evidence and Argument

Abstract: Discussion and argument concerning the deterrent impact of anticartel enforcement measures have gained in significance and controversy as the whole regulatory enterprise and rhetoric of cartel regulation has expanded and developed. Regulators have become ever more emphatic in the denunciation of business cartels, and deterrence has therefore assumed a significant role in the justification of a stronger and more determined effort of legal control. In particular, cartelists need to be deterred into whistle blowing for leniency programs to work, and businesses need to be deterred into compliance to achieve the ultimate regulatory goal. Deterrence (rather than, for instance, economic redistribution or retributive justice) then becomes a leading, perhaps the leading objective within the legal control of cartels. Yet claims of deterrent effect are notoriously difficult to measure and assess. The discussion here examines the underlying problems of penetrating and measuring the deterrent impact of anticartel poli...

European Criminal Law

Abstract: Since their creation, the European Union and the Council of Europe have worked to harmonise the justice systems of their member states. This project has been met with a series of challenges. European Criminal Law offers a compelling insight into the development and functions of European criminal law. It tracks the historical development of European criminal law, offering a detailed critical analysis of the criminal justice systems responsible for its implementation. While the rapid expansion and transnationalisation of criminal law is a necessary response to the growing numbers of free movement of persons and goods, it has serious implications for the rights of European citizens and needs to be balanced with rights protections. With its close analysis of secondary legislation and reliance on a wide variety of original sources, this book provides a thorough understanding of European Criminal Law and the institutions involved.

How Do Cartels Operate

Abstract: This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20 European Commission decisions over 2000-2004. It describes the properties of a collusive outcome in terms of the setting of price and a market allocation, monitoring of agreements with respect to price but more importantly sales, punishment methods for enforcing an agreement and also the use of buy-backs to compensate cartel members, methods for responding to external disruptions from non-cartel suppliers and handling over-zealous sales representatives, and operational procedures in terms of the frequency of meetings and the cartel’s organizational structure.

Cartel Overcharges: Survey and Meta-Analysis

Abstract: The article presents a unique regression analysis of social-science estimates of the size of cartel overcharges. More than 800 overcharge rates were collected from a variety of published sources that have appeared in the literature during the last 125 years. A meta-analysis of overcharges from 395 cartel episodes finds that duration, legal environment, and organizational characteristics of cartels explain the variation on overcharge rates to a greater extent than the type of publication or the method of overcharge analysis. In particular, overcharges are significantly higher for durable international cartels and are declining as antitrust enforcement regimes have stiffened. Historical case studies and government reports calculate lower overcharges, whereas antitrust authorities arrive at relatively high rates.

The Compliance Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory Enforcement

Abstract: Deterrence will often fail because it falls into the 'deterrence trap' - penalties are either not large enough or so large they exceed the capacity to pay. Responsive regulation, by contrast, builds commitment to compliance through moral suasion backed up by tough enforcement action. Empirical evidence on the impact of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's cartel enforcement activity shows that in overcoming the deterrence trap, responsive regulators can fall into 'compliance trap.' The 'compliance trap' occurs where there is a lack of political and cultural support for the moral seriousness of the law it must enforce, such as is the case with much of the law relating to business regulation. The regulator can choose to nevertheless take enforcement action in a way that garners compliance by communicating the moral seriousness of breaches of the law. If they do so, however, their enforcement action will ultimately lack legitimacy in the eyes of business regulatees. Most regulators most of the time will end up taking the easy option of enforcing the law 'softly' or formalistically, and therefore ineffectively.