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Christopher Harding

Bio: Christopher Harding is an academic researcher from Aberystwyth University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cartel & Criminal law. The author has an hindex of 8, co-authored 35 publications receiving 276 citations.

Papers
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Journal Article
TL;DR: Harding, Christopher, et al. as mentioned in this paper proposed the idea of joint criminal enterprise to capture the cartel's friends and capture the friends of the cartel, which they did not consider in this paper.
Abstract: Harding, Christopher, (2009) 'Capturing the cartel’s friends: Cartel facilitation and the idea of joint criminal enterprise', European Law Review 34 (2), pp. 298-309. Keywords: Cartels; EC law; Joint enterprise; Penalties

7 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, an interesting shift of attitude has been observable within European legal systems, suggesting a move towards the American approach to cartel activity, and resulting increasingly in an adoption of criminalization alongside procedures of administrative control.
Abstract: One of the most significant features of the history of legal control of business cartels, involved in such activities as price-fixing, market sharing and bid-rigging, is the dichotomy of attitude and approach as between the two main geographical sites of policy and legal activity, North America and Europe. From the closing years of the nineteenth century, the American approach (mildly under-studied by Canada) has been one of uncompromising censure, in the form of antitrust criminalization. The development of competition law, and more specifically anti-cartel law, in Europe has, in contrast, been more tentative, more agnostic and more empirical. However, during the closing years of the twentieth century an interesting shift of attitude has been observable within European legal systems, suggesting a move towards the American approach to cartel activity, and resulting increasingly in an adoption of criminalization alongside procedures of administrative control. The discussion here will indicate some of the

5 citations


Cited by
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MonographDOI
07 Jun 2018
TL;DR: In this article, the authors track the historical development of European criminal law, offering a detailed critical analysis of the criminal justice systems responsible for its implementation, and provide a thorough understanding of European Criminal Law and the institutions involved.
Abstract: Since their creation, the European Union and the Council of Europe have worked to harmonise the justice systems of their member states. This project has been met with a series of challenges. European Criminal Law offers a compelling insight into the development and functions of European criminal law. It tracks the historical development of European criminal law, offering a detailed critical analysis of the criminal justice systems responsible for its implementation. While the rapid expansion and transnationalisation of criminal law is a necessary response to the growing numbers of free movement of persons and goods, it has serious implications for the rights of European citizens and needs to be balanced with rights protections. With its close analysis of secondary legislation and reliance on a wide variety of original sources, this book provides a thorough understanding of European Criminal Law and the institutions involved.

236 citations

Book
01 Aug 2006
TL;DR: This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20 European Commission decisions over 1999-2004 and describes the properties of a collusive outcome, monitoring and punishment methods for enforcing it, the frequency of meetings, the organizational structure of cartels, and what preceded cartel formation.
Abstract: This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20 European Commission decisions over 2000-2004. It describes the properties of a collusive outcome in terms of the setting of price and a market allocation, monitoring of agreements with respect to price but more importantly sales, punishment methods for enforcing an agreement and also the use of buy-backs to compensate cartel members, methods for responding to external disruptions from non-cartel suppliers and handling over-zealous sales representatives, and operational procedures in terms of the frequency of meetings and the cartel’s organizational structure.

221 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare the impact of reduced fines and positive rewards and argue that rewarding individuals, including firm employees, can deter collusion in a more effective way, and explore explanations for the puzzling fact that managers keep incriminating evidence and argue reward programs actually provide additional incentives for keeping such evidence.

216 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper presented a unique regression analysis of social-science estimates of the size of cartel overcharges and found that overcharges are significantly higher for durable international cartels and are declining as antitrust enforcement regimes have stiffened.
Abstract: The article presents a unique regression analysis of social-science estimates of the size of cartel overcharges. More than 800 overcharge rates were collected from a variety of published sources that have appeared in the literature during the last 125 years. A meta-analysis of overcharges from 395 cartel episodes finds that duration, legal environment, and organizational characteristics of cartels explain the variation on overcharge rates to a greater extent than the type of publication or the method of overcharge analysis. In particular, overcharges are significantly higher for durable international cartels and are declining as antitrust enforcement regimes have stiffened. Historical case studies and government reports calculate lower overcharges, whereas antitrust authorities arrive at relatively high rates.

155 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the impact of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's cartel enforcement activity on business regulation has been investigated and empirically evidence on the effect of the enforcement action on the compliance of business regulation is presented.
Abstract: Deterrence will often fail because it falls into the 'deterrence trap' - penalties are either not large enough or so large they exceed the capacity to pay. Responsive regulation, by contrast, builds commitment to compliance through moral suasion backed up by tough enforcement action. Empirical evidence on the impact of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's cartel enforcement activity shows that in overcoming the deterrence trap, responsive regulators can fall into 'compliance trap.' The 'compliance trap' occurs where there is a lack of political and cultural support for the moral seriousness of the law it must enforce, such as is the case with much of the law relating to business regulation. The regulator can choose to nevertheless take enforcement action in a way that garners compliance by communicating the moral seriousness of breaches of the law. If they do so, however, their enforcement action will ultimately lack legitimacy in the eyes of business regulatees. Most regulators most of the time will end up taking the easy option of enforcing the law 'softly' or formalistically, and therefore ineffectively.

145 citations