Christopher Harding

Bio: Christopher Harding is an academic researcher from Aberystwyth University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cartel & Criminal law. The author has an hindex of 8, co-authored 35 publications receiving 276 citations.

Cartel Criminality: The Mythology and Pathology of Business Collusion

Abstract: Preface. Part I Theory and Method: Probing the Pathology and Mythology of Business Collusion: Orientation The phenomenon of cartelisation The normative basis of regulation and sanctions: pathology and mythology revisited. Part II Narratives and Analysis: Tales of Anti-Cartel Enforcement as Criminological Testing: Data and method: historical narrative and analysis Cartel biographies: six narratives of cartel prehistory, lifetime and after-life Measuring impact: conceptual and methodological problems Desistance, recalcitrance and cartelist after-life Tales of cultural diversity - how to deal with the dancing giants? Postscript

Game-playing and understanding decision-making within legal frameworks: the use of computerised simulation

Abstract: The use of hypothetical factual situations to explore and discuss the way in which ‘real-life’ events and problems occur and develop is an established and valuable predictive method for understanding such events and testing the resolution of problems. In so far as such simulation employs hypothetical events and itineraries of action as a way of arriving at conclusions and solutions, it may be described as a kind of game-playing, and the discussion in this paper first explores the value of simulation exercises in legal and other contexts. Then, taking the example of a simulation based upon a board game involving strategies and risks arising in the legal regulation of business cartels, it reports on the testing of a more powerful computerised version of the board game. Examining the outcome of a large number of moves around the game board, this served as a pilot study for considering the value of further development of such a computational model for possible application in research, educational, and training contexts.

A Pathology of Business Cartels: Original Sin or The Child of Regulation?

Abstract: Over the last 10 to 15 years there has been a significant movement towards criminalisation of involvement in business cartels in a number of jurisdictions around the world, outside of the US and Ca

European Criminal Law

Abstract: Since their creation, the European Union and the Council of Europe have worked to harmonise the justice systems of their member states. This project has been met with a series of challenges. European Criminal Law offers a compelling insight into the development and functions of European criminal law. It tracks the historical development of European criminal law, offering a detailed critical analysis of the criminal justice systems responsible for its implementation. While the rapid expansion and transnationalisation of criminal law is a necessary response to the growing numbers of free movement of persons and goods, it has serious implications for the rights of European citizens and needs to be balanced with rights protections. With its close analysis of secondary legislation and reliance on a wide variety of original sources, this book provides a thorough understanding of European Criminal Law and the institutions involved.

How Do Cartels Operate

Abstract: This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20 European Commission decisions over 2000-2004. It describes the properties of a collusive outcome in terms of the setting of price and a market allocation, monitoring of agreements with respect to price but more importantly sales, punishment methods for enforcing an agreement and also the use of buy-backs to compensate cartel members, methods for responding to external disruptions from non-cartel suppliers and handling over-zealous sales representatives, and operational procedures in terms of the frequency of meetings and the cartel’s organizational structure.

Cartel Overcharges: Survey and Meta-Analysis

Abstract: The article presents a unique regression analysis of social-science estimates of the size of cartel overcharges. More than 800 overcharge rates were collected from a variety of published sources that have appeared in the literature during the last 125 years. A meta-analysis of overcharges from 395 cartel episodes finds that duration, legal environment, and organizational characteristics of cartels explain the variation on overcharge rates to a greater extent than the type of publication or the method of overcharge analysis. In particular, overcharges are significantly higher for durable international cartels and are declining as antitrust enforcement regimes have stiffened. Historical case studies and government reports calculate lower overcharges, whereas antitrust authorities arrive at relatively high rates.

The Compliance Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory Enforcement

Abstract: Deterrence will often fail because it falls into the 'deterrence trap' - penalties are either not large enough or so large they exceed the capacity to pay. Responsive regulation, by contrast, builds commitment to compliance through moral suasion backed up by tough enforcement action. Empirical evidence on the impact of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's cartel enforcement activity shows that in overcoming the deterrence trap, responsive regulators can fall into 'compliance trap.' The 'compliance trap' occurs where there is a lack of political and cultural support for the moral seriousness of the law it must enforce, such as is the case with much of the law relating to business regulation. The regulator can choose to nevertheless take enforcement action in a way that garners compliance by communicating the moral seriousness of breaches of the law. If they do so, however, their enforcement action will ultimately lack legitimacy in the eyes of business regulatees. Most regulators most of the time will end up taking the easy option of enforcing the law 'softly' or formalistically, and therefore ineffectively.